U.S. AND EU DISCUSS TURKEY, CROATIA AT COELA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000918 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2018 TAGS: PREL EUN TU CR CY SUBJECT: U.S. AND EU DISCUSS TURKEY, CROATIA AT COELA TROIKA MEETING ON ENLARGEMENT Classified By: USEU POLMINCOUNS Laurence D. Wohlers, for reasons 1.4 (b ) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. EUR/SE Director Kathleen Fitzpatrick and USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurence Wohlers met with counterparts from the Slovenian Presidency, incoming French Presidency, Commission, and Council Secretariat to discuss EU candidate countries Turkey and Croatia at a regularly scheduled COELA troika meeting June 4, 2008. Fitzpatrick held side meetings with EU officials, member state representatives, and the Turkish Deputy Chief of Mission. On Turkey, topics of discussion included accession negotiations, domestic politics, PKK, Cyprus, NATO-EU relations, Turkey's geopolitical role, and public diplomacy efforts. On Croatia, EU officials described Croatia's solid progress in meeting accession benchmarks, but noted that the country will have to maintain a steady pace of still-needed reforms in order to be on track to conclude negotiations in late 2009. The talks also provided a glimpse into the upcoming French EU presidency's intended course of action on Turkey and Croatia. End Summary. Turkish Accession Negotiations -------------- ¶2. (C) Ms. Alenka Jerak, the Slovenian MFA's Deputy Head of the EU Department, opened the COELA meeting by stressing the Slovenian Presidency's commitment to the EU enlargement process. On Turkey, Jerak noted that only six accession chapters total had been opened and one provisionally closed thus far, with no new chapters yet opened under the Slovenian presidency. However, Jerak expressed hope that the presidency could open up two more chapters -- chapters six and seven on company law and intellectual property law -- at the EU accession conference June 17. (Note: the chapters were opened, as planned, June 17.) Jerak noted that Turkey had made concrete progress during the Slovenian presidency, amending Article 301 and adopting the law on foundations and the southeast development plan. On the flip side, Riccardo Serri of the Commission's Directorate General for Enlargement observed that Turkey's progress on reforms had slowed since ¶2005. He and several other EU interlocutors noted that the real test for Turkey would be how it implemented the amended Article 301. ¶3. (C) EUR/SE Director Fitzpatrick stressed the importance of continuing the process of EU accession negotiations with Turkey. She underscored that while the United States was not a member of the EU, it is clear that the United States and the EU share a broad strategic interest in having a democratic Turkey fully integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures, including the EU. The EU process itself gives shape, substance, and direction to Turkey's reform efforts and should continue. While Turkey is undergoing some political challenges, such as the closure case, it has weathered some difficult crises over the past year, and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was able to form a new government and elect a new President after receiving 47 per cent of the vote. Turkey has strengthened its democracy over the past several years; while this year efforts have slowed, Turkey did amend Article 301 (though not perfect, this was a positive development) and passed a new Foundations Law. The United States continued to press Turkey to re-open the Halki Seminary and recognize the Ecumenical Patriarch, in addition to expressing full support for EU-related reforms. Fitzpatrick urged a broad view of Turkey's progress and said that the EU accession process move forward. ¶4. (C) Separately, Commission and Council Secretariat contacts told EUR/SE Director Fitzpatrick they were concerned that preoccupation with domestic political issues had put the EU accession negotiation process on the back burner in the minds of Turkish decision makers, with all of their energy focused on domestic concerns. Additionally, contacts said that while Turkey had good, competent people dealing with EU matters, Foreign Minister Babacan was over-burdened with other responsibilities. They noted that it would be helpful for Babacan to appoint a deputy coordinator for EU negotiations. ¶5. (C/NF) Commission and UK Perm Rep contacts told Fitzpatrick in separate meetings that Cyprus was as obstructionist as ever in the EU's enlargement working group, with no improvement since the election of President Christofias. They surmised that this was due to the fact the BRUSSELS 00000918 002 OF 004 Cypriot MFA was a bastion of the DIKO party, which was taking a hard line on negotiations. The result was that a total of about 18 out of 35 Turkish accession chapters were effectively "blocked" by either Cyprus or France. Commission contacts said it would be useful for the USG to question Greek Cypriot interlocutors on why they continued to take such a tough line on Turkish accession negotiations in Brussels in light of the improved atmosphere on the island. AK Party Closure Case -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Serri said that the Commission was monitoring the AKP closure case as it pertained to EU standards for human rights and the rule of law. Separately and privately, other Commission contacts told Fitzpatrick the Commission was still "brainstorming" regarding how it would react to closure of the AKP. They noted that the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) case law and the Venice Commission were the principle references the EU would draw on in reacting to a closure. ¶7. (C/NF) UK Perm Rep contacts told Fitzpatrick they were in the process of gauging member states' views on the closure case to get a handle on how the EU might collectively respond in the event AKP is closed. While hopeful no member states would push for suspension of Turkish accession negotiations, UK contacts conveyed concern that some member states might push to "sanction" Turkey in some way. The ideal EU response to a closure of the party, in the UK's view, would stress that accession talks should continue, as these negotiations were between the EU and Turkey, not between the EU and a particular party. The Fight Against PKK -------------- ¶8. (C) Jerak said the EU had held its first troika with Turkey on terrorism, and that the EU recognized Turkey's difficult situation and right to defend itself against the PKK terrorist threat. In a separate meeting, Commission contacts noted that the apparent ability of the Turkish civilian government to control the military's actions had helped the EU to not "overreact" to Turkish military action in Iraq. Fitzpatrick said that the United States, the EU, Turkey and Iraq all agreed that the PKK is a terrorist organization. President Bush had decided to support Turkey's efforts against the PKK in Northern Iraq, and our efforts to encourage cooperation between Turkey and the Iraqi government and Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government - both essential to combating the PKK - were bearing fruit. The USG also encouraged Turkey to pursue a comprehensive approach including outreach to the Turkish Kurdish population in the southeast, by starting broadcasts in the Kurdish language and other educational efforts. Jerak noted concerns that Turkish attacks against the PKK could be destabilizing, and asked whether they had achieved any significant results. Fitzpatrick said that Turkish cross-border operations had been limited in scope and duration and had successfully focused on PKK targets, minimizing civilian casualties and damage. The operations had helped disrupt PKK networks and logistics. Fitzpatrick also encouraged EU members to take steps to end PKK financing and propaganda efforts in Europe. Cyprus -------------- ¶9. (C) On Cyprus, Fitzpatrick and Jerak agreed that the EU should support the positive momentum resulting from recent developments on the island, although the framework for negotiations should fall under the UN. Fitzpatrick underscored that we should not allow negative "static" that inevitably surrounds these discussions to diminish positive momentum, and that we should continue to support the efforts of Talat and Christofias to move toward full-fledged negotiations. She praised their March 21 and May 23 statements and the leadership the two have shown. Jerak added that under the Slovenian presidency the EU had managed to secure technical amendments to the green line regulations in order to increase trade between the two communities. All of Fitzpatrick's interlocutors in side meetings were hopeful for progress in Cyprus and agreed that the recent meeting between the two leaders on the island had been positive. Commission interlocutors, however, expressed concern that the BRUSSELS 00000918 003 OF 004 army and other "hard-liners" in Ankara remain quiet and said that any messages the USG could pass Ankara to that end would be helpful. Fitzpatrick assured them the USG was encouraging all sides to be flexible and urged EU members to do the same. Commission contacts added that Commissioner Rehn would likely visit the island if full-fledged negotiations were launched. They noted the Commissioner had previously traveled to Cyprus with an EU presidency representative, during the Luxembourg presidency. When questioned if the incoming French presidency might accompany Rehn, contacts said that was possible. NATO-EU Relations -------------- ¶10. (C/NF) Jerak emphasized that the EU not only welcomed, but needed Turkey's participation in its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) missions. Accordingly, she stressed that a mutually acceptable solution to the obstacles related to NATO-EU relations must be found. Fitzpatrick stressed the importance of resolving these issues so that essential planning could go forward in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and in any future NATO-EU operations. Separately, Commission contacts told Fitzpatrick that the Commission was "sitting on" the screening report for the Turkish accession chapter that dealt with NATO-EU relations -- chapter 31 -- because they were not getting encouraging signals from the Turks or Cypriots that they would show flexibility on this issue absent significant movement on the larger Cyprus problem. USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurence Wohlers told Commission interlocutors that Cypriot Perm Rep contacts had indicated to him that with Malta now in PfP, Cyprus felt more isolated. Wohlers suggested this might mean Cyprus would be more flexible. Commission contacts replied that if momentum on Cyprus negotiations increased, the French presidency might try to build on that momentum to improve NATO-EU relations. Turkey's Geopolitical Role -------------- ¶11. (C) In the COELA meeting, Fitzpatrick said that the strategic role Turkey played throughout the world was useful for the EU as well as the United States. She noted the United States maintained strong relations with Turkey on a wide range of issues, including Afghanistan, Iraq, the Middle East (noting Turkey's mediation effort between Syria and Israel),the Balkans, Caucasus, and energy security. The USG urged Turkey and Armenia to repair relations and open the border, and noted recent expressions by Turkish and Armenian leaders to this end. Jerak agreed with both points and highlighted the value to the EU of Turkey's leadership, including its mediation in talks between Israel and Syria, its presence in Lebanon, and its active role at the Annapolis Conference. Jerak added that Slovenia had played an advisory role with regard to Turkey and Armenia, based on Slovenia's experience with Italy, and noted the importance of easing tensions between Turkey and Armenia for reasons of regional stability as well as oil and gas resources. Fitzpatrick noted that Slovenia's efforts demonstrated the value of the EU's experience in reconciliation. Turkish and EU Public Opinion -------------- ¶12. (C) Wohlers asked the Commission what it was doing to improve Turkish public opinion toward the EU and vice versa. In response, Serri described the Commission's Civil Society Dialogue with Turkey, noting the Commission had spent approximately 20 million EUR in 2007 and would spend more in 2008, with a focus on cultural programs for Istanbul as the European Capital of Culture in 2010. Serri explained that the program was managed out of Commission DG Enlargement together with Turkish authorities, but said that Turkey had not done as much as it could with the program. What to Expect from the French Presidency -------------- ¶13. (C) French MFA Deputy Director for European Affairs Joel Meyer told Fitzpatrick that the incoming French presidency would work on the basis of the EU's December 2007 Council Conclusions on Turkey. He stressed that France hoped to open additional chapters during its presidency, but only chapters that were compatible with "both visions for Turkey" - that of accession and that of an alternative option, more in line BRUSSELS 00000918 004 OF 004 with President Sarkozy's personal views. Meyer said France agreed with the Slovenian presidency on the importance of resolving the Cyprus problem and that France would like to help both parties move toward resolution. He stressed that France was waiting for the UN and the communities themselves to move first, but that Paris stood ready to help and had begun making contacts with all of the parties involved. Again, Fitzpatrick stressed the importance for Turkey's reform process of continuing the accession process under the French Presidency, as Turkey's readiness for EU membership will evolve over time. Croatia's Accession Negotiations -------------- ¶14. (C) In contrast to Turkey, Presidency and Commission officials commented that Croatia has made significant progress in its EU accession negotiations. EC enlargement official Allan Jones explained that Croatia has opened 18 of 33 accession chapters, with two provisionally closed, adding that the numbers do not necessarily reflect the amount of work Croatia has done to meet the required benchmarks. He expressed hope that Croatia will open a few more chapters by the end of the year. French official Mathilde Grammont added that the incoming presidency would do its best to help Croatia make progress on opening and closing chapters. The EU will continue to encourage Croatia to be a positive model for its neighbors in the Balkans, according to the European officials. In response to Wohlers' question about the timing of Croatia's accession, Presidency and Commission officials noted President Barroso's view that, pending continued efforts by Croatia, negotiations could technically be closed by the end of 2009. Accession would take at least an additional year. Jones admitted that the schedule is "extremely tight" for both sides. ¶15. (C) Despite Croatia's good progress, shortcomings remain in key areas including judicial reform, public administration, corruption, minority rights, refugee returns, war crimes, cooperation with the ICTY, property restitution and regional cooperation. Jones explained that in order to move forward, Croatia will need to provide not only plans, but also evidence of implementation of measures to demonstrate commitment before new chapters can be opened. Three specific chapters that will prove difficult for Croatia relate to public procurement, competition policy (state aid to shipbuilding) and political reform. Jones also noted the need for Croatia to focus on meeting economic criteria including improvements in the general business environment and greater accountability for the 140 million Euros Croatia receives each year in pre-accession funding. ¶16. (C) Wohlers emphasized U.S. support for Croatia's EU accession and agreed with the EU's assessment that Croatia is an important success story and model for the region. He also noted Croatia's progress on NATO membership and U.S. expectations for accession in 2009. He mentioned ICTY concerns about Croatian cooperation on war crimes, and asked for the EU's assessment on the Ademi-Norac trial. Jones allowed that there were "hiccups" at the beginning of the case, including technical difficulties protecting witness identities, but said that the trial ran fairly well after that. He added, however, that the Croatians had a big incentive to run the case well, as this was the only case transferred from ICTY, and they would be under international scrutiny. He added that the EC will be watching Croatia's cooperation on local cases where there will less international attention and less pressure. These less publicized cases will provide the real test for how Croatia deals with witness protection, informants and the confidentiality of proceedings. ¶17. (U) This cable has been cleared by EUR/SE Director Kathleen Fitzpatrick. MURRAY .