U.S.-EU NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRUSSELS 000729 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR ISN, EUR/ERA, GENEVA FOR CD AMB ROCCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2018 TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL EUN PTER KN IR IN CH SUBJECT: U.S.-EU NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT CONSULTATIONS REF: USEU BRUSSELS 716 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Larry Wohlers for reasons 1 .4 (b) and (d) 1.(C) Summary: Acting Assistant Secretary Patricia McNerney led the U.S. delegation to the semi-annual U.S.-EU Troika consultations on Disarmament and Nonproliferation (CODUN/CONOP). The two sides had a thorough exchange of views on a wide range of disarmament and nonproliferation issues -- e.g., Iran, the DPRK, FMCT, small arms/light weapons, NPT -- engaging in a more substantive dialogue than often occurs at these meetings. The EU side described the substantial work it was doing on biological safety and security and on export control cooperation and announced that when Malta subscribed to the principles of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism all EU members would have done so. The EU pressed hard to be included as an institution in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), but McNerney stressed the U.S.'s concerns about opening up an action-oriented initiative to bureaucratization. The two sides agreed to continue consultations on the EU's draft Code of Conduct for Space Objects, which could provide a useful counter to the Russian draft treaty on weaponization of outer space if the CD began discussions of outer space. End summary Iran ¶2. (SBU) Annalisa Giannella of the EU Council Secretariat described EU actions in this area. The EU was proceeding on a dual track approach, she said, offering cooperation, including in the nuclear field, while exercising pressure to convince Iran to return to the negotiating table. The passage of UNSCR 1803 showed the wide consensus in the international community on how to deal with Iran. Giannella said the EU was now working on its implementation of the resolution and also mandating High Representative Solana to continue his contacts with Iran. ¶3. (C) In response to questions from McNerney, Giannella said the EU did not take seriously a recent Iranian statement that there was no bilateral track. She noted that the Iranians made many statements on both sides of the question, although she conceded that they would certainly prefer to negotiate with the IAEA, where they think they can avoid negotiations on current issues. Giannella also commented that Jallili was a theologian, rather than a negotiator, as Larijani had been. The EU found it impossible to have a dialogue with him, but instead had to listen to hours-long lectures. In response to a question on sanctions, she said discussions on additional sanctions were difficult within the EU, as some countries did not want to go beyond 1803. ¶4. (C) McNerney and Giannella had similar views of Iran's claims that it had installed 6,000 new centrifuges. They did not think the Iranians had so many new ones, nor that installation of the centrifuges was very advanced. According to Giannella, the Iranian leadership was rather trying to create a fait accompli in the negotiations and show their own public that they were advancing their program. Giannella, McNerney and Camille Grand, from the French MFA, agreed that public diplomacy should be improved to get through to the Iranian people exactly what the Iranian government was doing to develop a potential nuclear weapons capability. Giannella thought this might be considered by political directors. DPRK ¶5. (SBU) McNerney led off by describing where things stood regarding the disablement of North Korean nuclear facilities. She also noted that we were pressing the North Koreans for a correct and complete declaration on their nuclear activities and reported that we hoped to have something resolved on a declaration, at least on plutonium, at a new Six-Party meeting soon. The process was a slow one, moving in baby steps. The next phase would likely include removal of spent fuel, dismantlement of the DPRK's reactor, and verification activities related to plutonium. ¶6. (SBU) A discussion of the IAEA's role followed, in which McNerney said that it was a tricky issue because of the North Korean negative attitude. Yet from the U.S. perspective, it was very clear that the IAEA should be involved from the beginning, especially since the aim of the exercise was to BRUSSELS 00000729 002 OF 006 have the DPRK return to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards as a non-nuclear weapons state. Giannella pointed out that the EU had agreed on a Joint Action to provide financial resources for IAEA monitoring. Grand said he attached great importance to giving the IAEA a role in verification of the DPRK's compliance. ¶7. (C) In response to a question from Grand, McNerney said that the issue of North Korean missiles remained alive in the question of the larger regional peace structure, if not in the immediate goals of the Six-Party framework itself. U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative ¶8. (SBU) Stanislav Vidovic, Head of the Security Policy Division at the MFA in Ljubljana and Chair of the consultations, began discussion of this item by noting that the EU was giving positive consideration to the initiative but was waiting to see the elements of the deal. McNerney replied that there was not a lot to update. The Indian government was still consulting with its coalition partners in New Delhi and was not prepared to circulate the draft safeguards agreement with the IAEA. McNerney stressed that while approval by the U.S. Congress was still possible, time was running out. If the Indians moved forward in mid-May, the U.S. would try to secure rapid NSG approval, but if time did not permit, it would be up to a new Administration to carry the issue forward. Nonproliferation Treaty Review Process ¶9. (SBU) In the brief discussion of the NPT review process and especially the upcoming Preparatory Committee, McNerney highlighted U.S. priorities for the PrepCom and raised several procedural issues. She urged EU support for the U.S. position that the 2009 PrepCom take place in New York and hoped the EU would help move the 2008 Chair away from seeking a consensus document, which was almost certainly not achievable. The U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament (CD),Christina Rocca, recalled that the U.S. delegation had worked closely with the EU at the 2007 PrepCom and hoped the practice could be repeated. ¶10. (SBU) Grand replied that the EU would support holding the next PrepCom in New York, and Rosine Couchoud, of the Disarmament and Nonproliferation Directorate at the French MFA, agreed that there was no point in trying to get consensus on a text. It was preferable, she said, to engage in substantive discussions, rather than focusing on a text. She commented that the EU would circulate two papers at the PrepCom - one on civil nuclear energy (from the 2007 PrepCom) and one on nuclear weapon free zones and negative security assurances. Grand suggested exchanging texts on withdrawal before the meeting to ensure that the U.S. and the EU were on the same wavelength. Multilateral Fuel Assurances ¶11. (U) McNerney began by pointing out that the U.S. considers that all the proposals on the table help deal with the larger issue of getting states to forgo enrichment and reprocessing and to rely on the market for such services. Rather than looking for a perfect solution, the U.S. believes it is better to have many ideas blossom with the IAEA playing a central role in each. Giannella replied that the EU has much the same approach. It has developed criteria to assess the various proposals but has not selected among them. ¶12. (SBU) In discussing the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) proposal for a nuclear fuel bank, to which the U.S. has committed USD 50 million, Giannella said that the EU needed more details, e.g., who would decide on distributions from the fuel bank, before committing any funds. She noted that the IAEA was delaying the elaboration of such details until contributions were made and urged the U.S. to press the Agency to work out more details. Conference on Disarmament (CD)/Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) ¶13. (C) Grand led off by asking whether there was any chance of moving Pakistan, Iran, and China, the three CD members that have opposed the six CD presidents' work program, to support it. Rocca replied that the situation seemed the same as last year. She pointed out that China's articulated needs had been met by the Six Presidents' draft work program (CD BRUSSELS 00000729 003 OF 006 1840),putting China in an ambiguous position. The Chinese want to protect Pakistan and therefore find it difficult to take yes for an answer. According to Rocca, it was vital to get CD members to press the new Pakistani government, and not just in Geneva, but at the political level in Islamabad. Giannella supported this assessment by noting that the Pakistani CD ambassador had told her that the EU never made a demarche in Pakistan on this issue. She noted that HR Solana was going to Islamabad; she would urge him to raise the issue there and get back to the U.S. on the results. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism ¶14. (U) Vidovic said that the EU supported this initiative and reported that now only Malta among EU members had not adhered to the GI principles. If Malta did so, the EU Council would issue a formal statement of support. McNerney described the upcoming meetings and noted that 68 states had now subscribed to the GI principles. Spain was working to get Latin American states to join, and she had been urging the Gulf states to do so and was hoping to get Saudi Arabia's adherence. McNerney also noted that as countries moved toward developing nuclear energy, the GI was a complementary effort, which addressed potential vulnerabilities for misuse of nuclear energy. Civil Nuclear Cooperation ¶15. (U) McNerney briefed the EU on recent U.S. actions to build a foundation for nuclear cooperation with developing countries. The U.S. had signed an MOU with Bahrain (MOU's, she noted, are steps preliminary to negotiating formal "123" agreements on nuclear cooperation),would do so with the UAE soon, and already had signed a 123 agreement with Jordan. Each of these agreements contained provisions in which the governments indicated their intent to rely on the markets for fuel supplies rather than pursuing enrichment and reprocessing. The U.S. was also promoting the "attractive offer," which Presidents Bush and Putin had launched in 2007, and Amb. Jackie Wolcott had recently been appointed to explain its merits. ¶16. (U) Bruno Dupre, from the European Commission, explained that the EC was working to develop a culture of nonproliferation, safety, and security for countries outside the EU, as well as within the Union, as they bring nuclear power on line. Couchoud said that France was doing likewise as it developed nuclear cooperation with countries in the Middle East. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) ¶17. (C) Opening the discussion of the PSI, McNerney outlined the achievements during its almost five years of existence, which would be recognized at a U.S.-hosted meeting in May. She stressed its record of cooperation in interdicting WMD-related shipments, which had broadened interdiction opportunities, but noted the constraints under which it operates, e.g., the inability to board ships on the high seas. Following McNerney's briefing, the discussion quickly turned to the long-standing issue of participation by EU institutions as such in PSI meetings. In this regard, Giannella repeated the argument that EU competencies made it appropriate for the Union to participate. In response to a question from McNerney, Giannella said a paper promised by the EU to lay out its arguments was not ready; if it would help, the EU would accelerate its preparation. (Note: Text contained in reftel subsequently was presented to the USG). McNerney stressed that a paper would be useful, but made clear that the U.S. fears that admitting bodies such as the EU would unnecessarily bureaucratize the PSI and suggested that if it was to be persuasive, the EU deal with that concern in its paper. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 ¶18. (U) Vidovic said the EU supported UNSCR 1540 implementation, raised the issue in bilateral demarches, conducted workshops on implementation, and is now adopting a Joint Action to help improve third countries' capacities. He also said that the EU supported extension of the 1540 Committee's mandate and thanked the U.S. -- in particular its 1540 coordinator -- for its strong support of the resolution. ¶19. (SBU) McNerney agreed that that the U.S. coordinator (Tom Wuchte, ISN/CPI) deserved a lot of credit and suggested that BRUSSELS 00000729 004 OF 006 it would be useful for the EU to name a single point of contact as well. (Note: The EU side appeared to have conflicting understandings of whether or not they were in the process of choosing a coordinator.) She also described the efforts being undertaken to extend the Committee's mandate and noted that the U.S. was pressing Russia, South Africa, and Indonesia to agree. Dupre noted that the EU's "stability instrument" would provide assistance to states to implement ¶1540. ¶20. (SBU) According to Giannella the NAM countries had two problems with extension of the Committee. Many of them did not understand the relevance of nonproliferation for them; seminars were useful in the regard. A few key players saw the resolution as an imposition by the P-5 on other states. McNerney agreed that we had to be careful in using the Security Council to impose international law and should make it clear that it was up to individual sovereign states to implement 1540. Grand commented that we have to make it clear that 1540 was a unanimous decision of the Security Council and that it was in the interest of all states. Export Control Outreach ¶21. (U) The official responsible for export control outreach at the European Commission, Nicholas Organ, described Commission activities in the area. The EU has engaged in cooperative activities with ten countries (China, Ukraine, UAE, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, FYROM) and has agreed to extend assistance to another five (Turkey, Tunisia, Georgia, Moldova, and Malaysia). Activities can cover all or some of the following fields: legal, licensing, customs outreach, industry outreach, and assistance to enforcement agencies. Only the UAE is considered a major transshipment hub. Organ also noted that the program with China began in early 2006 and has focused on customs and industry outreach. The EU has conducted three seminars in China and an additional one on industry awareness will take place this June. He also noted that a series of study visits focusing on enforcement techniques is scheduled for autumn 2008. The Commission has assessed that the Chinese have been open and constructive towards the program and have deployed some of the techniques and lessons learned. ¶22. (SBU) McNerney noted that U.S. efforts in this area have focused on transshipment and highlighted the U.S. dialogue with the UAE. She noted, however, that countries neighboring the UAE do not have strict laws in this area and warned that the loophole potential was great. As far as China was concerned, she complimented the EU on the work done with China. Some of the problem with China was that it reads sanctions resolutions more narrowly than others do, but China also has problems with enforcement. She noted that the U.S. has engaged in direct talks with Chinese companies, which have been useful, since these companies wanted to trade with the U.S. and be seen as meeting high global standards. She concluded that a lot of work remained to be done with China. Space ¶23. (SBU) Irina Gorsic, Security Policy Division, Slovenian MFA, thanked the U.S. for its comments on the draft EU "Code of Conduct for Space Objects." The intra-EU group she headed on the subject was close to agreement on a new draft, which it would provide the U.S. The EU still had to decide whether to present the text at the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) or the CD and would consult with the U.S. first. As far as the Russian draft treaty prohibiting the placement of weapons in space was concerned, the EU statement to the CD on February 28, 2008 had made it clear that the treaty could be discussed once a CD program of work had been agreed. ¶24. (C) Rocca expressed appreciation for the close cooperation between the EU and the U.S. and said the U.S. experts would respond quickly to any new EU draft. She also stressed that outer space could only be discussed in the CD after approval of the currently proposed program of work. This condition was a major consideration in determining China's policy on the draft CD program of work. She also informed the EU that the U.S. was again trying to agree with Russia on a draft UN First Committee resolution on outer space CBMs, although the sticking point remained that the Russians tied it to their proposed non-weaponization of space treaty. Returning to the EU's code of conduct, Rocca agreed BRUSSELS 00000729 005 OF 006 with Grand that it would be useful in any discussions in the CD to have another proposal on the table in addition to the Russia idea. Chemical Weapons Convention ¶25. (SBU) The discussion on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) largely concerned the CWC Review Conference, which was then under way in the Hague. Gorsic and Grand both said that after the issue of destruction was taken care of, the proliferation of CW was the next major issue on the CWC agenda. Grand said now was not the time to deal with it, but we should be laying the groundwork for consideration of the issue in the next 5-10 years. After assuring the EU that the U.S. commitment to CW destruction was not in question, McNerney agreed that nonproliferation, including the question of how to find cheaters, will be the next big issue. Biological Weapons Convention ¶26. (U) Giannella and a representative from the Commission described the range of actions the EU was taking in this field. Giannella said the EU was considering what topics it should discuss in papers submitted for the BWC experts' meeting in August. She also discussed the EU's Joint Action on biological issues, under which the Union had held five regional seminars to promote universalization of the BWC and had carried out assistance visits in Peru and Nigeria. The EU also had approved a new Joint Action this year in support of the WHO, which will support regional workshops and assistance to one model country to help it update bio-preparedness. The Commission representative noted that it was supporting regional training centers on biosafety and security and had developed a global health security initiative, where it was supporting counter-measures and risk and threat assessments. ¶27. (SBU) McNerney complimented the EU on the amount of work it was doing in this area, which she called "terrific." The U.S., she said, was taking a regional approach, focusing on terrorism. The U.S. was emphasizing Pakistan but also looking at Indonesia and the Philippines. She noted that we were trying to get some G8 consideration of the issue, one which could have a big impact on individuals, but the G8 tended to emphasize nuclear concerns. Giannella and Grand agreed that biological concerns were appropriate for G8 consideration, while noting that Russia had rejected the thought that there was a problem in Russia. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)/Cluster Munitions ¶28. (SBU) Gorsic recalled the EU's joint statement on cluster munitions, which called for the negotiation of a legally binding instrument by the end of 2008. She could not predict whether the EU would have a common position by the time of the Dublin meeting of the "Oslo process" in May. Grand noted that Dublin might not be the final negotiating session of the Oslo process. He also commented that it was important to France that the CCW demonstrated that it could work and thought U.S. engagement in CCW on this issue was helpful. McNerney commented that the CCW could work only if states like China and Russia, which may be willing to see the U.S. have problems, went along. Small Arms/Light Weapons ¶29. (SBU) Gorsic emphasized the importance of the third Biennial Meeting of States on the UN Program of Action on SA/LW (BMS 3) and hoped the U.S. would decide to attend. McNerney replied that the U.S. preferred to focus on practical actions, rather than a lot of meetings, although it would attend the part of the session devoted to reviewing implementation of the International Marking and Tracing Instrument (ITI). She said the U.S. was also concerned that such meetings encroached on the U.S.'s internal policies. Giannella said the EU agreed with the need to pay particular attention to collection and destruction of excess weapons, but considered that the international community needed to deal with illicit trafficking, or destroyed weapons would merely be replaced. Grand agreed with McNerney about the limited value of many multilateral meetings and assured her that it was not EU policy to bash the U.S. (or at least, he said jokingly, not all the time). He thought it was important to focus on the agenda of BMS's to ensure that they were more focused. BRUSSELS 00000729 006 OF 006 Any Other Business: CTBT, Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) ¶30. (C) The EU had requested these items be considered briefly under Any Other Business, and both sides repeated well known positions. McNerney made clear the U.S. believed the CTBT Prepcom had acted weakly in the face of the North Korean nuclear test and did not see how adding adherence to the CTBT as a condition in prospective deals with the DPRK or India would help prevent violations of those agreements. ¶31. (SBU) On HCOC McNerney reiterated that the U.S. had committed to providing pre-launch notifications using the system we planned to use in our bilateral agreement with Russia. Until that was finalized, we would not go to the considerable expense of developing a duplicate arrangement. MURRAY .