Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRUSSELS467
2008-03-28 16:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

BELGIUM ARTICULATES ITS POSITIONS GOING INTO

Tags:  PREL NATO MARR KFE RS GG MD BE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBS #0467/01 0881631
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281631Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7207
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU IMMEDIATE 0055
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV IMMEDIATE 0014
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1526
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 0253
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 8239
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 000467 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR KFE RS GG MD BE
SUBJECT: BELGIUM ARTICULATES ITS POSITIONS GOING INTO
BUCHAREST

REF: BRUSSELS 450

Classified By: Political Counselor Lynn Gurian, reasons 1.4 b/d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 000467

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR KFE RS GG MD BE
SUBJECT: BELGIUM ARTICULATES ITS POSITIONS GOING INTO
BUCHAREST

REF: BRUSSELS 450

Classified By: Political Counselor Lynn Gurian, reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a tour d'horizon on issues to be
discussed at the Bucharest summit, Belgium's Political
Director for Multilateral Affairs told PolCouns on March 27
that: (1) CFE must survive; Belgium (GOB) welcomed Acting
U/S Fried's continued openness in dealing with Russia on its
concerns. Fried's constructive approach minimizes the
potential for the U.S. being blamed in the event of failure;
(2) enlargement is a "done deal," unavoidable politically and
needed to stabilize the Balkans; however, the NATO
requirements will challenge Albania and Macedonia. NATO must
go forward in discussions with Montenegro and Bosnia, though
discussions with Serbia would be premature, something to be
welcomed but not forced. Belgium does not believe the
Alliance should respond to every development in Europe with a
plan to enlarge. (3) MAP - Belgium would not oppose progress
on Ukraine and is ready to discuss it in Bucharest; Georgia
is a more difficult case given the nation's more "shallow"
public support. (4) Afghanistan ) Belgium is committed to
action there, but Belgium's parliament is pressing for an
exit strategy; Belgium will raise this issue in Bucharest.
(5) Kosovo remains politically fragile; it is important for
KFOR, the EU, and UN to work in active and close coordination
there. END SUMMARY.


THE RUSSIA FACTOR
--------------


2. (C) Political Director for Multilateral Affairs
Jean-Arthur Regibeau began the discussion with CFE, stating
&it is the cornerstone of peace and stability in Europe. It
would be very negative if CFE disappeared." He voiced
repeated admiration for the diplomacy and stamina that Acting
U/S Fried has shown in dealing with the Russians, saying
Belgium "warmly welcomes" Fried's constructive and open
approach. Regibeau noted the Russians are tough negotiators,
although on some issues they have some (unspecified)
"legitimate points." Regibeau confirmed Belgium agreed with

the U.S.-German CFE text of March 25, 2008, and would support
it (reftel) unless substantially changed by other nations.
Regibeau mused about Putin's plan to be in Bucharest, saying
it is good Putin is planning to be there, but will he
challenge NATO? Regibeau revealed Russian diplomats were
scheduled to call on him on March 28. Regibeau will be part
of Belgium's delegation to Bucharest.

ENLARGEMENT AND MAP
--------------


3. (C) Belgium accepts NATO enlargement as a "done deal,"
Regibeau continued, noting it is "unavoidable" at the
political level in the countries of the incoming tranche and
should help to stabilize the Balkans. He referred to
challenges facing Macedonia and Albania to implement
integration. Belgium believes NATO must increase its
dialogue with Montenegro and Bosnia. With regard to Serbia,
he thinks their joining NATO would be premature. Belgium
would welcome Serbia in the alliance once the political
situation there is stabilized, but Regibeau does not believe
in forcing the issue there.


4. (C) With regard to MAP, Belgium makes a distinction
between the applications of Ukraine and Georgia, but does not
exclude a rapprochement between them in Bucharest. Belgium
believes Ukraine is on the right path in terms of gaining an
"internal balance" and in "reacting responsibly" to Russia by
avoiding provocations. Domestically, public support for
Ukrainian pre-admission is "not fully ripe," Regibeau judged.
Belgium believes NATO
should take care not to be seen as a divisive factor within
Ukraine's domestic debate. The recent agreement between the
government and opposition to support MAP is a good sign.
Belgium would not oppose movement on Ukraine's application;
however, the preferred GOB position would be a compromise
showing that NATO welcomes Ukrainian membership but, given
the "shallow" public support, not come across as heavy
handed. Belgium is ready to listen to the arguments of NATO
colleagues on this matter, Regibeau concluded.


5. (C) Georgia, Regibeau stated, is a more difficult case.
Politically there are doubts about the validity of recent
elections. The government has also been aggressive with

regard to Russia, answering provocation with the same level
of response, i.e., "falling right into Russia's trap."
Belgium shares with other allies the concern that such
upping-the-ante of aggressive behavior not lead to a
situation where, as a member, Georgia would be able to invoke
Article 5 protection. Georgia's recent commitment to solve
the &frozen conflicts8 by peaceful dialogue likewise seems
to have "shallow" domestic support. Referring to the lesson
of Cyprus membership in the European Union as a comparison,
Regibeau said it was a "mistake" to have let the island join
before its internal political status was resolved. Belgium
does not want to shut the door to Georgia at Bucharest and
would like the nation to join through MAP provided the
required steps are met. NATO needs to be creative, he added,
in dealing with the issues of Georgia.

MISSILE DEFENSE
--------------


6. (C) On missile defense, Regibeau cautioned that Belgium
should be very careful and "stick with" its European
partners. The GOB will not block missile deployment, but he
believes it is too early to decide on the matter; the GOB
remains open to a common alliance agreement, but Regibeau
advised caution here. Regibeau queried rhetorically, what
is the real nature of the Iranian threat and is MD the best
way to address it? Belgium shares the views of southeastern
Europe that the shield should cover all of Europe or it will
divide the NATO security zone. The issue is where a
diplomatic approach should be tried before a military route.
A political agreement with Russia should be sought. That
solution would be easier to sell in Europe, he concluded.

ISAF
--------------


7. (C) Regibeau reiterated Belgium's recently announced
increased contributions to ISAF, including four F-16's, more
troops and deployment to Kandahar, as an example where the
new Belgian government is committed to greater
involvement in a priority arena. However, he pointedly added
that Belgium is in Afghanistan temporarily (though for an
unspecified time at this point) and the Belgian Parliament
will press for an exit strategy. Belgium will make this
point in Bucharesst.

KOSOVO
--------------


8. (C) Regibeau characterized Kosovo as &sensitive8 and
the political situation there as &fragile.8 KFOR must
continue to play an active role as a link with the UN and the
EU. He believes KFOR must intervene in the north of Kosovo
or wherever needed. Regibeau repeated the need for close
coordination of KFOR, the EU and UN to keep the Serbs,
through the Russians, from causing additional problems on the
UN Security Council and to give Kosovo the stability and
security it requires for its development.

BELGIUM IN THE ALLIANCE
--------------


9. (C) In general, Regibeau observed, Belgium questions
whether enlargement is "always the best answer" to problems
that arise for the Alliance. Belgium sees the Netherlands
and Germany as its most like-minded allies in NATO, based on
the three countries' common histories of the past century.
Its policy of rapprochement with its closest geographic and
socio/historic neighbors enable the Belgian government to
leverage support for NATO policies from the Belgian
parliament. The GOB formulates its policies in terms of what
will be acceptable to parliament and the public. Parliament
actively holds the foreign ministry accountable, particularly
on political-military issues (e.g., recently announced
increase in Belgian contributions to ISAF) which pacifist
lawmakers closely monitor. Thus Belgium's sensitivity to
prefer diplomacy to military action. The GOB would also like
to see NATO try more peaceful diplomacy first. The best way
to revitalize the Alliance is to let Europe have a sense of
ownership, Regibeau mused; however the Europeans are divided.
It will be important, he added, particularly vis-a-vis
Russia, to show the Alliance stands together.


10. (C) Comment: Regibeau's perspective of Belgium's place
and approach within NATO prior to Bucharest explained the
GOB's views not only on the issues at hand but also on its

current broader orientation to the Alliance. Noteworthy is
the government's sensitivity to parliamentary and public
reaction. Regibeau does not expect major changes in foreign
policy with the new Leterme government and MFA officials have
been positive about NATO issues. However, Belgium will
examine each issue seriously and wants to proceed with
caution as well as strong Alliance consensus. FOX .











.