U.S. COORDINATOR FOR COUNTER-NARCOTICS AND RULE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000382 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR INL/FO, EUR, INL/AP, INL/PC, EUR/ERA; JUSTICE FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; HOMELAND SECURITY FOR OFFICE OF POLICY, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; USNATO FOR DEFENSE OPERATIONS DIVISION, OFFICE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016 TAGS: KCRM PGOV PREL SNAR EU SUBJECT: U.S. COORDINATOR FOR COUNTER-NARCOTICS AND RULE OF LAW IN AFGHANISTAN UPDATES SACEUR ON DRUG SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN Classified By: INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS (INL) COUNSELOR JAMES P. MCANULTY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) U.S. Coordinator for Counter-Narcotics and Rule of Law in Afghanistan, Ambassador Thomas A. Schweich, briefed Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR),General Bantz J. Craddock March 6 on the drug situation in Afghanistan. Schweich noted increased correlation between insecurity and poppy cultivation, with provinces under greater government control, including the poorest ones, making the most strides in eliminating opium cultivation. SACEUR said allied military support of counter-drug efforts "incidental to military operations" had nearly reached the limits of current authorizations; he was considering seeking additional authorities to permit stand-alone interdiction operations, saying North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members may well be on board for such a change, although moving to direct support for eradication remained a bridge too far. They agreed that, while some progress has occurred on the counter-drug front in various provinces, lack of political will in Afghanistan remained the largest single hurdle. END SUMMARY. -------------- POOREST PROVINCES POPPY-FREE -------------- ¶2. (C) At the suggestion of UK counterparts, Ambassador Schweich, accompanied by Office Director for Afghanistan and Pakistan Programs in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL),Mission INL Counselor, and INL Special Assistant, briefed SACEUR General Craddock March 6 on the status of opium cultivation, counter-drug initiatives, and the relationship of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to counter-drug missions in Afghanistan. Defense Counselor Paul Flaherty of the UK Delegation to NATO also attended this meeting along with SACEUR Military Advisor U.S. Colonel Patrick Warren and UK Lieutenant Colonel Derek Hudson. Noting that UK colleagues had suggested that he brief him on the latest drug situation at this critical juncture in the Afghan growing season, Schweich observed that the cultivation landscape had changed since his previous briefing to SACEUR in early 2007. With continued progress in Nangarhar and Badakshan in the east, the poorest provinces now remained totally free of poppy cultivation. Additionally, information uncovered during a recent major raid of facilities linked to drug trafficker Haji Bajcho contained lists of customers and suppliers, including names of Taliban commanders, thereby demonstrating explicit links between the Taliban and drug traffickers. -------------- LACK OF POLITICAL WILL IS BIGGEST OBSTACLE -------------- ¶3. (C) Poppy cultivation continued to soar in Helmand province, where wealthy landowners had converted farm lands with access to irrigation and roads provided by the international community to drug production. Eighty percent of opium cultivation now involved fields that farmers had switched from wheat or cotton production during the past few years. This phenomenon reflected the lack of law enforcement presence in the province. Myths persisted regarding drug production in Afghanistan, and such myths perpetuated bad policy. Drug production in Helmand mostly involved flat, large fields owned by wealthy landowners near urban areas, rather than poor farmers in remote mountainous regions. SACEUR inquired about the role of poor sharecroppers. Schweich acknowledged that some sharecroppers lacked advance BRUSSELS 00000382 002 OF 004 credit to produce legitimate crops on their own fields and resorted to working for meager wages on lands owned by the wealthy; nonetheless, with irrigation providing the opportunity to "multi-crop" and with easy and relatively secure access to markets in the provincial center, it would be hard to argue that sharecroppers in the poppy-rich central districts of Helmand did not have legitimate alternatives. SACEUR remarked that the flat lands would be "ideal" candidates for aerial spraying, as had occurred successfully in Colombia. Schweich noted that the USG had removed aerial spraying as an option for eradication to promote allied unity. Yet, Afghan leaders continued to allege disunity among allies as an excuse for not doing more against drugs. Lack of political will during the current election campaign remained the leading obstacle. Politicians did not want to crack down on drug traffickers, particularly among Pashtun tribes, until after the elections, for fear of driving away potential supporters. . -------------- -------------- NEARING LIMITS OF AUTHORITIES ON ANTI-DRUG SUPPORT -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) INL/AP Office Director Williams noted the importance of integrating counter-narcotics efforts with other tasks. He cited, for example, Task Force Bayonet in Nangarhar, where military commanders vetted aid projects to ensure that they did not inadvertently assist those who supported drug cultivation and the insurgents. Similarly, a task force in Helmand has begun to promote civil-military coordination there. The UK has implemented outer perimeter security, which SACEUR said was appropriate -- if done "incidental to any military operation." The UK helped build a base for the central Poppy Eradication Force and conducted medical evacuations of wounded counter-drug personnel, even in one instance during an ongoing fire fight. Williams expressed hope that the Afghan Government would provide promised force protection. Failing that, he expressed hope that the UK would step forward to do so. Both he and Schweich praised the publication of ISAF Standard Operating Procedure 503, which provided clear guidelines on indirect military support of counter-drug missions. SACEUR noted that he was "nearing the limit" of his authorities in providing such support "incidentally to military operations." He acknowledged that national forces that did not want to provide this indirect support would continue failing to do so. SACEUR remarked that he would consider seeking "additional" authorities to permit direct action against drug labs and other interdiction targets -- removing the current burdensome requirement that such operations be consequent to ongoing / pre-planned counter-insurgency operations. Th UK representative noted that UK forces had destroyed a drug laboratory incidental to military operations and discovered sensitive equipment there, including protective vests. He remarked on the importance of follow-up investigations, such as identifying buyers and suppliers of precursor chemicals, rather than merely "torching" the labs. -------------- ENHANCING SECURITY IS KEY -------------- ¶5. (C) Schweich noted progress on interdiction, including prosecutions against 400 Afghan drug traffickers and the continuing enhancement of the Afghan Government's ability to prosecute high-value targets and complex networks. To date, Afghanistan has extradited one kingpin to the U.S. and surrendered another three persons who left voluntarily in lieu of extradition. SACEUR lamented recent shrill editorials about Afghanistan sliding downhill into a "narco-state." He did not agree with this pessimistic scenario. Schweich agreed with SACEUR, cautioning however that some parts of the country remained vulnerable to sliding into "narco-state" status. SACEUR said the key in the south BRUSSELS 00000382 003 OF 004 would be improving security. The U.S. planned to send a battalion into the south shortly to replace one that would transfer to the east. -------------- PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGN -------------- ¶6. (C) Schweich said the greatest deterrent to drug cultivation involved convincing Afghan farmers that drug cultivation violated the tenets of Islam. Through the holding of 113 "shuras" in 17 provinces, the international community has enlisted the help of local clerics to spread this message. The ISAF public information campaign has also boosted this message lately, in contrast to an incident the previous year in which some military units had distributed leaflets noting that the military did not do eradication. Schweich also briefed SACEUR on the positive impact of the Good Performers Initiative. Under this joint US-UK initiative, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commanders worked closely with provincial governors in implementing the program under clearly enunciated guidelines. The Afghan Government has set a goal of eradicating 50,000 hectares. Although this objective seemed overly ambitious, Schweich averred, falling short of this goal would generate greater pressure and political will for the future. He noted that counter-drug personnel could only conduct manual eradication where they enjoyed adequate force protection. Without such protection, however, eradication units were sometimes diverted away from powerful narco-farmers' fields to those of the poorest and least powerful. To serve as an effective deterrent to planting drug crops, they needed to "interject an element of risk" by destroying the fields of wealthy landowners and deputy police chiefs, for example. According to UNODC officials, the quantity of eradication has been too low and the quality too poor (i.e., not going after the right targets) to serve as deterrents to planting illicit crops. -------------- IMPORTANCE OF ALLIED UNITY -------------- ¶7. (C) Schweich also noted increased funding for interdiction and prosecution of high-value drug traffickers. Only a fraction of U.S. funds will go towards short-term eradication projects. He reiterated the importance of allied unity in putting greater pressure on the Afghan Government to demonstrate political will towards counter-drug efforts. Otherwise, Afghan officials would continue to exploit perceived disunity among allies. SACEUR noted alleged interest by Iranian leaders in going after drug production, which has caused serious abuse and addiction problems in their country. He openly wondered whether Iran would take stronger measures against blocking movement of weapons into Afghanistan, if the international community committed, in turn, to more aggressive efforts against drug smuggling from Afghanistan into Iran. SACEUR closed the meeting by expressing appreciation for the briefing. He noted that he planned to use some of the information the following week during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and office calls on Capitol Hill. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Ambassador Schweich and SACEUR seemed to agree on the current drug situation in Afghanistan, including possible measures to enhance counter-drug efforts and the importance of continuing along the path of promoting ever-closer civil-military coordination in the field. SACEUR remained actively engaged throughout the briefing, frequently asking questions and interjecting his own observations. BRUSSELS 00000382 004 OF 004 ¶9. (U) Ambassador Schweich has cleared this telegram. MURRAY .