FEITH TO PSC: MAINTAIN EULEX DEPLOYMENT TO ALL OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000381 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2018 TAGS: PREL NATO EUN KV SUBJECT: FEITH TO PSC: MAINTAIN EULEX DEPLOYMENT TO ALL OF KOSOVO ... FOR NOW Classified By: PolMinCouns L. Wohlers for reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary - - - - - - ¶1. (C) ICR/EUSR Pieter Feith briefed Political and Security Committee (PSC) ambassadors March 11 on Kosovo. Feith stressed that UNMIK must do its job, particularly in northern Kosovo, in order to maintain conditions for deployment of EULEX. Feith asked for full PSC support for deploying EULEX throughout Kosovo, maintaining current EU plans, and for urging the UN to take appropriate responses to provocations, including those expected with the likely May 11 Serbian elections. Feith said he expects the situation on the ground to get worse and that Belgrade's long-term strategy is to maintain visible parallel institutions in northern Kosovo. One Council Secretariat contact told us that there is no consensus within the PSC regarding whether to adjust the EULEX deployment timetable; rather, PSC will wait for the Council Secretariat's draft OP PLAN Annex on the North, expected in late March. End summary. Feith to PSC: There is No Plan B -- For Now - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) ICR/EUSR Pieter Feith briefed PSC ambassadors March ¶11. Sabina Stadler, Council Secretariat Slovene Presidency Coordinator (strictly protect) attended the session and provided us March 11 a readout. Feith began by noting that the situation in northern Kosovo could have been worse; still, he expects more trouble, particularly as there is "no acceptance" of the EU in the north at all. Cooperation between UNMIK and Belgrade is worse than what had been expected a few months ago. Serbia's elections, likely May 11, will present Belgrade opportunities to try to establish visible parallel institutions throughout the north. Feith surmised that this is part of a longer-term strategy by Belgrade. (Note: Stadler inferred that Feith sees Belgrade as eventually seeking partition.) On a positive note, Feith reported that customs collections are the border have resumed. If there is more violence at the gates, however, the gates will be closed. Stick to Deployment ... Conditions Permitting - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Feith said there is a "sense that the international community (IC) is losing the southern enclaves," but did not explain how. He said Kosovo Serbs are waiting for the IC's �A;next move; the Kosovo Serbs' response could be violent. Feith noted that his aim is to reach out to Kosovo Serbs on both sides of the Ibar with political messages of support and economic assistance. According to Stadler, Feith emphasized the need for the EU to deploy throughout all of Kosovo "when the situation permits." Separately, we asked both Stefan Lehne, Council Secretariat Director the W. Balkans, and his deputy, Michael Giffoni, for latest thinking on deployment of EULEX. Lehne said deployment "starts soon," but said deployment to the North is not envisioned in the first several weeks. Giffoni told us that it is "clear" that the EU plans to stick to its deployment timetable. That said, "we need the conditions to deploy," which is why the EU is pressing the UN to do its job, including in northern Kosovo. (Note: We understand that EULEX has, indeed, begun deployment, with 20 personnel joining the EUPT in Kosovo, and a second wave will deploy at the end of April.) Kosovo Government Doing Well - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Turning to the Kosovo Government, Feith said Pristina is focused on consolidation. It wants to promulgate its new constitution and finish the package of Ahtisaari-related legislation. Feith said the appointment of a foreign minister will be crucial in Kosovo's efforts to attract more recognition. Feith said he had asked the SRSG to proceed with the establishment of the new municipality of Northern Mitrovica. He noted a likely delay in the KPC's transition. Feith said the Kosovo Albanians have remained restrained in light of Kosovo Serb provocations but added that he could not predict how long this would remain the case. ¶5. (C) Given the likelihood of further trouble from Kosovo Serbs in the run-up to and aftermath of Serbia's elections, Feith asked the PSC to wait to debate the OPLAN's Annex on the North (which one contact told us would be issued March 27) until after the Serb elections. Given the fluid situation in the North, he said he could give an accurate assessment of where the situation there is headed only after the elections. ICO Assuming Some "OSCE Functions" BRUSSELS 00000381 002 OF 002 - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Feith also noted that he had discussed the situation in Kosovo with OSCE officials and concluded that the EU will have to help further with monitoring the implementation of a "comprehensive settlement" (EU code for "Ahtisaari package"). Mobile teams working under the ICO will help monitor compliance with decentralization and cultural heritage commitments. Feith Seeks Full PSC Support - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Following his report, Feith reportedly asked the PSC's full support on four issues: (1) ensuring that EULEX will be deployed throughout Kosovo; (2) understanding that he cannot accurately assess the situation in the north until after the Serb elections are held in May; (3) committing to current EU plans -- "There can be no Plan B until Plan A is tried;" and (4) urging UNMIK to take appropriate responses to the May 11 elections. (Note: Feith apparently did not, however, outline what scenarios and "appropriate responses" he had in mind.) UN and NATO must play Active Roles - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) According to another Council Secretariat contact, Feith also noted that the EU should discuss "restructuring" rather than "transition" from UNMIK, given that UNMIK may retain some structure in Kosovo after June. Our contact noted that there was general concern expressed by PSC ambassadors that UNMIK is not playing the role it should in Kosovo and that KFOR, as well, was shying away from some activities under cover of being "status neutral." Nor was there consensus regarding deploying EULEX as scheduled or somehow delaying at least part of the deployment. In an aside, two of our contacts noted that the Spanish representative insisted that Feith make it clear that he was briefing as the EUSR, not as the ICR. Comment - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) While Feith is the EUSR in Kosovo, he does not head the EULEX Mission. That chief -- retired French General de Kermabon -- is currently in New York seeking to strengthen the UN's resolve to at least maintain the IC's redlines. That said, if more than a few member states see a high risk of violence in the northern Kosovo without appropriate responses from UNMIK and/or KFOR, we can expect contentious debates here about the EULEX deployment schedule. While most member states see the Kosovo mission as a litmus test of EU credibility, we expect that a small yet vocal minority of member states to question the wisdom of standing up to Kosovo Serb provocations. Strong determination and leadership from key member states, such as France, Germany, and the UK, as well as visible KFOR and UNMIK responses to provocations, are needed to derail any potential calls for delaying deployment to the north. MURRAY .