U.S.-EU TROIKA DISCUSSIONS ON EAST ASIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000356 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN CH KN KS BM XB SUBJECT: U.S.-EU TROIKA DISCUSSIONS ON EAST ASIA Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Larry Wohlers. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Glyn Davies led the U.S. side in the East Asia session of the U.S.-EU COASI Troika meetings on February 20. The EU side was led by Ambassador Janez Premoze, Director for Asia in the Slovenian MFA, for the current EU presidency. Premoze was joined by James Moran, Director of the European Commission's RELEX Asia Department, and Antonio Tanca, Deputy Head of the Asia-Oceania Unit in the EU Council Secretariat. Issues discussed included: the Strategic Situation in East Asia, China, Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Asian regional organizations, Burma, and the Pacific Islands. End Summary. Strategic Situation ¶2. (SBU) PDAS Davies opened by noting the importance of U.S. military alliances in East Asia in guiding U.S. policy, the salience of APEC as a regional forum, and the economic importance of our free trade agreements with Singapore, Australia and the ROK. He observed that U.S. alliances are not static; indeed we are constantly updating our Status of Forces agreements and other elements. The U.S. hopes the Six Party Talks constitute the beginning of a DPRK opening to the world, and a means of addressing North East Asian security rivalries. The biggest issue that both the U.S. and Europe will need to contend with in the future will be the rise of China. On Burma, the regime's planned constitutional referendum is a travesty and a sham, and we need to do more. ¶3. (SBU) Premoze said the EU will soon draft Common Foreign and Security Policy guidelines for East Asia. These will highlight EU concerns about human rights, democracy, regional security, and development of trade ties. Moran said the fact that for the first time security guidelines will be published for Europe demonstrates that Europe is taking a stronger interest in the region. The EU engages in the region via the ARF, and views the U.S. as a Pacific power. China ¶4. (C) Premoze said 2008 will be a critical year, with the Beijing Olympics and Taiwan presidential elections. EU-China relations are underpinned by a Strategic Partnership, and the EU maintains its Human Rights dialogue. Premoze noted the upcoming meeting of parties with human rights dialogues with China (the former Bern process),including the U.S. and EU. On human rights in China, he said the EU thought that there had been stumbling blocks, but their assessment was that things were moving in the right direction. The EU has had exchanges with China on DPRK, Middle East, Iran and Burma, and there was a successful EU-China Summit in November 2007. The two sides are launching an EU-China high-level economic and trade dialogue. The core issue for the EU will be its growing trade deficit with China -- there is growing concern on this issue in Europe. Market access is also high on the list. Moran characterized the EU's recent statement on Taiwan as strong. Head of the Commission RELEX China Office Franz Jessen said that Commission President Barroso would visit China April 24-25. He will raise Taiwan and Tibet issues. The EU is urging Taiwan to exercise restraint. ¶5. (C) EAP/CM Director Norris reviewed U.S. institutional relations with China. The Deputy Secretary hosted the U.S.-China Senior Dialogue in January. There had been no real breakthroughs, but none had been expected. There will be another round before year's end. The U.S. and China hold various sub-dialogues on regional issues to include Africa, the Middle East, Western Hemisphere, and South and Central Asia. We also have counter-terrorism discussions with the Chinese. We want to start a dialogue on development assistance. The U.S. and China will hold another round of our Strategic Economic Dialogue in Washington in June, which will be looking at various issues including investment. ¶6. (C) The issue of the Congressional Gold Medal for the Dalai Lama caused irritation in U.S.-Chinese relations. The Deputy Secretary encouraged the Chinese to engage with Dalai Lama. The President has said that he will accept the invitation to attend the Olympics. While we do not formally link human rights to participation in the Olympics, the President has said the Games are an opportunity for China to demonstrate greater openness and tolerance, and we have urged the Chinese to take steps in areas like freedom of the press, BRUSSELS 00000356 002 OF 004 religious freedom, Internet freedom, and release of dissidents. Norris said that the U.S. is focused on the March 22 Taiwan presidential elections and the May 20 inauguration. We have made clear our opposition to the proposed referendum on UN membership for Taiwan; at the same time, we have urged the Chinese not to overreact. ¶7. (C) Tanca said that the Chinese are rather nervous about the Olympics and aware of the fact that despite governmental positions, things might get out of hand with the media. PDAS Davies replied that self-generated pressure is probably the most useful. Explicit linkages might not be so useful because one might exclude another, e.g., Darfur v. freedom of the press. Jessen said the EU is urging that journalists be free to travel to the rest of China after the Olympics, and that the intellectual property rights protections of the Olympic logo be extended to other areas. ¶8. (C) Premoze said the EU was pleased that China-Japan relations have warmed recently, and that the matter of visits to the Yasakuni Shrine are less of an issue. Norris said that the U.S. also welcomed this warming. On international issues, we see the Chinese taking a more responsible role with things like the Six Party Talks and the Chinese engineering troop deployment in Darfur. The area of least progress is on Iran. We want the Chinese to join in supporting third UNSCR on Iran and are concerned about growing Chinese economic relations with Iran. Oil development contracts and continued conventional arms sales, as well as sales of dual-use technologies that can be employed in the Iranian ballistic missile program, are particular concerns. Jessen said that they see relations with Iran as an economic necessity, though they are displeased with Iranian broadcasts of Chinese language Muslim news. Cross-Straits relations ¶9. (C) Premoze described the Taiwan situation as the biggest threat to regional stability. The EU is moderately optimistic about the March elections. They expect continued pressure from China on the referendum. EU pressure has not been enough. PDAS Davies said the Taiwans are looking for nuances of differences between the U.S. and the EU. We are being clear that Taiwan's international status will not change with the referendum. PDAS Davies stressed that the U.S. continues to take the view that the EU arms embargo on China should not be lifted. Norris described EU statements on the referendum as very helpful. The U.S. is opposing the referendum, but we do not want the Chinese to extract a change in our basic policy on Taiwan, which is based on the Three Communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. Tanca said that the One China policy actually resides with each EU member state. PDAS Davies said that, concerning Taiwan in international organizations, we take a common sense approach. We do not support Taiwan membQship in international organizations where statehood is required but do support its appropriate participation, e.g., observership in the WHO. China is trying to squeeze Taiwan's international space. Like the U.S., Premoze said the EU supported "meaningful participation" for Taiwan in international organizations. North Korea ¶10. (C) PDAS Davies said the Six Party Talks are unofficially paused because the DPRK has not made its declaration of its nuclear holdings. Setting deadlines with the DPRK is unproductive. Our central message to North Korea is that all is still possible. We support outreach by other parties to the DPRK. Premoze said the EU is open to another troika visit to the DPRK. We need another toolbox for political and economic engagement. The EU will support the extension of the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights. PDAS Davies said that the U.S. is not considering making preemptive concessions absent the DPRK declaration -- e.g., not moving up action on items such as fuel oil shipments, removal of the DPRK from our State Sponsors of Terrorism list. He said the DPRK had shared some initial ideas in December which we informed them were insufficient. ¶11. (C) French MFA representative Jean-Noel Poirier, representing the upcoming EU presidency, said that it would be a major step for the DPRK to provide a complete list of its nuclear activities. He asked if the U.S. had considered an incremental process in which we discuss specific elements. PDAS Davies said the U.S. had taken care to demonstrate its BRUSSELS 00000356 003 OF 004 patience. It is difficult to negotiate with the North Korean diplomats because they are never empowered to make any decisions. Nevertheless, the idea of deconstructing the declaration and having individual meetings was interesting. Regional Organizations ¶12. (SBU) Premoze described the ASEAN Charter as a significant development, moving from simple economic coordination towards political cooperation. Burma being a signatory, however, complicates matters. The EU-ASEAN Summit was successful, if somewhat formal. PDAS Davies said the U.S. had eight priority areas of cooperation with ASEAN via its plan of action. Premoze asked about the prospects of an ARF meeting on nonproliferation matters, RELEX Advisor Barrett asked about a Maritime Security initiative with the ARF. Burma ¶13. (C) Moran asserted that the international community needed to give UN Special Representative Gambari more time. PDAS Davies said that regional actors such as Yudhoyono and Arroyo have been helpful, and that there has been some modest public interest within South East Asia in the Burma situation. He noted that there is a difference of nuance between the U.S. and EU approaches. We saw several different tracks to the issue. There is the UN piece, and support for Gambari. We continue to engage with Burma's neighbors, i.e., China, India, and Thailand, with China being the most important. We support the democracy movement to include the NLD and various ethnic minority groups. We think that targeted sanctions are needed and that it is possible to continue to tighten them in a way that does not have an impact upon common people. The purpose of sanctions is not just to pressure the regime but also the Chinese. We know that the regime has been complaining about the impact of the sanctions to the Chinese. We think sanctions are working and we have direct and anecdotal evidence for that. They also send the signal that we cannot continue with the current sham process. We do not see sanctions as the only element in our approach. We can provide the EU with evidence that these steps are having an impact. UNSYG Moon said in December that the Burmese could not ignore the international community with impunity. If the next round of Gambari's engagement proceeds without success, we need to say so. ¶14. (C) Premoze said Burma was very high on the Slovene Presidency agenda. The regime's constitutional drafting process was not transparent, and did not include the NLD or ethnic minorities. They anticipated the renewal of the EU's common position by the end of April. The EU actively supports the work of Special Rep Gambari and will welcome news of his March trip. EU Special Envoy Fassino supports Gambari. On sanctions, EU working groups are looking at additional options to included expanded sanctions. The EU is also ready to continue with incentives for Burma. ¶15. (C) Moran said that the EU was trying to strike a balance. There was an open question concerning the efficacy of sanctions. The regime is not worried about their effect. The EU is looking at incentives, such as increasing its humanitarian assistance (which is provided only through NGOs). Moran claimed that Aung Sang Syu Kyi appreciated this work. Her contacts with the regime don't amount to anything. The regime is "pretty competent." It feels that it has ridden out the storm. People in the country are nervous. The EU has not unrealistic expectations with regard to the constitutional process. If the international continues with "sticks" it's an open question as to whether this will work. He asked if it was possible to penetrate the Singaporean banking system used by the regime. ¶16. (C) PDAS Davies said that there were broader sanctions that could be employed including visas. We need to keep pressure on the Chinese, to include discussion of a possible UNSCR. Moran said the Chinese are worried about stability; there are many ethnic Chinese in Burma. PDAS Davies said that ASSK does not want a process that excludes a role for the military in the country. In terms of international action, the Indians have done nothing. Moran said the Burmese have a strong cultural aversion to the Chinese, whose influence on the regime should not be exaggerated. Pacific Islands BRUSSELS 00000356 004 OF 004 ¶17. (SBU) PDAS Davies said that the Australians are becoming more active regionally, in the Solomon Islands and Timor. Premoze asked about the efficacy of the Pacific Island Forum, and said the EU supported extension of the UN Mission in Timor L'Este. He then turned to Chinese and Taiwan "checkbook" diplomacy and the damage it was doing to those countries. PDAS Davies said the U.S. was trying to get the Taiwanese to accept principles of transparency concerning their aid. He thanked the EU for holding off sugar support funds for Fiji. He asked that the EU consider participating in an upcoming international meeting on diabetes in the Pacific Islands. ¶18. (U) PDAS Davies has cleared this message. MURRAY .