DAS BRYZA AND EU OFFICIALS AGREE: PROGRESS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000317 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018 TAGS: PREL PHUM EUN CY TU SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA AND EU OFFICIALS AGREE: PROGRESS ON CYPRUS AND TURKEY MUTUALLY REINFORCING Classified By: CDA Larry Wohlers for reasons 1.5(b/d). Summary - - - - - - - ¶1. (C) EU officials and DAS Bryza agreed that the UN should take advantage of the opportunity a new Cypriot president offered to energize negotiations on Cyprus. EU accession negotiations on Turkey will continue its moderate pace under the Slovene and French presidencies, with two or even three chapters expected to be opened under each. Without progress on implementing the Additional Ankara Protocol by the end of 2009 (a prospect tied to a solution on Cyprus, as acknowledged by EU interlocutors),accession talks would stall because of "negative momentum." Movement on Cyprus talks, however, could help protect Turkey's accession prospects from being over-politicized and from Sarkozy's "visceral" position on Turkey. EU Political Director Robert Cooper characterized Turkey as "not wanting" to improve NATO-EU relations. End summary. Cypriot Election Opens Window of Opportunity - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Cooper agreed with Bryza that the Cypriot presidential elections offered an opening that could lead to negotiations, noting that 65 per cent of Cypriot voters favored negotiations, with Katharios observing that even a "less constructive Kasoulides" is better than a non-constructive Papadopoulos. While Katharios cautioned that Turkish behind-the-scenes machinations could negatively affect this window of opportunity, Cooper struck a more positive note, stressing that the post-Papadopoulos period could mark the beginning of a process (built on a modified Annan Plan while using a different title) that would include gradual introduction of confidence-building measures, possibly including opening a Turkish port to Cypriot commerce. The key, Cooper emphasized, would be to "de-dramatize" any resumed negotiations. Cooper underscored that the EU would "pour money into northern Cyprus" if there is a settlement on the island. Looming Two-State Possibility Will Prod Greek Cypriots - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Katharios noted that, "We may have to think the unthinkable" -- a two-state solution, perhaps with a bit more territory for the ROC, if all other efforts to find a negotiated solution fail. Cooper, observing that Putin's recent comments along those lines "scared Nicosia quite a lot," did not go that far, but averred that there might be a "one-state solution that is not very different from a two-state solution" if post-Cypriot election negotiations fail. UN Should Engage Soon - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) In a separate meeting, Commission Director General for Enlargement Michael Leigh also agreed with DAS Bryza about seizing the window of opportunity to resume the UN process on Cyprus. Leigh noted that the fear of "a creeping two-state solution and creeping recognition" should mobilize the next Cypriot president to engage seriously in negotiations. Leigh said he is urging the highest levels in the EU, including Commission President Barroso, to urge UNSYG Ban to initiate a process soon. Any process, Leigh added, should have buy-in at every step from the parties, with major players ready to facilitate the process. Turning to the EU's relations with northern Cyprus, Leigh said the Commission will push for progress on direct trade, but held out little hope for success. Nevertheless, the Commission will keep this issue alive. On possible formulas for a solution, Leigh noted the need to emphasize commercial interests but added that opening ports likely will not be enough, as evidenced by the failed German Presidency initiative. Rather, opening of an airport and a moratorium on property sales in northern Cyprus likely will have to be part of a package deal to induce the Turks to sign an agreement. Turkey's Accession Negotiations Reinforced by Cyprus Talks - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Advisor on Turkey to Commissioner Rehn, Heather Grabbe, added that even the start of a UN process would help keep Turkey's EU accession on track. She explained that member states, including France, would hesitate to negatively affect the accession negotiations so as to avoid damaging UN negotiations regarding Cyprus. . BRUSSELS 00000317 002 OF 003 Focus on Technical Chapters to Maintain Pace of Accession Negotiations - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Katharios reviewed the prospect for opening additional acquis chapters for accession negotiations. Chapter 25 (Science and Research) is provisionally closed; five others have been opened (18 -- Statistics, 20 - Enterprise and Industrial Policy, 21 - Trans-European Networks, 28- Consumer and Health Protection, and 32 - Financial Control. Eight Chapters are effectively blocked because of the lack of implementation by Turkey of the Additional Ankara Protocol (with Greece and Cyprus particularly concerned over Chapter 14 - Transport Policy - given "problems for civilian aviation in the S.E. Aegean posed by the Turkish military." Cyprus is informally blocking consideration of Chapter 15 -- Energy. No additional chapter can be provisionally closed without implementation of the Additional Protocol. According to Katharios, Turkey "never fully implemented" its previous Partnership Agreement with the EU, further complicating the case for the friends of Turkey within the EU. In the short-term, the EU is trying to convince Ankara to concentrate on fulfilling the requirements of "technical" chapters (with Chapter 6 - Company Law - and Chapter 7 - Intellectual Property Law - possibly being opened at the end of the Slovenian Presidency in June) to maintain the pace of negotiations and to buy time to address key political issues. But French and German Opposition Loom - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Cooper and Katharios noted that, regardless of the technical talks, key elements in Turkey's accession remain the positions of France and Germany -- a "big political problem," in Cooper's view. The lengthy timeline "kills the Turks," given that Ankara must pay a political cost in reforms in the short-term yet reap the advantages of the process in the medium- and long-terms, with no guarantee of actual accession. Cooper concluded that the "visceral French hostility" to Turkish accession, in addition to the "managed" German position, has led to Turkey's lack of confidence in the accession process. Leigh observed that, while the French Presidency may play the role of "honest broker," he had heard of a recent "20-minute tirade" by Sarkozy regarding Turkey. That said, Sarkozy does not appear poised to provoke a break "right now." Grabbe noted, however, that the French PermRep in Brussels had said that Paris might be willing to re-examine some of the eight "suspended" acquis chapters. She said that the Commission might be in a position to report at least on Turkey's technical progress in meeting the requirements of some of those chapters with French acquiescence. Turkish Reforms: Progress, but More Needed - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) DAS Bryza asked for the EU's assessment of Turkey's domestic reforms. Leigh replied that there have been positive steps, but that more needs to be done. The recently passed Law on Foundations is a step forward, even if Greece and Cyprus will claim that it does not go far enough. The proposed amendments to Article 301 appear to be modest steps forward. The EU has demonstrated understanding for Turkey's moves against the PKK in northern Iraq and hopes that such understanding can be reciprocated with further domestic reforms. Bryza stressed that U.S. assistance to Turkey on the PKK was instrumental in improving bilateral relations and urged the EU to take similar steps where possible. Grabbe agreed and said the West should take advantage of the improved atmosphere and urge the AKP to move courageously on critical issues where the U.S. and the EU could provide the Turkish Government needed cover. Grabbe agreed with DAS Bryza on nudging Turkey to also improve relations with Armenia. ¶9. (C) A way forward, Cooper stressed, must be found to inject "political faith" to prompt Turkey to adopt major reforms and reverse the increasingly negative attitude toward accession. Otherwise, "if nothing happens" by the December 2009 European Council, "we'll be out of stream," and the accession process will suffer from "negative momentum." It will not be a train wreck, but stagnation will set in. The next nine months are "critical," he added. Leigh termed 2009 as a period "like 2006, with a train crash looming" absent progress and particularly if Sarkozy maintains his "visceral position" and given that even some in the German SPD were getting "cold feet" regarding Turkey. Bryza noted the improvement in U.S.-Turkish relations following President Bush's meetings with PM Erdogan in November and President Gul BRUSSELS 00000317 003 OF 003 in January. Not only were the Turks opening new channels of bilateral cooperation, they were also talking of their historic opportunity to improve relations with Yerevan and were beginning to think creatively on Cyprus. Bryza, emphasizing the strategic importance of Turkey, urged the EU to maintain the accession process and support any resumed negotiations on Cyprus under a UN umbrella. Turkey-NATO-EU: Ankara Prefers the Problem to a Solution - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) Cooper was decidedly downbeat on Turkey's role in NATO-EU relations. According to Cooper, the Turks do not want to solve the problems regarding NATO-EU cooperation as they prefer the problem to a solution. The EU does not have a deal "so big," that the Turks could not refuse it. Brussels could try to find ways to offer Ankara "things" in the European Defense Agency (EDA),but Ankara will find a way to reject it. Cooper reasoned that Turkey has continued to raise its complaints about treatment from the EU as a method of keeping the Cyprus issue on the radar screen. Bryza acknowledged that Turkey had made some mistakes in pressing its case but underscored that the EU should live up to its commitments to Turkey. ¶11. (C) Cooper stressed that a solution could encompass measures including Turkey/NATO-EU relations and Cyprus/EU-NATO relations. The French relationship with NATO might be part of the equation. Key is to get Ankara confident enough to "melt its frozen thinking." While he said he is unsure if Turkey is ready for this approach, "We should try it," Cooper emphasized, stressing that with a change in the Cypriot Government, this year offers a better opportunity for movement than 2009. ¶12. (C) Katharios took an even more one-sided view, characterizing NATO as having taken an "inflexible stance" that is against our common strategic interest. Cooper pointed to a nine-page Turkish non-paper, "Turkey's Perspective on (the) ESDP," (e-mailed to EUR/SEE and EUR/RPM) which was shared with various EU military representatives in mid-February, as evidence of Turkey's "accumulated displeasure" with its relations with the EU. Comment - - - - - - - ¶13. (C) The EU is fairly confident that the French presidency will serve as an honest broker on Turkish accession. The urgency is to resume the UN process on Cyprus and find a solution that could give Turkey the political cover to open its ports to Cypriot transportation. Absent that, the EU fears, if not a train wreck, a long stall in the accession process. On the other hand, movement on Cyprus talks could help promote solid movement on Turkey's accession path. The EU is eager to help seize the opportunity the Cypriot presidential election offers to move forward on both fronts. ¶14. (U) DAS Bryza did not clear this message. Wohlers .