DAS KRAMER CONSULTS EU ON MOLDOVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000023 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS KINR EAID ECON EUN MD XH SUBJECT: DAS KRAMER CONSULTS EU ON MOLDOVA Classified By: USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurence Wohlers, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- 1.(C/NF) EUR DAS David Kramer held back-to-back meetings on December 14 with EU officials and member state representatives to review developments in Moldova and the Transnistria settlement process. Talks covered a range of sensitive issues, including perceptions and intentions of Russia, Romania, and EU CFSP High Representative Solana. The Lithuanians questioned the wisdom of EU High Representative Solana's apparent receptiveness to Russian proposals and revealed that several EU member states may seek to block the political mandate of the EU envoy to Moldova, Kalman Mizsei. In a separate meeting with Kramer, Mizsei suggested Russian interest in solving the conflict based on a recent visit to Brussels by senior Russian officials. On a more positive note, German, French, Lithuanian and Commission interlocutors confirmed that on December 10, EU Foreign Ministers had agreed to put the EU's relations with Moldova on a higher political footing. In each meeting DAS Kramer praised EU efforts to intensify Moldova's integration into Europe. He also warned that Russia was seeking to exploit cracks in the EU's political consensus - and between the EU and U.S. -- on Moldova with a view toward splitting the West. END SUMMARY 2.(SBU) During a December 14-15 visit to Brussels, EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary David Kramer held separate meetings with EU senior officials and member state representatives from France, Germany and Lithuania. Topics included political and security developments in Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. This cable reports on the discussions concerning Moldova's relations with the EU, including the EU's position with respect to the 5 2 (Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, EU and United States) settlement talks. Other topics are reported septel. EU FM's Endorse Stronger Relations -------------- 3.(C) In a December 14 meeting at the Lithuanian Mission, Lithuanian Undersecretary of State Zygiamantas Pavilionis noted that at their December 10 GAERC meeting, EU Foreign Ministers had quietly decided to "uplift" the status of four countries currently participating in the EU European Neighborhood policy: Israel, Morocco, Ukraine, and Moldova. According to Pavilionis, the UK, France and Sweden were particularly helpful in supporting the concept, which was the brainchild of RELEX DDG Hugues Mingarelli. The Lithuanians expected the December GAERC decision to set the stage for an EU discussion in February 2008 on the long-term process for Ukraine and Moldova's process of integration into Europe. While Moldovan elections would be a complicating factor, the EU's positive political signal could create a timely incentive to Chisinau to ensure smooth elections. In his meeting with DAS Kramer later the same day, Mingarelli referred indirectly to his policy success at the GAERC noting that the EU had had a "good" meeting with President Voronin on December 14 and that Voronin seemed to have clearly understood the message that if Moldova continued to make progress, there was a possibility of a "new contract" in 2008. Romania's Turf -------------- 4.(C) EU, German, French and Lithuanian contacts generally agreed with the U.S. assessment that Russia was trying to divide and conquer the EU ) and the EU from the U.S. -- on Moldova-Transnistria. In separate meetings with Pavilioinis and EU officials, Kramer noted that Russia was exploiting Romania's problems with Moldova, including the latter two countries' failure to conclude a border agreement. He floated the idea of using the April 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest to resolve the border problem between Romania and Moldova. Since both parties had said they were 95 per cent of the way there, the platform of a signing at the summit might give them the necessary sense of urgency to complete the deal, though Kramer stressed this was an idea that had not been vetted with his USG colleagues. Both Mingarelli and Pavilionis responded positively to the idea, but noted Romania's refusal to brook EU "interference" in its dealings with Moldova. Mingarelli believed there would be little appetite within the EU to push Romania against its will. However, a discrete conversation with its president might be effective. Lithuania asked for strong U.S. diplomacy to back European efforts. Russian Intentions -------------- 5.(C) DAS Kramer's meetings here shed some light on how various EU actors in the 5 2 settlement talks viewed Russian and U.S. roles in the 5 2. RELEX Eastern Europe Affairs Director Gunnar Wiegand asked if the United States had BRUSSELS 00000023 002 OF 002 insights as to why Russia had been sending signals that it wanted to be helpful on Moldova/Transnistria. DAS Kramer replied that the Russians had displayed no such flexibility in conversations with the USG, especially in the related CFE discussions, and suspected that they were simply trying to split the 5 2. At the same time, DAS Kramer thought that PM Voronin's creativity and flexibility might have made the Russians take notice. Wiegand did not share his own opinion on the matter. Separately, German PSC Ambassador Clemens von Goetze and the French Deputy PSC Representative Didier Chaber readily agreed with DAS Kramer's assessment. Keeping the 5 2 on track -------------- 6.(C/NF) The Lithuanians made plain their unease with EU High Rep Solana's and Mizsei,s handling of the Moldova-Transnistria file. In this regard, Pavilioinis requested that the USG intensify its coordination with likeminded EU member states to keep the settlement talks on track. Suspicious that Solana was putting his own short-term political ambitions (in the race for the next EU High Rep) ahead of the long-term good of Moldova, Lithuania feared Solana would cut a settlement deal with Moscow over the head of Chisinau -- and the EU-27 -- in the coming year. Lithuanian concerns were only fueled by the perception that Solana and Kalman Mizsei, the EU Special Representative for Moldova were pursuing a settlement along Russian lines. In a December 13 meeting in Brussels, Solana reportedly gave visiting Russian Deputy NSA Zubakov and DFM Karasin his agreement to work together on a settlement. At the same time, Solana had refused to provide Mizsei with any guidelines or redlines for follow-on discussions with Russia. Pavilionis said that Mizsei had also balked at receiving any political guidance from EU member states, including from the UK Political Director. 7.(C) In a separate meeting, Mizsei told Kramer that Karasin and Zubakov left the impression that Russia was ready to solve the Transnistria conflict, though how exactly remained unclear. Kramer replied with considerable skepticism, saying that the US has seen no such readiness on Russia,s part and in fact has seen the opposite in the CFE discussions context. Kramer offered that Russia instead may be trying to test the unity of the EU and the U.S.-EU position. Move Against EU Envoy Possible -------------- 8.(C/NF) According to Pavilionis, EUSR Mizsei (Hungary) did not enjoy the trust of Moldova or key EU member states. He revealed that Lithuania, Romania, Poland and Moldova might seek to block Mizsei's political mandate at the February GAERC. The UK was becoming "more courageous" and Sweden was "more cautious but interested" in such a move. Pavilioinis asked point blank whether the USG trusted Mizsei. Kramer said he had some concerns, particularly when Mizsei seemed ready to negotiate with Russia Moldova,s neutrality; Kramer said the U.S. will never do that. At the same time, Lithuania, Hungary and Sweden had prepared a non-paper for EU Friends of Moldova on ways in which the EU could support progress in the 5 2 talks. They hoped to bring these ideas forward to the full EU-27 in the coming weeks. (Note: Per DAS Kramer's instructions, USEU forwarded an electronic copy of the non-paper to EUR/ERA on December 15. End note.) 9.(U) This message has been cleared by DAS Kramer. MURRAY .