IRAN: EU SEEKS TO BOLSTER PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001715

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/ERA, NEA/IR, DRL, ECA FOR ABED-KOTOB, NEA/PPD
FOR BENZE, IIP FOR BRUCE WHARTON, R FOR MORRIS JACOBS,
EUR/PPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV SCUL IR KDEM KPAO OEXC OIIP
EUN
SUBJECT: IRAN: EU SEEKS TO BOLSTER PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
EFFORTS, SEEKS INFORMATION EXCHANGE WITH USG

BRUSSELS 00001715 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: USEU Polmincouns Chris Davis for reasons 1.4(b) and(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent conversations with European
Commission, Council, and Member State representatives
indicate that while the will exists to expand their current
Iran-related public diplomacy programming,
a number of factors are slowing the EU's ability to implement
such programs. The absence of a Commission presence in
Tehran is only one of several causes: feuding between the
Commission and Council over division of authority and
resources, lack of a broad contact base in-country, lack of
Member State coordination on bilateral projects, and fear of
Iranian government reprisals also contribute to EU hesitancy.
Both Commission and Council contacts expressed keen interest
in increasing information sharing with the USG on best
practices in Farsi-language internet public diplomacy,
broadcasting, and exchange programs. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) CURRENT EFFORTS FOCUS ON EDUCATION, EXPANDING TO
INCLUDE LIMITED BROADCASTING: DG RELEX Iran Deputy Director
Francois Massoulie and Deputy Head of Unit Information and
Communications Oliver Nette reviewed both current and
upcoming EC-sponsored projects with Mission officers and
visiting Berlin Iran Watcher. Current programs include the
allotment of 60 ERASMUS scholarship slots for Iranian
university students as well as Commission sponsorship of a
Human Rights Department at Qom's Mofid University. Two
larger-scale projects, aiming to educate Iranians about the
EU system and European values, are also in the works. The
Commission is currently soliciting bids for a five-year, 15
million Euro Farsi-language television program, financed by
the European Parliament and featuring European-oriented news.



3. (C) Both Commission and Council representatives expressed
strong interest in expanding public diplomacy programming,
but cited multiple reasons for their hesitance so far.
Council Iran Desk officer Didier Cosse and SG/HR Solana's
Deputy Personal Representative for Nonproliferation Andreas
Strub said that they favor additional public diplomacy steps
to engage the Iranian people to complement its tough line on
the regime's nuclear program.


4. (C) INFIGHTING, NO COMMISSION PRESENCE, LIMITED CONTACT
BASE HINDER EFFORTS: Numerous roadblocks, however, are
blocking EU progress on expanding their public diplomacy
efforts. The Council and the Commission continue to wrangle
over a public diplomacy package for Iran. The dispute
centers on two aspects of the draft Council Joint Action.
The first concerns whether the Commission and Council
mandates and resources will be determined on the basis of
second or first pillar (CFSP vs. community) action. Second,
member states differ on whether the text of the Joint Action,
which is a public document, should be a general overview of
intention or a detailed explanation of actions, intentions,
and funding. According to a Council contact, the UK is in
favor of a "less is more" approach, whereas the Dutch,
Swedes, Austrians want greater transparency. The Germans
appear undecided. In order to address the various
stakeholders' concerns, the French Presidency is now drafting
for eventual Council approval an internal "master" policy
planning document on Iran PD including details of
implementation at the CFSP, bilateral, and Community levels
including actions and funding. With such a comprehensive
planning reference in hand -- but not for public
dissemination -- the French would then seek to have the
Council agree to a streamlined Joint Action plan covering
only CFSP elements of Iran PD programming. The key elements
of the comprehensive plan would likely include broadcasting
in Farsi, a seminar in Tehran on EU CFSP, and more exchanges
with Iranian journalists and other important constituencies
in Iran.


5. (C) Another major factor is the Commission's lack of a
diplomatic presence in Tehran. Its most recent attempt to
place a Commission representative at the Belgian Embassy in
Tehran was rejected by the Iranian government, which would
prefer a full-scale Commission office and the signal of
strengthened relations that would go with it. EU
institutional and member state contacts also cited limited
contacts among a broad base of Iranian society, noting that
the 24 EU member state embassies on the ground tend to
interact with a small swath of Iran's political and economic

BRUSSELS 00001715 002.2 OF 003


elite, resulting in embassies' dependency on this elite to
carry out projects at any cost and to a narrow audience.


6. (C) A proposed non-official seminar on the CFSP provides
a case study of the consequences of limited access:
originally tabled during the German EU Presidency, the French
picked up the idea in the last few weeks, securing
co-sponsorship from the Ravand Institute and the European
Institute for Security Studies. According to EU
institutional contacts, the Ravand Institute was chosen
because it is among the few Iranian think-tanks with the
necessary high-level political level connections that was not
tainted by the infamous 2006 Holocaust denial conference
sponsored by the regime. Commission and French Presidency
sources lament that Ravand has tried to take advantage of
what they characterize as its virtual "monopoly" power to
extract unreasonable financial terms for the seminar slated
to take place in early December. Several EU member state
contacts told USEU that they balked at a budget estimate
presented by the French Presidency on behalf of Ravand that
was nearly ten times the normal budget for a conference of
this kind. The Czechs believe the seminar may be postponed
until their Presidency, but support it as a means to inform
Iranian elites about the basic policy functions of the EU.
The Czechs would hope to keep the nuclear weapons issue off
the agenda, but may wish to address it indirectly under an
agenda item on "EU energy policy" (NFI). The Czechs believe
it may be possible in the future to gain limited access to
Iranian media outlets as well to achieve PD goals, by linking
up with Iranian elites who have some common cause on a
particular issue, similar to what UN agencies have done
through programs.


7. (C) Fear of retaliation against Iranian participants and
other EU interest is also on the minds of EU Iran policy
makers Massoulie cited the example of a planned EU Visitor's
Program for journalists to visit Europe, noting that the
Commission remains hesitant on implementing the program, due
to fears of what the Iranian MOIS would do to the
participants before or after the program. In a similar vein,
Strub and Cosse expressed concerns that reaching and
convincing Iranian moderates of Western policies in the
current Iranian domestic climate has become difficult, making
public diplomacy tactical planning all the more difficult:
"is this the right moment (for additional PD activities)?"
Strub and Cosse also noted their fear of ramifications for
other projects and on-the-ground activities; Cosse noted the
Iranian Mission to the EU had complained about the European
Parliament's support for a new broadcasting channel and
posited "what would happen if we gave even more funding?"


8. (C) EU Member States have made similar comments in
separate discussions. On October 3, a Czech diplomat
currently posted to Tehran told Poloff that cultural and
ethnic repression in Iran made it increasingly difficult to
sponsor cultural events there. Educational exchanges were a
more promising avenue for reaching civil society because it
was more difficult for the regime to refuse such programming.
The Czech contact praised UN agencies in Tehran for their
skill in "selling" programs to the regime, e.g.,
anti-narcotics, TIP, and refugees, with a price tag that
includes some human rights component, such as educational
reform and enrollment of girls in school. Asked about other
sectors ripe for bilateral cooperation, our Tehran-based
Czech contact pointed to archeological preservation, urban
renewal, and waste recycling. Finally, a visiting Czech MFA
official in charge of human rights programming noted that
NGOs in the Czech Republic or elsewhere in the newer EU
member states could be potential partners for the USG on Iran
democracy programming partners.


9. (C) INTEREST IN INCREASED INFORMATION EXCHANGE ON
IRAN-RELATED PD EFFORTS: Both Commission RELEX and Council
interlocutors expressed appreciation for information
presented on USG Iran public diplomacy effort and expressed
interest in a more detailed information exchange about best
practices on visitor's programs, IIP Farsi language
programming, as well as how USG institutions, specifically
the BBG and IIP, collect and evaluate user numbers for
internet and broadcasting efforts. The Commission asked for
information about the exact methodology for media monitoring,
which they noted is very expensive, and whether we undertake
this regularly. They also expressed interest in exchanging

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views with BBG officials on broadcasting efforts in general.


10. (C) RECOMMENDATION AND ACTION REQUEST: Cohesive
information sharing among the Member States and
with the Commission, let alone strategic and tactical public
diplomacy planning, appears to be lacking. We will reach out
to provide information on our programs and best practices.
We will also explore the idea of a Washington visit by EU and
EC Iran-related PD officials and would welcome a Brussels
stop by Department officers engaged in Iran PD efforts. We
would further recommend that the Department expand the PD
aspects of the twice yearly Presidency Trilateral
consultations (EU-US-Canada) in order to give the issue more
prominence and EU and US efforts more effectiveness. There
may be potential for the Czech Republic, given its history
and continued active NGOs, to lend focus to Iran civil
society support during its Presidency. We would be
interested in Embassy Prague and Department views on this.
END COMMENT.


11. (C) This is a joint USEU - Embassy Berlin cable.

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