BELGIUM: "CREDIBLE AFGHAN ELECTIONS ARE MORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001624 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM AND SCA/A E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MARR AF BE SUBJECT: BELGIUM: "CREDIBLE AFGHAN ELECTIONS ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN ELECTIONS ON TIME" REF: STATE 108855 Classified By: Political Economic Counselor Richard Eason, reason 1.4(b ) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The GOB is concerned that the USG is not doing enough to curb participation in Afghan elections and government by corrupt individuals. It would like to see agreement on ways to improve the credibility of the election process and quality of candidates among the NATO Allies before the elections take place, whether on schedule in 2009-10 or later. MFA officials hinted that the GOB would increase its commitment to security and economic development in Afghanistan, as well as its financial contribution to the elections if the Allies pay more attention to building a modern and less corrupt state in Afghanistan and less to supporting particular politicians. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On October 17, POLOFF delivered Ref A demarche to Renier Nijskens, Director of the Department for South and East Asia and Oceania at the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and South Asia desk officer Alain Hanssen. Nijskens said that Belgium shares the United States goal of a democratic Afghanistan and the nearer term goal of presidential, regional and National Assembly elections that produce a legitimate Afghan partner for building security and prosperity. However, Nijskens said that the GOB is concerned about a number of issues surrounding elections in Afghanistan, including the lack of viable political parties and the number of corrupt individuals who seek office in order to abuse the system. The Afghan government, Nijskens said, is flouting fundamental rules, shuffling officials suspected of criminal activity from job to job, and has named an alleged criminal to be head of the national police. The situation reminds Nijskens of Vietnam, where, as he says, a corrupt government was allowed to flourish behind Security provided by the United States, leading to ultimate failure. ¶3. (C) Nijskens made it clear that he and the MFA -- and some other NATO allies -- believe that the United States is emphasizing the holding of elections at a particular time while ignoring or excusing conditions that vitiate the goal of democratizing and modernizing the Afghan government. The USG is promoting a policy of turning a blind eye to unacceptable government practices in the name of respecting Afghan sovereignty, he said. Hanssen contributed that the GOB feels it is more important to support building good institutions than particular individuals, including Mohammed Karzai. Also, he said, the use of ISAF to provide election-related security is troubling, because the foreign forces are not trusted by many Afghans and their involvement undermines the validity of the elections in the Afghans' eyes. Nijskens urged strongly that the NATO allies meet as soon as possible, discuss the problems, and agree on rules for the next Afghan elections that would enhance their legitimacy. He stressed a need to vet candidates and prevent the participation of the most corrupt individuals. Other ideas for strengthening the legitimacy of the elections and the government that would be formed as a result could be discussed among the Allies, he added. ¶4. (C) POLOFF remarked that it is clear the U.S. and Belgium share the same goals for the Afghan government and the elections. He suggested that it should be possible to work hard now and find ways to address some of the GOB's concerns, while keeping to the timetable for elections, which the USG deems to be very important. Nijskens countered that "credible elections are more important than elections on time." Belgium has made a decision to become more deeply involved in providing security for Afghanistan, sending an F-16 squadron to Kandahar and an OMLT training mission to Kunduz (to begin in early 2009). Belgium's commitment is small compared to that of the U.S., Nijskens observed, but it is large for a country its size. Nijskens said that Belgium is inclined to develop both its military role and economic assistance, as evidenced by the recent visit by Defense Minister De Crem and Development Minister Michel to Afghanistan. While things are often "impossible" in Belgium, he noted, they are possible when the government makes up its mind to do them -- to include contributing money to the elections, he implied. Basically, he said, the GOB wants to feel more certain that the end result will be the more modern, successful Afghanistan that is the Allies' mutual goal, not a corrupt state. To that end, he repeated, it is necessary that the Allies have a united position and draw red lines for the Afghan government and the elections. The space being created by calling for a "go-slow" approach to democracy is being filled by drug dealing, highjacking and looting, he said. BRUSSELS 00001624 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) POLOFF suggested that approving an ISAF role for counternarcotics operations (ref B) would be one way to help curb the drug dealing problem. Nijskens insisted that it is necessary to create a credible alternative for agricultural development first, then bring in military force to eradicate drug crops. He finds that the drug dealers have the money to be elected and then can frustrate enforcement efforts. But the important thing is a viable agricultural plan, he said. Hanssen added that the new Afghan Minister of Interior seems to be an improvement over his predecessor. He summed up by admitting that it is impossible to find "perfect virgins" for every ministry and regional government office, but it is necessary to send a signal to the Afghan government that it has to do better. ¶6. (C) POLOFF thanked Nijskens and Hanssen for their detailed statement of the GOB position on the election issue. He promised to report their words to Washington, obtain a reaction and follow up at a later date. .