EULEX KOSOVO: PROGRESS ON DEPLOYMENT BUT POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001569 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ERA, INL/CIV E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2018 TAGS: PREL EUN UNMIK KV SUBJECT: EULEX KOSOVO: PROGRESS ON DEPLOYMENT BUT POLITICAL ISSUES REMAIN REF: BRUSSELS 1486 Classified By: Ambassador Kristen Silverberg for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with the Ambassador October 7, EULEX Kosovo Head of Mission Yves de Kermabon reported that deployment was in full swing, with approximately 450 personnel on the ground. De Kermabon said that EULEX would reach an "initial operating capability" - capable of assuming the mission - by the beginning of December. He added that EULEX would reach a "final capability" - to include deployment to the north - two to three months later. De Kermabon said the two most significant factors affecting operations were logistics and the political environment, with UNMIK slow to transfer assets and Belgrade still not having given EULEX a green light to deploy to the north. He reported that coordination efforts with KFOR were "very good," with EULEX and KFOR each working to transform unsigned technical agreements into operational guidance. De Kermabon anticipates no trouble from the Turks, the Turkish Ambassador to NATO reportedly telling him that he saw "no problems to a pragmatic approach." End Summary. EULEX Deployment Ongoing -------------- ¶2. (C) Meeting with the Ambassador October 7 to discuss the status of EULEX deployment, EULEX Kosovo Head of Mission (HOM) Yves de Kermabon reported that deployment was in full swing, adding proudly "there is rhythm." He said that deployment was happening in waves of approximately 100 personnel per week, a total of 450 personnel now on the ground. De Kermabon reported that his only concern was dropouts, an issue he attributed to the earlier postponement in deployment. To address this, de Kermabon said that he had asked PSC ambassadors October 7 to ensure that their respective personnel were available to deploy at the assigned times. ¶3. (C) De Kermabon said that barring any political or logistic holdups, EULEX would reach an "initial operating capability" - meaning it could assume the mission from UNMIK - by the beginning of December. While cautioning that EULEX may not be deployed everywhere or at full staffing by the time it reached an "initial capability," de Kermabon said EULEX would nonetheless be able to carry out its mandate. He explained that EULEX would not reach a "final capability" 
until 2-3 months later, once it had reached full operational capability - to include deployment in the north. Concerns - Logistics and Belgrade -------------- ¶4. (C) While characterizing the overall handover from UNMIK to EULEX as "OK," de Kermabon said "due to personnel resistance, there are difficulties." Elaborating on this, de Kermabon suggested that UNMIK personnel on the ground were hesitant to give up their positions and resources despite guidance from New York. De Kermabon said that he would maintain pressure on UNMIK by keeping EULEX to its deployment plan and meeting with the new head of DPKO in New York "in the coming days." ¶5. (C) De Kermabon said that the political situation was another constraining factor, explaining that EULEX needed a green light from Belgrade in order to deploy to the north. In response to Ambassador Silverberg's comment that this was unlikely, especially if the Serbs note EU hesitation, going in by force, de Kermabon said, "was not an option." He said that he was relying on member states to pressure Belgrade to accept EULEX, suggesting that it was his view that Serbian FM Jeremic was calling the shots in Belgrade. De Kermabon said it was his feeling that Serbian President Tadic was prepared to give EULEX the green light, but that Jeremic was blocking that for internal political purposes. He said that it was important for member states to tell Jeremic to "stop." De Kermabon said that it was also important to stop UNMIK's negotiations with Belgrade, a task he said Council Secretariat Balkans Director Stefan Lehne was being dispatched to Belgrade to do in the coming week. ¶6. (C) When Ambassador Silverberg noted that a delay in BRUSSELS 00001569 002 OF 003 deploying to the north would reinforce a sense of partition, and perhaps make it even harder for Serbia to quietly acquiesce, de Kermabon added that it was "important to seize the initiative," de Kermabon suggested that EULEX be firm with Belgrade on the issue of deployment to the north, and ask Belgrade only for its input on how best to do so, not whether EULEX can do so. De Kermabon suggested that this "tactic" was similar to EULEX's approach to UNMIK, arriving in force to ask UNMIK only how they would like to conduct the handover, not whether. For this "bottom up" approach to be successful, de Kermabon repeated that "top down" action was necessary on the political side. De Kermabon said that while Serbia had been able to play upon divisions within the 27 EU member states to postpone EULEX deployment, Serbs - to include Bogdanovic - realize that it is inevitable and are ready to work together with EULEX once Jeremic gives the green light. Cooperation with KFOR -------------- ¶7. (C) De Kermabon characterized cooperation with KFOR as "very good." He said that EULEX and KFOR were working together to find "a pragmatic solution in the field." COMKFOR General Guy and de Kermabon had agreed to transform the unsigned EULEX-KFOR technical agreements into "practical guidance." De Kermabon said that he and Guy had agreed to establish a working group, joint training exercises, and regularly scheduled COMKFOR-EULEX HOM meetings. De Kermabon said that he had briefed DSACEUR McColl on these efforts and that McColl had endorsed them. De Kermabon reported that he was in the process of developing the field guidance with his staff and that it would be reviewed by the member states in the CPCC before being exchanged with KFOR. De Kermabon said that he anticipated no difficulties with Turkey, sharing that the Turkish Ambassador to NATO had told him that he saw "no problems to a pragmatic approach." ¶8. (C) De Kermabon said that EULEX will work to coordinate its response with the local police and KFOR, with local police, EULEX, and then KFOR responding to situations in that order. He stressed that joint command and control training was key to preparedness as language and different equipment could pose challenges. De Kermabon said EULEX sought to reestablish the so-called "blue box" and "green box" approach he had instituted as COMKFOR: local police operating inside a "blue box" while military personnel allowed them freedom of movement by providing a wider cordon or "green box." He reported that the KFOR Chief of Staff General Berger was interested in working together with EULEX on this strategy, and added that he would "follow this carefully." Other Issues -------------- ¶9. (C) De Kermabon reported that negotiations with the UN on the issue of privileges and immunities (P/Is) were ongoing. He was concerned that this could affect the participation of certain member states, most notably Romania, an important contributor to the mission. Concerning the "UN Umbrella" and how he understood this to affect his operations, de Kermabon suggested that this might not be a major issue. EULEX would only have to provide a bi-yearly update report to the UN as KFOR does. Nonetheless, de Kermabon said that this would have to be handled sensitively as some member states might object to the notion of "reporting" to the UN, let alone de Kermabon's presence in New York to deliver such a report. With regard to contingency planning efforts, de Kermabon said he had made a formal request to PSC Ambassadors for reinforcements in case of provocations early on in the mission (reftel). He said that he envisioned this force as a mobile force, able to quickly respond to any serious incidents. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) While we are encouraged by the renewed deployment of EULEX personnel, EULEX's continued insistence on a Serbian green light is troubling. De Kermabon's report of improved coordination with KFOR is especially welcome news. That said, while coordination between EULEX and KFOR at higher levels is reportedly good, our working level EU contacts BRUSSELS 00001569 003 OF 003 still privately express doubts that EULEX will enjoy the same level of support that UNMIK did. It is essential that we work to dispel this notion, reassuring our European partners that they have the support of KFOR so they will not have a pretext not to deploy to the north. .