WHITHER MACEDONIA? - EU OFFICIALS PESSIMISTIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001541 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2018 TAGS: PREL EUN MK GR KV SUBJECT: WHITHER MACEDONIA? - EU OFFICIALS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT MACEDONIAN INTEGRATION Classified By: USEU POLMC Chris Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In meetings with new U.S. Ambassador to Macedonia Phil Reeker September 23, a wide range of EU officials provided a bleak assessment of Macedonia's prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration in the near term. EU officials attributed the current state of affairs to continued Greek intransigence on the name issue and "unhelpful" political developments in Macedonia. Greek Permanent Representative Vassilis Kaskarelis blamed Macedonian PM Gruevski for the impasse, suggesting that having upgraded the name issue internationally for domestic purposes, no Greek government could compromise on the issue. Echoing Ambassador Reeker's concerns that lack of forward momentum could contribute to renewed inter-ethnic problems in Macedonia, EU officials suggested that the U.S. could help unblock the current impasse by working with Macedonia's government to favor some compromise. End Summary. Greek Perm Rep View ¶2. (C) Enroute to Skopje, Ambassador Phil Reeker stopped in Brussels September 23 to meet with EU officials involved with Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic integration efforts. Providing Ambassador Reeker with a very blunt and to-the-point assessment of the current situation, Greek Permanent Representative (and former Greek deputy negotiator on the name issue) Vassilis Kaskarelis said that he saw "no way out of the current situation." Kaskarelis blamed Macedonian PM Gruevski for the current impasse, suggesting that Gruevski had "played the name card in order to overcome domestic problems and marginalize political opponents." Adding that Gruevski lacked experience, Kaskarelis said that it was important to "pass the message to them that if they do not approach the whole situation more realistically, they will have big problems." Elaborating on the problems Macedonia might face, Kaskarelis said that the European Commission would most likely issue a negative report later this fall and suggested that political reforms in Macedonia would suffer as Gruevski was "absorbed with the target of getting rid of everybody." ¶3. (C) Continuing his criticisms, Kaskarelis said that, while the European public was "fed up" with enlargement, the Skopje government mistakenly still believed it was the focus of European interest and that certain EU member states could "make the Greek problem go away." Kaskarelis said he believed Skopje's upgrading the name issue internationally had been a big mistake. He criticized the U.S. handling of the issue over the past year, suggesting we had left Gruevski with the impression that we would be able to help solve the name issue. While acknowledging that he thought the name problem was "stupid" and that Greece could have solved it 15 years ago, Kaskarelis said Skopje's actions created an uproar in Greece, with the government "forced to react." He said he believed "no government can give the green light to Macedonia over this." The issue also influenced Greece's position on Macedonian NATO entry. While leaving open the possibility of a double name (note ) presumably meaning that Macedonia would use its constitutional name internally and a mutually-agreed name everywhere else) and implying there may be flexibility on the identity issue (Kaskarelis saying "Macedonski" could work),he was extremely pessimistic, saying he saw no way for the name issue to be resolved. Other European Views ¶4. (C) According to MEP Doris Pack, chairwoman of the European Parliament's delegation for relations with South-East Europe, the political situation in Macedonia remains very fragile, with inter-ethnic relations tense despite greater ethnic minority representation in the Macedonian government. Pack said that PM Gruevski lacked experience and "does not listen," and that NGOs are telling her that he had "no plan, just tactics." While acknowledging that these attributes and actions, including Gruevski's recent letter writing campaign to European leaders, were unhelpful, Pack argued that Macedonia's biggest problem was neighboring Greece. Critical that "we are all taken hostage by a member state," Pack nonetheless shared Kaskarelis' view that no Greek government could bend on the name issue since "this had brought down previous Greek governments." Suggesting that Gruevski had "a false sense of reality," Pack said that he was mistaken in expecting that other member states would be able to bring about a change in Greek views. ¶5. (C) European Commission Enlargement Directorate FYROM Head of Unit Paola Pampaloni said that Macedonia's problems were BRUSSELS 00001541 002 OF 003 primarily political in nature, and that Macedonia is making steady progress in the areas of legislative and economic reforms. Surprised that Gruevski had not learned any lessons from Bucharest, Pampaloni said that despite having a dominant political majority, Gruevski seemed less inclined to compromise on the name issue than ever before. In her view, Gruevski still believes that the U.S. and other EU member states will be able to solve the name problem for Macedonia. In addition to this false estimation, Pampaloni believes Gruevski has "damaged his position among member states" by writing letters and negotiating through the press. Concerning the Commission's upcoming report on Macedonia to be released November 5, Pampaloni said that accession negotiations could not begin until "progress was made in political dialogue, per the Copenhagen Criteria." Looking forward, signs were not encouraging to Pampaloni. Gruevski's actions - ranging from showing no flexibility on the name issue to calls for an early election - leave the impression among many member states that his only priorities were his own political standing and domestic objectives, not EU integration. Saying that "compromise is not in his vocabulary," Pampaloni suggested that only figures such as outgoing UNGA President Srgjan Kerim or former Interior Minister Boskoski reportedly had any influence over Gruevski. ¶6. (C) Council Secretariat Director for Balkan and Central European Affairs Stefan Lehne's assessment of the situation was similarly grim, with Lehne suggesting that "the UN and the U.S. are the only game in town to solve the name issue." Concerned that Europe's influence suffered in the region as a result of this standoff, Lehne said about Gruevski, "We have a local politician who is not a committed European and will probably face another Bucharest if he pushes for a date." While encouraged by greater minority participation in government, to include the coalition Gruevski had formed with ethnic Albanian parties, Lehne expressed concern that if ethnic Albanians see Gruevski abandoning the EU/NATO accession track, Gruevski's "lack of vision" could lead to problems during the upcoming municipal elections and in other areas. Concerning the name issue, Lehne said that while Gruevski realizes he needs to go ninety percent of the way, Gruevski is not convinced the Greeks will go the other ten, an approach suggesting Gruevski lacked confidence. Citing border demarcation with Kosovo as an example, Lehne said he did not believe Gruevski would move forward until"demarcation was totally a done deal ) signed, stamped, delivered." Lehne said the EU had communicated to Gruevski that if the name issue could be solved, much goodwill would be created, possibly allowing the EU to "cut some corners," keeping Macedonia on its path towards full Euro-Atlantic integration. ¶7. (C) UK Permanent Representative Tim Barrow said "the more I speak with the Greeks, the more I am aware they are not moving." Barrow said that the name issue was "hard wired" into Greek politics as governments could fall on the issue. Adding that Macedonia's recent posturing on the issue had not helped, Barrow suggested that Skopje needed to "make its case better, recognizing who had the stronger hand." Characterizing U.S. engagement on the issue as both "positive and critical," Barrow said that it was important that the U.S. and UK be in line to seize the moment when it comes up. Saying that it was his impression that many in Athens want to solve the name issue, Barrow also suggested that the Macedonians change the terms of debate. Barrow said it was his hope to reinvigorate PSC trips to the region as they increased knowledge and, most importantly, enthusiasm about the area. Macedonian View ¶8. (C) Regarding Greece's continued efforts to frustrate Macedonian integration ambitions, Macedonian Ambassador Blerim Reka said this was actually part of a "larger geostrategic plan to destroy the Adriatic Charter." Reka said that while Macedonia had shown great flexibility on the flag and constitution, the name issue was a Macedonian red line because "for Macedonia the name is our identity, for Greeks it is an issue of maintaining a coalition government." Frustrated that Macedonia had spent 3 years as an EU candidate country but still did not have a date for negotiations, Reka said Macedonia's immediate priorities were to obtain a date for negotiations to begin and a visa free travel regime with the EU. Reka suggested that if these goals were not achieved, pessimism among ordinary Macedonians about the benefits of further integration would rise. Calling for the EU and NATO to "show flexibility," Reka said BRUSSELS 00001541 003 OF 003 that 2009 would be a decisive year to "show Macedonians the benefits of Euro-Atlantic integration." While acknowledging that Macedonia most likely would not receive a date when the Commission released its report in November, Reka repeatedly stressed the importance of NATO integration, saying "NATO provides a guarantee; the EU path will take time." Comment ¶9. (C) These meetings show clearly that the Macedonian government, and Prime Minister Gruevski in particular, need to change course in dealing with Greece and in managing Macedonia's internal affairs, in order to regain the high ground. If it proves to be impossible for any Greek government to accept a reasonable solution on the name dispute, then Macedonia needs to have established a constructive position and record that will enable the U.S. and other proponents of stability in the Balkans to explore new avenues toward the goal of Euro-Atlantic integration. (U) This cable has been cleared by Ambassador Reeker. .