TFGG01: AMBASSADOR MEETS EU ENLARGEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001276

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN GG RU TU YI
SUBJECT: TFGG01: AMBASSADOR MEETS EU ENLARGEMENT
COMMISSIONER REHN ON EVE OF GAERC ON GEORGIA; RUSSIA,
SERBIA AND TURKEY DISCUSSED

REF: BRUSSELS 1245

Classified By: USEU/POL M-C Chris Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(C) Summary: In the Ambassador's August 12 meeting with
the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn said the
EU, post-Georgia, needed to re-examine its relations with
Russia, including the EU-Russia Partnership Agreement. On
Serbia, Rehn thought the French presidency would move toward
an Interim Agreement, since relations with the EU were
improving after the arrest of Karadzic. He did not answer
whether he thought a Serbian referral to the ICJ of the
question of Kosovo independence could affect the deployment
of EULEX. On Turkey, Rehn thought France might open three
accession chapters, rather than the usual two per presidency.
It is important, he said, to reinforce positive trends,
especially those leading to entente between the religious and
secular in Turkey. End Summary

Georgia
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2. (C) The EU's Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn said on
August 12 he could not predict what would be decided at the
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)
meeting on the following day regarding Georgia, pending a
report from President Sarkozy. He said President Bush's
strong statement on August 11 was important. The issues to
be discussed in GAERC would likely be: cease-fire,
withdrawal of forces to status quo ante positions, respect
for international borders, humanitarian assistance, and an
eventual international monitoring presence. The setting was
more complicated for Europe, he said, given especially
Russia's provision of energy resources. The
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is vulnerable, and Rehn noted
that it had recently been damaged in an apparent terrorist
attack in Turkey. (Note: This was a reference to an
explosion on August 6, claimed by the PKK, End Note.)
Nonetheless, he said, Europe needed to voice its concerns and
debate the consequences for Russian/EU relations.


3. (C) The Ambassador said Russia should not be allowed to
hold Gori as a negotiating point, and that Russian could not
retain a continued role as peacekeepers and mediators, per
the 1994 Moscow Agreement. To Rehn's question about the
consequences for U.S./Russian relations, the Ambassador noted
that the Secretary had convened the G7, signaling less
openness toward the G8 format including Russia, and that
there was work underway in the USG to identify longer-term
consequences. The Ambassador noted that the EU should have
on the table a number of options as well including the
EU-Russia Partnership Agreement and the treatment of Gazprom.


4. (C) The Ambassador asked about longer-term consequences
for EU enlargement. Rehn said Russia was testing EU resolve,
and the big issue was Ukraine. He said Putin had been
consistent in warning that independence for Kosovo would have
consequences for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. "Many Serbians,
even pro-European ones," he said, "are saying 'I told you
so.'" The Ambassador maintained that it is important for the
U.S. and the EU to signal continued support to Georgia;
otherwise, aspiring democrats will conclude there is a hard
price to pay for turning to the West. Moreover, she said,
the Russian offensive was clearly pre-meditated.


5. (C) Rehn agreed that Russia seemed to want to establish a
buffer zone in Georgia, and even cut the country in half and
weaken it. Noting the striking parallels with the early
1920s - when Moscow used the pretext of threats to local
Bolsheviks to take over Georgia - Rehn acknowledged that
Putin knew his history. "However, he should have been more
creative." Now, Rehn said, it is difficult to imagine what
kind of Partnership Agreement the EU could have with Russia,
given such behavior. Rehn, who is Finnish, noted there is a
reason why his country reportedly has the largest artillery
forces in the EU.

Serbia
--------------


6. (C) For Serbia itself, however, things were "clearly
better," and the French Presidency wanted to move toward an
Interim Agreement, which Rehn said counted more than a
Stabilization and Association Agreement. An Interim
Agreement was immediately implementable since it would be
based on EU competencies, not member state competencies. If
ICTY prosecutor Brammertz's next report is positive, the
Dutch would be more likely to support and Interim Agreement.
Rehn thought Brammertz considered the Karadzic arrest to be
"a milestone," but that Brammertz had continued concerns
about access to archival materials. "This is the first chance

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we've had to make real progress with Serbia," he added.


7. (C) As for referring the question of Kosovo independence
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ),Rehn wanted to
avoid Serbia's doing that, but said that if Belgrade can
transfer the Kosovo issue elsewhere for a time, it could make
negotiating with the EU easier. Rehn did not answer the
Ambassador's question about the impact of an ICJ referral on
EULEX deployment, which could encourage the UN and some EU
members to adopt a "wait and see" approach. The Ambassador
also made the point that an ICJ judgment could have
unintended consequences for other countries and that we were
pointing out to other UNGA members the risks to their
interests.

Turkey
--------------


8. (C) Commissioner Olli Rehn said he did not have a
convincing answer to the Ambassador's question about the
impact on accession talks of the Constitutional Court's
judgment regarding the Turkish AKP party. Turkish society -
Muslim democrats and secularists - still needed to find a
modus vivendi, with EU and U.S. encouragement, he said, and
this would be "a long and difficult journey." Rehn thought
there now needed to be some constitutional amendments, and no
provocation from the Turkish military establishment; however,
the chief prosecutor did not seem ready to drop his case
against the AKP. Rehn thought France might be willing to
open three chapters for negotiation with Turkey, rather than
the usual two per EU presidency. Rehn and the Ambassador
both deemed unfounded the suspicion some harbor that Turkey's
EU membership would ultimately weaken the EU.

SILVERBERG

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