QUAD POLDIRS ON GEORGIA-ABKHAZIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001120 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS KINR EAID ECON EUN GO XH SUBJECT: QUAD POLDIRS ON GEORGIA-ABKHAZIA REF: TBILISI 1258 Classified By: USEU Political Counselor Christopher R. Davis, for reaso ns 1.4 (b) and (d). 1.(C) SUMMARY: At a July 22 meeting in Brussels, Political Directors of Quad countries (Germany, U.S., UK, and France) agreed to pursue a three-phase plan as outlined in the Germany "Friends" paper to bring the parties to the Abhkazia conflict to negotiate a peaceful settlement. The Quad, in this formation also known as the "Western Friends of Georgia," pledged to launch negotiations in Berlin in the last week of July over a two to three day period. The Quad further agreed to consider in such discussion various ways to reach agreement on a phase one package including a Georgian non-use of force pledge and balanced security arrangements, e.g., a freeze of the status quo, the principle of IDP returns and possible pull back of forces, including a joint Abkhaz/Georgian police force with international oversight. In response to a UK request, the U.S. supported the possibility of EU observation of the Berlin talks. In addition, the Quad planned for a Georgia ministerial meeting at the UN General Assembly High Level segment in September. They also explored ways to increase the diplomatic costs to Russia of its continued obstructionism and develop possible incentives for the Abkhaz to negotiate a settlement. END SUMMARY. 2.(C) On July 22, on the margins of the EU monthly foreign ministers meeting in Brussels, German Political Director Volker Stanzel convened a 90 minute meeting of the Western Friends of Georgia political directors, including for the UK, PolDir Sir Mark Lyall Grant; for France MFA DirGen for Eastern Europe Roland Galharague and Deputy Director Alexandre Vulic. EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried was joined by EUR DAS Matthew Bryza represented the United States. 3.(C) Stanzel opened the meeting with a read-out of German Foreign Minister Steinmeier's recent trip to Georgia and Russia. Stanzel said that talks with the Georgians, Abkhaz and Russians served to highlight three problems already foreseen by the Quad: how to persuade Georgia to give a non-use of force (NUF) pledge; how to persuade the Abkhaz to enter into a process with an intended outcome (i.e., reintegration) to which they did not now agree how to work around the Russians who wanted toprevent the Abkhaz from negotiating? Steinmeier reportedly concluded that the process was "not fully back to square one, but close to it." Steinmeier had not obtained an endorsement by any party of the three phase plan, but did acknowledge effort to get to that point by the three parties to the conflict. 4.(C) On next steps, Germany obtained the Quad's support to convene negotiations in the middle of next week in Berlin, based on a three-phase plan outlined in the German-drafted "Friends of Georgia" paper, but with details of each phase to be negotiated. Stanzel agreed with UK and U.S. emphasis on the need for flexibility in the negotiations to ensure the right combination of elements in each phase. A/S Fried stressed the importance of emphasizing phase one and discussing security arrangements. The Georgians were willing to offer a NUF but only as part of a package. With this in mind, the USG was currently looking at configuration of phase one with a view toward addressing policing problems in both the Gali district and the Kodori Gorge. The Quad agreed to include in such discussion a joint Abkhaz/Georgian police force with international oversight. 5.(C) The Germans proposed that the talks could begin at the expert level, then work up to Political Directors over two to three days. Stanzel explained that this format could allow experts to have the opportunity to meet informally and explore possibilities for aspects of a settlement package before requiring formally staking out positions. To make it more difficult for the Russians and Abkhaz to refuse to attend the event, Steinmeier intended to personally issue the invitations and open the first session. Fried pledged to attend, but expressed concern that the Russians would be obstructionist in the early sessions if they knew in advance that the level would escalate to Political Directors. He urged a rapid escalation to the Political Directors, without making it contingent upon progress at the lower level. In response to a UK query, A/S Fried supported the inclusion of EU observers to the process. DAS Bryza added that the Western Friends could use EU help in developing and implementing quick impact CBMs, such as in the health and humanitarian areas, could be useful. Stanzel noted that the Russians would have to agree to any such EU role in the talks. 6.(C) The French added that a late summer lull in Euro Atlantic diplomacy toward Georgia (i.e., between the Berlin meeting and the UNGA) could be dangerous. They urged Western BRUSSELS 00001120 002 OF 002 Friends to ensure the continuity of the burgeoning political process A/S Fried and DAS Bryza also warned that Russian attempts to resurrect an inflammatory resolution on Georgia in the UNSC could also damage prospects for the talks. In any case, the UK and U.S. delegations suggested that we consider joint U.S.-EU demarches rather than isolated interventions. 7.(C) The Quad briefly discussed ways in which Transatlantic partners could try to exert leverage on the Russians and Abkhaz, particularly in the event that Russia continued be obstructionist and provocative. A/S Fried reported that the USG was making quiet efforts to reach out to the Abkhaz as well as to explore how to pressure Russia if its firms violated Georgia's sovereignty in Abhkazia. He urged European partners to consider similar measures toward the Russians, as well as a ban on facilitating visa issuance to Abkhaz attempting to travel to Europe on Russian passports. 8.(U) Assistant Secretary Fried has cleared this message. CHASE .