EC NON-PROLIFERATION WORKSHOPS YIELD IMPROVED

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001034 SENSITIVE SIPDIS PLEASE PASS TO U.S. OAS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP EUN SUBJECT: EC NON-PROLIFERATION WORKSHOPS YIELD IMPROVED COORDINATION REF: STATE 33804 This message is Sensitive But Unclassified. Please protect accordingly. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Building on cooperative efforts that began in March, U.S. non-proliferation officials participated in European Commission (EC)-hosted workshops focused on determining the EC's priorities for programming EU Stability Instrument funding on non-proliferation and identifying opportunities for coordination and cooperation with other actors. U.S. officials provided a detailed overview of U.S. efforts and programs targeted at export control, nuclear smuggling/illicit trafficking, scientist redirection, and UNSCR 1540 outreach. EU and IAEA representatives also discussed their programs, and EC officials committed to continue the EU-U.S. coordination with a follow-up meeting in early 2009 after Stability Instrument funding is allocated. End Summary. -------------- Background -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Coordination is moving ahead based on the U.S.-EU summit declaration in 2007, which called for promoting greater coordination of nonproliferation efforts through UNSCR 1540. In 2006, the EU established an approximately 300 million-Euro "Stability Instrument" to carry out its activities in this area and has expressed an interest in further coordinating policies with other donors as a follow up to the March 2008 consultations. To explore how to aid third countries in nonproliferation capacity-building, European Commission and U.S. nonproliferation experts met June 24-26 at the expert level. Prospective areas of cooperation include export control, prevention of nuclear smuggling, support for engagement of scientists, and the development of regional 1540 centers of excellence, building off of the Ministerial endorsements in the OSCE, OAS, and ARF about regional cooperation as called for in UNSCR 1810. In the June workshops, U.S. officers for third country assistance, to include EXBS, Nuclear Smuggling (NSOI), Scientist Redirection, and in conjunction with UNSCR 1540, presented to EU Commission and Council experts a detailed overview about ways to program EU Stability Instrument funding on nonproliferation. The EU (primarily Germany's export control ministry, BAFA) and IAEA programs were discussed in more general terms and the EU expressed its desire to continue this coordination. In all, the joint U.S.-EU collaboration started in March will complement the related USG initiatives. End background. -------------- Workshop I - Nuclear Smuggling -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The first day's workshop addressed nuclear smuggling. Michael Stafford, coordinator of the U.S. Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI),gave a briefing on NSOI and its progress to date, and then laid out a menu of NSOI-developed projects for the EU to consider supporting with Stability Instrument funds. This menu included projects to improve security along green borders in the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan; improve security at fixed border crossings in the Kyrgyz Republic; provide long-term, secure storage for radioactive sources in Ukraine; improve border security in Afghanistan; improve security at fixed border crossings and seaports in Ukraine; improve security along green borders in Ukraine; improve border security in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and fight corruption. Stafford also described anticipated assistance needs for Pakistan and the particular sensitivities that would be involved in working with the Pakistani government. ¶4. (U) Other speakers included Anita Nilssen and George Moore of the IAEA, who provided a briefing on the IAEA's Illicit Trafficking Database, what the database indicates about the nuclear smuggling threat, and some general thoughts BRUSSELS 00001034 002 OF 004 about assistance priorities and the need for donor coordination; Bruno Gruselle of the French Foundation for Strategic Research, who also addressed the nuclear smuggling threat; and Francesco Marelli of the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, who described the work of his organization. ¶5. (SBU) Subsequent to the presentations and ensuing discussion, EC EuropeAid Cooperation Office Director Jean-Paul Joulia informed Stafford that he would be making recommendations shortly on allocation of remaining 2008 funds and was inclined to support several of the NSOI suggestions. This would likely include funding from the Nuclear Safety Instrument for the long-term, secure storage facility in Ukraine, support from some funding source for anti-corruption training, and funding from the Nuclear Stability Instrument for fixed border crossings in the Kyrgyz Republic and/or Ukraine. Joulia promised Stafford an update on his planning in mid-July, and he said a final decision would be made in November. Lars-Gunnar Wigemark, Security Policy Office Director in the EC External Relations Directorate-General, told Stafford that he would be formulating recommendations for allocation of 2009-11 funds and was also inclined to support several NSOI-developed projects. These included projects to improve security at fixed border crossings in Afghanistan and possibly Pakistan, as well as projects to better secure green borders in several Central Asian countries. He suggested that the sides hold a third meeting early in 2009 to firm up the details of the EU contribution, and that they remain in informal communication during the interim period. -------------- Workshop II -- Export Control -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The workshop's discussion topic for June 25 was "Dual-Use Export Control." U.S. 1540 Coordinator Tom Wuchte started the discussion with an overview of UNSCR 1540 and the way ahead, followed by Andrew Church, Deputy Director of ISN/ECC, who briefed the group on the Department's Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program. The briefing provided background on the types of assistance offered under the EXBS Program and other related USG programs that are coordinated through the monthly Interagency Working Group chaired by ISN/ECC. The main focus, however, was on the types of assistance the EU could provide to specific countries and regions to complement U.S. efforts. U.S. suggestions focused on several areas, including: helping to institutionalize strategic trade-related training by integrating it into the curricula of national training centers, such as customs academies; establishing regional centers of excellence that could focus on some or all aspects of strategic trade controls (e.g., licensing, targeting suspect containers at border crossings) and help foster regional networks and collaboration; contributing to large-scale, multi-year projects, including refurbishing border posts in Central Asia; working in countries and regions not covered by EXBS or other related USG program assistance, such as sub-Saharan Africa and those that have requested assistance under UNSCR 1540 but for which the EXBS program does not have funding. Church also reiterated the critical importance of prior coordination in areas of increasing nonproliferation outreach interest to the EU, particularly Southeast Asia and the Middle East/North Africa, given the active ongoing presence of a number of major donors already in those regions, including some EU member states. Other suggestions focused on specific countries in which the EU might be more successful in gaining traction, such as Egypt, and countries in which EXBS engagement had just begun and a division of labor made sense, such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Church left behind a list of countries in which EXBS is currently active. ¶7. (SBU) In addition to providing suggestions for EU assistance, he also encouraged the EU to use its clout as a grouping of 27 countries to help build the political will in countries to establish or make meaningful improvements to their strategic trade controls. These remarks helped to provide a different perspective from those of Olaf Simonsen of Germany's Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA),who presented on BAFA's efforts as the lead BRUSSELS 00001034 003 OF 004 implementer of current EU export control outreach efforts, and argued that outreach efforts should be limited to those countries that invite donors to help them. Simonsen also proposed a division of labor between the EU and other assistance providers based on the "best country cooperation principle." Sergey Yakimov of Russia's Federal Service for Technical and Export Control (FSTEC) provided a briefing on the ongoing, multi-year EU-Russian Cooperation Program, which presumably seeks to harmonize the EU and Russian export control systems. Yakimov mentioned that a comparative analysis of the Russian and EU legal frameworks for export control had been completed and that FSTEC was making several recommendations for changes to the Russian system as a result. Department is seeking to obtain a copy but, if unsuccessful, will ask the mission to formally make the request. Mati Tarvainen of the IAEA also presented, with the main suggestion being to focus efforts on countries that lacked safeguards. When pressed to suggest specific countries for outreach efforts, he would say only that there are many countries in Africa that had no safeguards in force. ¶8. (SBU) The EC is clearly interested in broadening its outreach efforts to specific regions, including the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. It also appears willing to explore assistance to Africa, and EC staffer Bruno Dupre openly supported comments by UNSCR 1540 Coordinator Tom Wuchte that, while African countries might not pose an immediate nonproliferation threat, there was value in a forward-looking approach, and engagement there would help remove excuses by countries in other regions for not improving controls due to lack of universality. Both Church and Wuchte underscored the importance of close coordination between the U.S. and EU as we move forward. -------------- Workshop III -- Scientist Redirection -------------- ¶9. (U) The third day's workshop on June 26th focused on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Scientist Redirection. Robin Copeland gave the U.S. Department of State's presentation and highlighted the multiple programs underway to facilitate the redirection of former WMD scientists and also to work with scientists in the biological and chemical communities that have valuable dual use knowledge. She reviewed projects underway in Russia and the Former Soviet Union (FSU),including ISTC/STCU, Bio Industry Initiative and Biosecurity Engagement Program. She also provided overviews of the Iraq and Libya Scientist Engagement Programs, as well as the bio and chemical security engagement programs (CSP) underway outside the former Soviet Union. She highlighted programs which could benefit from EU involvement, such as those in Iraq, and outlined specific projects within program categories where the EU might be able to contribute funding and expertise. ¶10. (U) Other speakers included Maurizio Martellini, Landau Center, on a theoretical model for identifying new communities of scientists and the best ways to engage them, as well as how to measure success; Uve Meyer, German Embassy on the benefits of using the ISTC as the vehicle for all future EU scientist engagement; Greg Kaser, HTSPE, on behalf of the UK government about their WMD scientist engagement programs in Russia and the FSU and their new initiative to assist Libya with isotope production; and Ian Anthony from SIPRI presenting on some of the broad issues and questions that provided a good framework for the afternoon discussion. ¶11. (SBU) It was widely held that the nonproliferation community needs to move away from the use of the word redirection and begin to use the word engagement. There was consensus that individuals with significant dual use knowledge, especially from the chemical and biotechnology industries, represent a new challenge and need to be engaged. There was some debate about whether the ISTC is the best vehicle to use as an umbrella organization for future engagement in places such as the DPRK. Several participants strongly advocated for the ISTC, although the general view was that the ISTC is overly bureaucratic, has managerial challenges and may not be the best vehicle to take cooperation forward into new geographic locations and with BRUSSELS 00001034 004 OF 004 new communities, especially where young scientists are involved. Another topic that was consistently highlighted was the development of civilian nuclear power in the Middle East and the need for this work to be done in a transparent, safe and secure manner with a cadre of well trained scientists and engineers. ¶12. (SBU) Currently, the EU's entire budget for WMD scientist redirection goes through its Research Division, which in turn sends one hundred percent of the funds to the ISTC and STCU. The EU representatives recognize this may need to change if the EU is going to respond with flexibility to new challenges but the bias towards the ISTC that some member countries have will continue to make the routing of the funding a contentious issue. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (U) The EU's Stability Report is due to be considered after July 3rd and its recommendations will be discussed in September. Such projects that the EU are likely to sponsor include the aforementioned regional CBRN training centers located in perhaps the Middle East/North Africa or Southeast Asia. Very few details were provided on the centers except that they were presented as a training institution that could be utilized by non-member countries. Overall, the increased coordination through UNSCR 1540 and the desire to facilitate better deconfliction of 3rd country assistance set a positive way forward. USEU welcomes this effort and will work closely with key Washington offices to continue the efforts and prepare for the expected next step in early 2009. ¶14. (U) This cable was cleared by the U.S. 1540 Coordinator Tom Wuchte and program officers in attendance. WOHLERS .