SLOVAK-HUNGARIAN TENSIONS RISK DAMAGING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRATISLAVA 000507 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/CE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2018 TAGS: PREL PHUM LO HU SUBJECT: SLOVAK-HUNGARIAN TENSIONS RISK DAMAGING MAJORITY-MINORITY RELATIONS WITHIN SLOVAKIA REF: A) BRATISLAVA 316 B) BRATISLAVA 290 BRATISLAVA 00000507 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Vincent Obsitnik for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (C) Introduction and Summary: Only two months after Prime Ministers Fico and Gyurscany dined together in Brussels, Slovak-Hungarian relations have reached a new low in the post-Meciar period. Actions by Slovak riot police against unruly Hungarian fans at a November 1 soccer match and subsequent protests in front of the Slovak Embassy in Budapest have further inflamed tensions, which had spiked over issues related mainly to the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Almost as if scripted, the key protagonists have played their role to a tee: Jan Slota spewing crude, xenophobic insults; Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) leader Pal Csaky provoking the entire Slovak political spectrum by raising "taboos" such as the Benes Decrees and autonomy; Hungarian extremists mounting protests in front of the Slovak Embassy in Budapest; GOH officials publicly questioning the status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia; and PM Fico and Parliamentary leader Paska sternly warning against Hungarian interference in Slovakia's domestic affairs. ¶2. (C) The November 1 incident, which appears to have been instigated by Hungarian extremists (from Hungary),has led to polemics on both sides of the border. Although Foreign Ministers Kubis and Goncz plan to hold bilateral consultations in Budapest on December 15, we are concerned that with the approach of a long Slovak election season and uncertainties caused by the global financial crisis, both governments must act more decisively to lower tensions and rein in extremism. If not, the unhealthy (and too familiar) dynamic described above could intensify with unforeseen, and potentially violent, consequences. At greatest risk is the relatively good, if historically-loaded, relationship between the Slovaks and the ethnic Hungarian minority in Slovakia. End Introduction and Summary. Csaky's "Provocations" -------------- ¶3. (C) In September, SMK participated in a meeting of the Forum of Hungarian MPs of the Carpathian Basin in Budapest -- an entity that since last March appears to be an institutional part of the Hungarian Parliament. This meeting led to calls by the Slovak National Party (SNS) for a special parliamentary session at which SMK would be questioned about its "traitorous" activities and alleged fealty to Hungarian Parliamentary Speaker Szili. Although Slovak Parliament Speaker Paska declined to convene such a session, he introduced a resolution on October 31 condemning SMK's participation in the Forum and accusing the Hungarian Parliament of infringing on Slovak sovereignty. The resolution was approved during a vitriolic parliamentary session on November 4. ¶4. (C) Csaky's subsequent meeting with an ethnic Hungarian Romanian MEP, Laszlo Tokes (the leader of the Carpathian Basin Autonomy Forum),made headlines and provoked sharp criticism from across the political spectrum -- not to mention from the SMK's former chairman, Bela Bugar. Under a banner reading "Csaky breaks the taboo," the daily SME reported that Csaky, during his meeting with Tokes, discussed ideas for cultural and educational autonomy and a Hungarian "mini-parliament" that would oversee decision-making on these issues. Prime Minister Fico and FM Kubis sharply criticized Csaky, which led, in part, to Hungarian FM Goncz's convocation of the Slovak Ambassador on October 2. ¶5. (C) As Csaky noted in an October 7 interview in the daily SME, such forms of self-government are features (if not particularly effective ones) of life for the small Slovak minority in Hungary. He also clarified that SMK does not espouse regional autonomy, but rather greater decision-making authority over key issues affecting the Hungarian minority, i.e., education and culture. As both ethnic Hungarian and Slovak scholars point out, Europe offers several successful models for progressive majority-minority relations, e.g., in South Tyrol and Finland. But the use of the word "autonomy" really does appear to be a taboo in Slovakia; even the most moderate of Slovak MPs characterized Csaky's words as "not very friendly to Slovakia." ¶6. (C) Zoltan Bara, international relations chairman of SMK, told Poloffs on October 9 that it was unfortunate that Csaky had used the word autonomy, but dismissed the furor as a "pseudo issue." Bara also confirmed that SMK had decided not to join Tokes' "autonomy forum." When asked what SMK could BRATISLAVA 00000507 002.2 OF 004 do to lower tensions, Bara stated that party leaders needed to repeat continually that the Hungarians do not seek territorial autonomy, nor do they view Kosovo as a precedent. Bara spoke candidly about the pride he feels in the significant successes that Slovakia has achieved. Hungary's economic and political doldrums form quite a stark contrast, he added. But Bara made clear, as have several other ethnic Hungarian interlocutors (from different economic strata and regions of Slovakia),that the effects of SNS's hostile words and policies, e.g., deleting Hungarian place names from new schoolbooks, are increasingly felt among the minority population. The fact that senior GOS officials rarely directly condemn Slota's anti-Hungarian remarks is worse, according to Bara. War of Words Heats Up -------------- ¶7. (C) In response to Csaky's actions and criticism from the GOH, the Slovak Foreign Ministry circulated a non-paper on Slovak-Hungarian relations to NATO and EU Missions in Bratislava on October 10 (emailed to EUR/CE). It states that "since the declaration of Kosovo's independence, there have evidently been intensified efforts by the political representatives of Hungarian minorities in states neighboring Hungary, including Slovakia, to open the issue of the creation of ethnically autonomous areas on the territories of these countries. The attitudes of several political actors in Hungary contribute to the growth of this trend." The non-paper also condemns the Hungarian Parliament's support for the Forum of Hungarian MPs in the Carpathian Basin and the decision of the forum to "establish a lobbying office in Brussels, whose main goal is the promotion of the idea of autonomy." ¶8. (C) The interministerial rhetoric has heated up further in recent days: after FM Goncz publicly accused the Slovak Government of allowing hatred of foreigners to develop in Slovakia, a reportedly furious FM Kubis immediately ordered his staff to draft a stern response rejecting Goncz's assertions. The October 23 statement read, in part: Goncz's statement is "just another manifestation of Budapest's long-term policy aimed at discrediting the Slovak Republic and its government, and activity in which Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Goncz is becoming increasingly involved, and as such it needs to be condemned." (Comment: We have often heard from reliable sources -- including the Minister himself -- that Kubis does not view Goncz as a trustworthy partner. Too many times, according to the Slovaks, Goncz has said one thing in a meeting with Kubis or the two have agreed on a way forward, and she has subsequently gone to the press in a way that undercuts Kubis. End Comment.) ¶9. (C) Tensions spilled over at a November 1 soccer match in the Slovak town of Dunajska Streda (ethnic Hungarians comprise a majority of the population). According to press reports, young Hungarian extremists organized via the internet to cross the border and gather at the soccer match. Hungarian law enforcement officials alerted the Slovaks, who deployed almost 1000 Slovak police officers to the match. (Comment: According to one Emboff, many Slovaks also knew thanks to internet chat sites that Hungarians planned to gather in large numbers at the match. End Comment.) There are differing accounts of what led to the police crackdown, which occurred 15 minutes into the game, which then resumed without further incident. The GOH has requested an investigation because 50 people sought medical treatment as a result of the police action. Six were reportedly hospitalized. The Slovak Police arrested, and shortly thereafter released 15 Slovaks and 17 Hungarian citizens in connection with the event. Poloff spoke on November 3 with Dunajska Streda's mayor, who characterized the police action as "overkill." He praised the good relations between Slovaks and Hungarians in the town, but added that the events of November 1 were the "worst ethnic incident" he could recall in almost two decades. Mere hours after the stadium arrests, in protests that were reportedly coordinated in part by the radical Hungarian political party Jobbik, approximately 150 people burned Slovak flags in front of the Slovak Embassy in Budapest, prompting a harsh statement of protest from the MFA in Bratislava. Forget Slota's Provocations...Look at GOS Policy -------------- --- ¶10. (C) The current incidents are worrisome, not least because they highlight how easily events can spin out of control. However, they obscure what is for many ethnic BRATISLAVA 00000507 003.2 OF 004 Hungarian politicians and intellectuals the fundamental problem, i.e., that under the Fico government, it is not possible for ethnic Hungarians to "take part effectively...in decisions affecting" the minority as provided for in both the Slovak Constitution and in the 1995 Bilateral Treaty between Slovakia and Hungary. Recent comments by Education Minister Mikolaj (an SNS appointee) to the effect that it would be preferable if Hungarians refrained from using Hungarian in public, and his steadfast refusal to withdraw textbooks for Hungarian students that do not include in the text Hungarian place names, as previously pledged by the GOS, undermine the oft-repeated statement of Slovak officials that the SNS anti-Hungarian agenda is only rhetorical and not relevant to GOS policy. ¶11. (C) SMK also claims that in first four recent rounds of EU structural fund allocations, only one Hungarian school in Slovakia received EU monies. The MFA doesn't dispute SMK's statistics, but denies any discriminatory practice. MFA officials state that prior to 2006, when SMK was in government, Hungarian schools were amply supported and thus are generally in better condition than some Slovak schools. During an October 21 visit to Nove Zamky, a town with a 50-50 mix of Slovaks and Hungarians, the city administrator, a Slovak, told poloffs that the Hungarian high school was underfunded by the regional government in comparison to its Slovak counterpart. ¶12. (C) Prime Minister Fico stated decisively on October 20 that the government would not withdraw the controversial textbooks, but then instructed his party to support an SMK-drafted bill which would mandate that future textbooks contain Hungarian geographic names in the text. This small gesture helped avert protests by a coalition of Hungarian educators, parents and politicians, but underscores an ironic dynamic: Despite -- or, more accurately, as a result of -- concerns about the government's attitudes and policies toward minorities, SMK is very open about its desire to be part of the next governing coalition. This, SMK believes, is the only way to guarantee that the rights of ethnic Hungarians are not eroded. ¶13. (C) As an isolated part of a weakened opposition, the Hungarian Coalition Party wields almost no power. It would be inaccurate to posit that because there are 20 ethnic Hungarian deputies in the Parliament that Hungarians have meaningful input into national-level decision-making that affects the Hungarian community. They simply do not, and the textbook issue is merely an example of the minority's lack of influence. Only when SMK garners the support of Smer, as in the case of the October 23 vote, can it protect ethnic Hungarian interests. ¶14. (C) Comment and conclusion: Despite the mutual recriminations between Bratislava and Budapest, the most salient question may not be the fate of Slovak-Hungarian relations, which will likely totter along, but rather how much damage can be done to what is a relatively good, but historically-loaded, relationship between the Slovak majority and the Hungarian minority. A recent poll conducted by the Slovak Academy of Sciences indicates that approximately 70 percent of ethnic Hungarians are proud to be Slovak citizens. This is good news. On the other hand, a poll conducted by the Open Society Foundation indicates that an increasing number of Slovak youth have negative perceptions of Hungarians and even characterize them using some of the same insulting phrases as Jan Slota. More troubling is the fact that PM Fico and other key GOS officials refuse to condemn strongly Slota's hate speech. In unintentionally ironic comments on November 3, President Gasparovic stated that "any extremism, intolerance and nationalist emotions do not belong in sports and should be condemned by all political parties." Yet, Gasparovic has stated that he supports the sentiments, if not the words of Jan Slota. ¶15. (C) Comment cont.: Meanwhile, the political and economic climate in Hungary appears to be fostering extremists like the Jobbik party and the Magyar Garda. Recently, a video posted on You Tube featured threats against Hedviga Malinova (see septel) and Pal Csaky. During the video, when Csaky's image appeared a voice could be heard saying "kill him, kill him, kill him." It is not an unreasonable leap to conclude that hate speech and xenophobic gestures -- such as the defacing of signs and buildings in ethnic Slovak village of Mlynky in Hungary -- could encourage fringe elements, such as the producers of the video and the soccer hooligans. We leave it to Embassy Budapest to comment on the Gyurscany Government's actions and motivations, but in Slovakia, it BRATISLAVA 00000507 004.2 OF 004 appears that PM Fico seeks to co-opt the nationalist voters of SNS with an eye toward jettisoning SNS from the next coalition. In the meantime, however, this approach will cause Slovakia's international reputation to suffer, it could provoke inter-ethnic violence, and relations between two natural partners will continue to be strained. OBSITNIK