MOVING SLOVAKIA CLOSER TO "YES" ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRATISLAVA 000487 SIPDIS FOR EUR -- STUART JONES E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2018 TAGS: PREL LO KVIR SUBJECT: MOVING SLOVAKIA CLOSER TO "YES" ON KOSOVO Classified By: Ambassador Vincent Obsitnik for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (C) Although the Government of Slovakia shows no signs of softening its opposition to Kosovo's independence, per my recent consultations with you and Assistant Secretary Fried, I plan to use recent key recognitions, i.e., by Montenegro, Portugal and Macedonia, to press the Slovaks toward a more flexible stance. Prime Minister Fico frequently characterizes Kosovo's declaration of independence as a violation of international law. All Slovak political parties, except the Hungarian Coalition Party, have rejected Kosovo's independence and made clear their opposition to Slovak recognition. Numerous factors inform the Slovak position: close ties to Serbia (and Russia); concern about the aspirations of Slovakia's large Hungarian minority; and, in some cases, barely disguised antipathy toward Albanian Muslims. Finally, there remains resentment toward the U.S. for its role in the 1999 NATO intervention and an abiding belief that it was the U.S., not the Serbians, who created the circumstances which led to the final break-up of Yugoslavia. ¶2. (C) I have concluded that Slovakia will move on Kosovo only when Serbia, Russia, or key EU partners, e.g., Spain, do. Clearly, EU states that have already recognized will have the greatest leverage on their fellow EU members and on Serbia. In the meantime, I ask for Washington's support for a concerted effort to help shift Slovak official and public opinion. The two key pillars of the argument would be that Kosovo's independence is consistent with international law and that acceptance of Kosovo's independence by all EU members will help Serbia move forward and closer to the European Union. We will also seek to knock down flawed comparisons between Slovakia's ethnic Hungarians and Kosovo Albanians. What We Will Do -------------- 3.(C) One of the key challenges we face in Slovakia is that both the public and elite are woefully ill-informed (and sometimes misinformed) about the history of the Serbia-Kosovo conflict and about the progress the Kosovars have made toward the development of a multi-ethnic society that respects minorities. Also, many Slovaks (including senior GOS officials and politicians) appear to be genuinely concerned that Kosovo could serve as a precedent for the Hungarian minority illustrates the extent of the problem. ¶4. (C) Using the resources and contacts we have, Embassy Bratislava will intensify our outreach on Kosovo, making the case that moving forward on the basis of an independent Kosovo is best not only for Kosovo, but also for Serbia. Given a lack of regular personal contact with PM Fico, I will utilize other levers of influence, e.g., close colleagues of Fico such as Culture Minister Madaric and key "influentials," such as former Ambassador Kacer, to convey our messages. I will also use the goodwill gained from President Gasparovic's recent visit to the U.S. to press him to take a more pragmatic stance. I hope to initiate a mini "contact group" of diplomats in Bratislava to strategize about how to encourage constructive Slovak policy. We will press Hungarian politicians and intellectuals to repeat/amplify the message that Kosovo is not a precedent for ethnic Hungarians in Kosovo, and will host roundtables and events aimed at strengthening Slovak-Hungarian relations. In an effort to build broader and more accurate public understanding of the Balkans, particularly the Serbian-Kosovo conflict, post is considering a multi-city "film festival," which could foster greater objectivity and understanding of the Balkan conflicts. We would then seek to place films in schools, libraries and offer them to Slovak TV stations. What We Seek -------------- ¶5. (U) To support Post's efforts, I ask that you consider: -- Sending respected USG and non-USG lawyers, e.g., Legal Advisor John Bellinger, to Slovakia to speak with a range of Slovak interlocutors on the legality of Kosovo's independence. These discussions could also take place via DVC, a format that could also be used for dialogue between Balkan experts and Slovak officials, journalists and think-tank representatives. BRATISLAVA 00000487 002 OF 002 -- Providing more compelling written argumentation on the legality of Kosovo for Post's use with interlocutors. I have been impressed with the argumentation contained in an article published by the American Society of International Law (text emailed to EUR/CE). -- Visits by key USG officials such as yourself to discuss Balkan policy with GOS officials;. -- An IV-type program for Slovaks and Kosovar Albanians, e.g., Department would sponsor a select group of Slovaks to travel to Kosovo, and vice versa. Such a program could be carried out with participants from other non-recognizing EU states. -- Providing regular updates on positive developments in Kosovo; Working With the EU -------------- ¶6. (C) I and my staff consult with our U.S. Embassy colleagues in other EU non-recognizing states and we understand that different issues underpin the firm resistance to Kosovo recognition. That said, perhaps some of the tactics/programs/visits we are considering could be relevant elsewhere, too. I believe that more consultation with the EU and activism by Brussels could help move the ball forward. Perhaps Washington and key European capitals, e.g., Paris and Berlin, could craft a more closely-coordinated effort aimed at securing recognition by all EU members by a date certain, e.g., the anniversary of Kosovo's independence. I know such results would be very tough to achieve, but I often have the sense that the Slovaks are hearing about Kosovo from this Embassy, but not very much from their EU colleagues either here or in Brussels. Based on my discussions with a wide range of Slovaks during the past 10 months, I believe that it is essential that we intensify our efforts precisely now, because of positive developments in Kosovo and Serbia and because this is the period in which we, the U.S. and the EU have maximum leverage on Serbian and Kosovar Albanian leaders. Delays or setbacks in progress in either Belgrade or Pristina will only harden Slovak attitudes. ¶7. (U) Stu, it was a pleasure to meet you and I look forward to hearing from you. Best, Vince OBSITNIK