SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRATISLAVA 000446

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CE, PASS TO NSC ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO LO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
SLOVAK PRESIDENT IVAN GASPAROVIC

Classified By: Ambassador Vincent Obsitnik, for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (C) I met with President Gasparovic September 30, and from
his perspective the timing of his visit to Washington could
not be more auspicious. The trip will link him in the minds
of Slovak voters with accession to the Visa Waiver Program,
one of the brightest spots in our bilateral relations. While
Gasparovic clearly values the transatlantic relationship and
shares many of our views on key foreign policy challenges,
the Slovak Government -- now led by Prime Minister Robert
Fico -- pursues a less pro-U.S. foreign policy and he
actively seeks closer economic and political ties with
Moscow. While President Gasparovic may sometimes also defer
to Russian views, he wants Slovakia to be a responsible Ally
and, in internal government debates, pushes for greater
Slovak engagement, such as in Afghanistan and meeting
Bucharest NATO Summit commitments. President Gasparovic is
likely to be reelected in April 2009. His advisors have told
me that he intends to be a more "activist" President in his
next term, particularly on foreign and defense policy issues.
This meeting with President Bush can encourage a popular
politician to become a more assertive proponent of
transatlantic values and cooperation.


2. (C) Slovakia is an economic success story. Following the
authoritarian rule of Vladimir Meciar in the 1990's, the
country underwent rapid reform under former Prime Minister
Dzurinda. Within six years, Slovakia went from being the
"Black Hole of Europe," to the "Tatra Tiger," with
invitations to join NATO and the European Union. The reforms
were difficult, however, and in 2006 the voters elected
Robert Fico, who promised a more "social democratic"
government.


3. (C) But despite threats to roll back many of the key
reforms, the current government has kept Slovakia on track
economically. It made the final push for adoption of the
Euro and accession to the Schengen zone. Foreign investors
continue to come to Slovakia, which now produces the highest
number of automobiles per capita in the world. U.S.
companies have invested almost 4 billion USD in Slovakia to
date.


4. (C) Thus, in fifteen short years since Slovakia achieved
full independence, it has created a thriving market economy,
joined NATO and the European Union, served effectively on the
UN Security Council and been accepted into the Schengen and
Eurozones. Slovak soldiers serve in Afghanistan and Kosovo.
Slovak NGOs are helping to build civil society in countries
like Serbia, Belarus, Afghanistan and Cuba. And very soon, I
hope, Slovakia will enter the Visa Waiver Program.


5. (C) At home, European Union accession is bringing
significant EU funds to help develop lagging infrastructure.
This will help broaden the geographic base of investment
beyond Bratislava. Yet, despite these successes, the current
government displays several troubling tendencies that could
potentially threaten Slovakia's continued progress at home
and its reputation abroad. Gasparovic at times acts as a
moderating force to Fico's populist and social-democratic
stances.


6. (C) Chief among these tendencies is the government's
almost wholly uncritical stance toward Moscow. The
government has, for instance, refused to recognize Kosovo --
a stance Gasparovic has vocally supported. But where Fico has
criticized U.S. missile defense plans, Gasparovic has
supported them. The official Slovak policy is to support
Georgia's territorial integrity, a view PM Fico has
articulated publicly even while he has also spoken about
Georgian "provocations." In the weeks following the
invasion, the government hosted Deputy Prime Minister Sechin
and announced closer economic cooperation with Moscow,
particularly on energy. With this issue as with others,
Gasparovic's ability to stake out a separate position from
Fico's is limited by the Fico government's popularity, the
nature of Slovak presidency, and the shakiness of
Gasparovic's own political base (although Gasparovic himself
is popular, he lacks a party infrastructure).


7. (C) The other disturbing tendencies fall under the rubric
of "reform fatigue." Slovakia has not progressed recently in
the fight against corruption, the strengthening of civil
society, and the expansion of democratic and open practices.
Although PM Fico has sacked four Ministers for corruption or
other ethics related problems, some current ministers are
widely believed to be corrupt. Prime Minister Fico's partners

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in the governing coalition, Vladimir Meciar and far-right
nationalist Jan Slota, are infamous for their inexplicable
wealth and unsavory connections. The Parliament in March
passed one of the most restrictive press laws in Europe.
While Gasparovic could provide some useful pressure toward
progress, again he has not done so, perhaps because he lacks
a firm basis to challenge the popular Prime Minister.


8. (C) Finally, under the Fico government, relations between
Slovakia and Hungary have worsened. A vicious cycle has
developed in which Slovak nationalists -- led by coalition
partner Jan Slota -- and ethnic Hungarian politicians (both
in Slovakia and Hungary) bait each other. In addition to
Slota's frequent anti-Hungarian rhetoric, even more
mainstream Slovak politicians have criticized events such as
meetings in Budapest of the "Forum for Parliamentary Members
from the Carpathian Basin" (an entity made up of ethnic
Hungarians from around the region, affiliated with the
Hungarian Parliament). This political level tit-for-tat gets
abundant play in the media, obscuring the effective and close
cooperation between the two countries on many economic,
regional and other issues. Rather than condemning this cycle,
let alone Slota's inflammatory remarks, Gasparovic has made
it clear that he thinks the Hungarians are mostly at fault
for the tension. The notion that Hungarians in Slovakia
could use Kosovo as a precedent here is risible, yet, given
the long and vexed history of Slovak-Hungarian relations,
President Gasparovic might tell you that it's a concern.


9. (C) If Gasparovic wins reelection, and the indications are
that he will, I do believe he will be willing to distance
himself publicly from the Prime Minister on key issues. He
has told me that he thinks the Prime Minister's approach to
Iran, for example, is "irresponsible" because Fico downplays
the threat. Slovakia is anchored in NATO and the EU, but it
is drifting a bit. Gasparovic can help, over time, bring it
more firmly into the Euro-Atlantic ambit. Slovakia needs a
strong advocate for transatlantic values in a position of
influence; over the next few years, Gasparovic is the most
likely person to play that role. The U.S. needs a stronger
ally among the Slovak leadership, and I think Gasparovic is
also ready to play that role.


10. (C) Separately I will be reporting additional details of
my September 30 meeting with Gasparovic.
OBSITNIK