SLOVAK CONSULTATIONS WITH RUSSIAN OFFICIALS: MORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000418 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/CE E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018 TAGS: PREL NATO RU LO GA SUBJECT: SLOVAK CONSULTATIONS WITH RUSSIAN OFFICIALS: MORE BUSINESS THAN USUAL Classified By: Ambassador Vincent Obsitnik for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (C) Summary. PM Fico hosted Russian Deputy Prime Minister Secin for an interministerial working lunch on September 10. In a subsequent press conference, Secin and Fico confirmed that the "Slovak-Russian intergovernmental Committee" would henceforth meet quarterly, vice twice yearly, to intensify cooperation in the commercial and energy sectors. Our contacts at the MFA could not provide a readout of the meeting, which, according to PM Fico's comment to the press did not address any "political issues." On September 15-16, Deputy Minister Vladimir Titov visited Bratislava for consultations with FM Kubis and his nominal counterpart, MFA State Secretary Strofova. According to MFA sources, the Kubis-Titov discussions had been in train since June and dealt with Georgia, the Balkans and Russian relations with NATO and EU. Titov reportedly argued that South Ossetia and Abkhazia had never been a part of Georgia, because of the results of referenda that were held in each province after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Titov also made clear to the Slovaks that if Georgia used military force again, Russia would respond in kind. Comment: Although the Titov meeting was the first at this level since 2005, it is clear that PM Fico and Russian Deputy Minister Secin sought to demonstrate that as far as Russian-Slovak relations are concerned, and notwithstanding any differences on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it will not only be "business as usual" between Moscow and Bratislava, but more business than usual. Visit of Russian Deputy PM Secin -------------- ¶2. (U) PM Fico hosted Deputy Prime Minister Secin, in Vienna for talks with OPEC, for a working lunch on September 10. The event was attended by FM Kubis, Economy Minister Jahnatek, Transportation Minister Vazny and representatives of the Slovak nuclear agency, JAVYS. The agenda, according to Fico's and Secin's comments in their joint press conference, appears to be a continuation of the discussions that took place in April between then-PM Zubkov and PM Fico: energy and nuclear cooperation, construction of a wide-gauge railroad, investment in the banking sector. Fico announced that the Slovak-Russian intergovernmental commission would increase its meetings from twice a year to four times a year in order to intensify economic cooperation and speed work on ongoing bilateral projects. Fico told the press that no "political" or "international" topics had been discussed. Titov Meeting: Lots of Propaganda, Less Pushback -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) According to MFA Director for Russia and CIS, Stefan Rozkopal, the visit of Russian Deputy Minister Titov has been in the works since June. The last visit of a Russian Deputy FM had taken place in 2005. Rozkopal, who attended the meetings (but not the one-on-one dinner between Kubis and Titov on September 15),told us that FM Kubis repeated the Slovak "mantras" on Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty, but also made clear that Slovakia views Russia as a good partner and does not seek confrontation. Titov offered a number of thoughts on the situation in Georgia, including a new justification for Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Titov reportedly stated that neither province had ever been a part of Georgia, in light of the results of referenda conducted in each during the 1990's. In the more distant past, Titov attempted to argue, the Georgians and the South Ossetians and Abkhaz had little in common, so independence is a logical conclusion with roots that pre-date the most recent conflict. ¶4. (C) Deputy Minister Titov also made clear that Russia would respond with force to any Georgian military action, and claimed that President Sakaashvili had (at some point) tried to cut a deal with Moscow in which he would refrain from seeking NATO membership, if Russia would guarantee Georgia's territorial integrity vis-a-vis South Ossetia and Abkhazia. According to Rozkopal, Titov cited the importance of "internal political developments" in Russia's actions in the Caucasus. Titov was critical of the U.S., noting that U.S. officials had tried to reassure Russia that Georgia would remain calm, but that analysis -- and U.S. influence -- had proved lacking. ¶5. (C) Rozkopal told us that the Slovak delegation was struck by the matter-of-fact way in which Titov stated, regarding Moldova that, if President Voronin would guarantee the safety of Russians in Transniester, "Russia would not get involved." (Comment: At this point, Rozkopal repeated a comment similar to his assessment of the Russian Ambassador's rhetoric after the Georgia conflict began: the language is different; the confident, even arrogant tone, evokes the Soviet style.) ¶6. (C) Titov used the meeting to revive a call for a new approach to security, a new framework for Russia-European relations. Regarding NATO, Titov asserted that promises made to Russia in the past regarding NATO expansion had been broken. Titov also accused NATO members of hypocrisy, claiming that after the NAC condemned Russia's actions, "every NATO member" approached Russia on a bilateral basis to make clear a desire for continued cooperation. Regarding the Balkans, FM Kubis reportedly urged a more constructive Russian stance on Bosnia. Titov responded that the Bosnians were "sick of the international community," and asked why, if the Europeans could assume more responsibility in Kosovo, why not in Bosnia, too? (Comment: With respect to Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia we note that the Slovak reaction is in line with that of the Serbs. We would be surprised if there was any frank dialogue between the Russians and the Slovaks about how the Russian Federation has gutted the "principled" Slovak arguments on Kosovo.) ¶7. (C) Comment and Conclusion: The Slovak reaction to the recent Russia-Georgia conflict is multifaceted. Even within the MFA, concern about Russia's behavior and the long-term consequences for European security is muted by a strong pro-Russia strain among the Ministry's top diplomats. Working level contacts at the MFA told us (with a palpable sense of relief) that Slovakia has maintained a "middle course" in the EU. We would argue that that characterization may be a stretch, given PM Fico's consistent message of support and understanding for Russia's actions, but it is precisely Fico's stance that produces "relief" at being able to steer anything close to a middle course. While MFA officials clearly do not like and are concerned by Russia's growing arrogance, they convey a sense of resignation, too. It's clear to us that the Slovaks do not have genuine confidence in the ability of the EU, NATO and the U.S. to manage Russia or to defend against possible future aggression. The Georgian Ambassador in Bratislava told Ambassador Obsitnik that a senior Smer politician had said that "the U.S. is bluffing in Georgia." Of greater concern, the Georgian Ambassador also reported that Slovenian President Turk had made similar comments to Georgian Vice Premier at the recent Bled Strategic Forum. MFA officials are also concerned about potential Russian moves in Ukraine and believe that tensions will become worse, not better, in the run-up to the NATO Ministerial. Finally, the Slovaks, perhaps along with other Europeans, consistently overestimate Russia's strength and influence. They do not buy the notion that Russia needs Europe and the international community as much as Europe, in particular, needs Russia. Nor do they believe that Russia is or will be isolated as a result of its actions in Georgia. ¶8. (C) Comment cont: As the V-4 President's failure last week to agree on a Georgia statement demonstrated, even a shared history of Soviet domination doesn't produce unanimity of views on Russia's imperial designs today. More than almost any other country in the region, Slovakia is determined -- within the confines of NATO and EU membership -- to not only maintain good relations with Russia, but, as the recent visit of DPM Secin made clear, to strengthen those ties. OBSITNIK