Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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08BRATISLAVA316 | 2008-07-09 15:44:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bratislava |
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRATISLAVA 000316 |
1.(C) Summary. Following Hungarian Prime Minister Gyurscany's postponement of his long-planned visit to Slovakia, the brief meeting between Gyurscany and his Slovak counterpart on the margins of the June 15-16 V-4 Summit did little to dispel the impression of malaise in Slovak-Hungarian relations. Slovak officials -- on the defensive in the wake of anti-Hungarian remarks by Jan Slota and persistent criticism of Slovakia's minority policies by Hungarian MEPs and the U.S.-based Hungarian lobby -- have reacted by taking the rhetorical offensive against the Hungarian Guard. Foreign Minister Kubis and Chairman of the Parliamentary Affairs Committee separately complained to Ambassador about the lack of international condemnation of the Guard, which inducted 600 new members in April (ref a). PM Fico, meanwhile, has in recent speeches expressed concern about the ramifications for regional stability of the potential return to power of Hungarian opposition party Fidesz. Kosovo's declaration of independence has added another element to the mix: almost all of our interlocutors express some degree of unease about the precedential impact on Kosovo for Slovakia and its large Hungarian minority. Despite the cross-border broadsides and summit setbacks, however, diplomats and bureaucrats from each side continue to meet and to implement the program of bilateral cooperation agreed by Fico and Gyurscany in June 2007. Bilateral consultations and meetings of the Slovak- Hungarian Mixed Commissions are ongoing. Economic cooperation is excellent, and Slovak and Hungarian forces are working together in peacekeeping operations, including ISAF and UNFICYP in Cyprus. This cooperation -- as well as that in the NATO, EU and V-4 contexts -- will ensure that the engine of bilateral relations keeps running. It won't function optimally, however, until issues related to the large Hungarian minority in Slovakia ceases to be a hot-button issue on both sides of the border. In the meantime, the U.S. should continue to stress the importance of mutual tolerance, the "sui generis" nature of Kosovo, and look for ways to bolster concrete cooperation between Slovaks and Hungarians. End Summary. Waiting for Gyurscany... -------------------------- 2. (C) It's been a busy, but not particularly positive few months in Slovak-Hungarian relations. From March through May, top officials and media from both countries were focused on a high-profile dispute over office space in the only Slovak- majority village in Hungary, Pilisszentkereszt, ("Mlynky," in Slovak). The dispute arose (ref b) after the town council ordered the Slovak self-government and other Slovak organizations to vacate the so-called "Slovak House," without having -- according to the Hungarian ombudsman for minority rights -- taken the appropriate legal steps. In the meantime, the GOS, rankled by the reach and influence of the Hungarian diaspora and persistent criticism of the government's approach toward minority issues by Hungarian MEPs in Brussels immediately seized the opportunity to highlight inequities on the other side of the border. In the end, both governments agreed to subsidize the construction of a new Slovak House, but not before the situation was amply exploited by numerous politicians on both sides of the border. 3.(C) As officials were working out the details of the Mlynky settlement, Slovak National Party leader Jan Slota publicly referred to Hungary's founder, King Stephen, as a "clown on a horse." (The offending remark was made in the presence of PM Fico, who did not disavow it.) In response, the GOH postponed the long-planned visit of Gyurscany to Slovakia and Hungarian FM Goncz drew comparisons between Slota's SNS party and the extremist paramilitary Hungarian Guard. (Comment: Slovak diplomats who participated in the series of preparatory meetings for the visit had told us even before Slota's comments that chances were less than 50-50 that Gyurscany would visit in June, because of his domestic political problems. At this point, per ref c, FM Kubis believes it will take something "big" to get Gyurscany to a summit meeting with Fico. By contrast, the Hungarian Ambassador to Slovakia told Ambassador Obsitnik at a June 25 reception that the two sides were working hard to find a date and that if Slota remains quiet, a visit could take place in August. End comment.) BRATISLAVA 00000316 002 OF 005 4. (C) Slota's June 6 comments, in which he referred to Hungarian FM Goncz as an "unkempt" woman who should take more care of her appearance, added fuel to the fire. Deputy PM Caplovic quickly criticized the remarks and FM Kubis issued a quick, formal apology about Goncz, but also felt that Goncz had gone too far in comparing a racist militia, i.e., the Hungarian Guard, to a political party, SNS, led by Slota. PM Fico waited 5 days until he acknowledged that such remarks did not have a place in politics. He quickly added, however, that FM Goncz "was not free to say whatever she wanted," referring to her comparison of SNS to the Hungarian Guard. Further undermining his tepid apology, Fico stated that "now it clear that is was a good decision to build a coalition from these parties back in 2006." 5. (C) Although PM Fico told the Ambassador last December -- on the eve of Slovakia's and Hungary's entry into Schengen -- that tensions between the neighboring countries were "an anachronism," he appears to have calculated that allowing Slota and the SNS to pursue a nationalist agenda benefits him politically. In fact, Fico increasingly leavens his populist, social democratic speech with nationalist rhetoric (without the anti-Hungarian content): from his appeals for greater patriotism and pride in the Slovak history to his admonitions to politicians to speak better Slovak. Looking ahead to 2010, Fico is, according to some observers, courting Jan Slota's voters so that he can jettison Jan Slota's party. Ironically, the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) -- which broke from opposition parties SDKU and KDH over the Lisbon Treaty vote -- has been most open about its potential willingness to join a Smer-led coalition in the next government, should SNS be dropped. Behind the Scenes: Cooperation -------------------------- 6. (C) The fits and starts that characterize relations at the highest level, however, belie the progress being made at the working level. Bilateral consultations and meetings of the Slovak-Hungarian Mixed Commissions are ongoing. The Mixed Commission on Minorities met in Bratislava on June 10, in what several participants described as a productive and collegial encounter. One concrete outcome has already emerged from that session: on July 8, the directors of Slovak and Hungarian Radio signed an agreement in Budapest for cooperation that would include programming aimed at the minority communities on both sides of the border. Furthermore, many of the 14 cooperative projects agreed by Fico and Gyurscany in 2007, under the rubric of the "common past, common future" program, are being implemented. The Slovak and Hungarian Ministries of Health recently concluded an MOU to facilitate cooperation in the fight against cancer. In September 2007, FMs Kubis and Goncz signed an agreement to reconstruct two bridges on the Ipel River between Slovakia and Hungary. 7.(C) In general, economic cooperation between Slovakia and Hungary is excellent; the volume of trade between the two countries increased by almost 40 percent in 2007. MOD contacts characterize defense relations with the Hungarians as excellent and confirm that the two sides have finalized the text of an interministerial cooperation agreement. During a trip to Hungary in late 2007, Slovak Chief of Defense General Bulik and his Hungarian counterpart publicly praised the two countries' cooperation, including in ISAF and UNFICYP as a model for other NATO and EU members. Slovak and Hungarian law enforcement officials worked together in a months-long operation that led to the seizure of uranium on the Slovak- Hungarian border in November 2007. In April, Slovak and Hungarian officials met in Bratislava to discuss expanding regional cooperation, particularly cross-border programs with Ukraine. MFA officials insist that Slovakia and Hungary work well in the V-4, EU and NATO contexts and that, despite the historic baggage (and perhaps to some extent because of it) Slovakia and Hungary are natural partners. Trianon, Munich, and Kosovo: For Some, the Past is Present -------------------------- -------------------------- 8. (C) Despite the breadth and modernity of the EU and NATO partnerships, the complex history of the region continues to shape bilateral relations in a more parochial fashion. Memories of past conflicts and injustices loom large in Central Europe. This is certainly the case in Slovakia, which is still coming to terms with many aspects of the past, including the long and multifaceted relationship with its former ruler, Hungary (where a small, but vocal element of the BRATISLAVA 00000316 003 OF 005 population apparently views the Trianon Treaty not as a historical footnote, but as a live issue). Anachronistic disputes, e.g., regarding the WWII-era Benes Decrees, can knock contemporary relations off track, as was the case here last fall (ref c). The response of Slovak parliamentarians to protests in Hungary earlier this month on the anniversary of the Trianon Treaty was not silence or bemusement, but nine questions to the government regarding the status of the Treaty during parliament's June 19 "question time." Interior Minister Kalinak, representing PM Fico at the session, confirmed that the Slovak government would not allow changes in the border between Slovakia and Hungary through the reopening of the Treaty and criticized the Hungarian Guard. (Comment: The focus by Smer MPs on Trianon, likely was also partly a tactic to draw attention from the just-emerging controversy surrounding Finance Minister Pociatek. End Comment). 9. (C) More than the recent protests, it is Kosovo that spurs Slovak politicians to express concern about the inviolability of Slovakia's borders. Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee Zala opined over lunch with the Ambassador on June 19 that the Kosovo precedent would destabilize Europe and called on the U.S. to make a strong statement on the inviolability of borders. Although Zala made clear that he did not believe that the situations in Serbia and Slovakia were similar, he suggested that somehow, down the line, the Kosovo precedent would affect Slovakia. We have heard this argument from Slovak politicians across the political spectrum. Amongst some of the harder-line opponents of Kosovo, we also discern a lack of confidence that the U.S. or "the West" can or will prevent unintended consequences. (Comment: several, albeit sparsely attended, anti-Kosovo protests here have compared the West's role in Kosovo independence to its acquiescence at Munich in 1938.) Although Slovak opposition to Kosovo's independence is based also on strong ties with Serbia and, to paraphrase PM Fico, a small country's reliance on international law, there is almost always a Hungarian subtext to any conversation about Kosovo. President Gasparovic told Ambassador Obsitnik that he believes that Hungarian politicians (on both sides of the border) will use the Kosovo precedent to promote the reunification of Slovakia (and Romania's) Hungarian minority with Hungary. An MFA official offered a more realistic assessment: although there is no danger of border changes, Hungary will seek to use the protections and rights provided to Serbs in Kosovo as a model for collective minority rights for Hungarians throughout Europe. Minority Questions -------------------------- 10. (C) When Foreign Ministers Kubis and Goncz met last November, she told him that the one of the pre-conditions for the Gyurscany-Fico meeting was that the GOS would, at a minimum, maintain the "status quo" on minority rights. At the time, there had been indications -- particularly from the SNS- led Ministries of Education and Culture -- that funding for Hungarian-language radio would be cut, that Hungarian textbooks would be required to use Slovak names, and that the status of Slovakia's only Hungarian university would be downgraded. After several months of negotiations, funding was found for Radio Patria, the Slovak Government provided an additional 16 million SKK for Selye University, and agreement was reached to continue to use both Slovak and Hungarian geographic names in textbooks. These steps appear to have met the request of the GOH and that of the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK). In June, however, the media reported that Slovak Minister of Education Jan Mikolaj had reached an agreement with his party, SNS, on a directive that would permit textbooks in Slovakia's Hungarian schools to print the Hungarian-language version of geographic place names only once; all subsequent mentions would be in Slovak. It seems like a minor issue, but it, along with the widely supported parliamentary resolutions on Benes and Cernova (ref d) and SNS's anti-Hungarian rhetoric, contribute to a growing sense among some in the ethnic Hungarian community that the trajectory of minority rights policy is headed in the wrong direction. 11. (C) Echoing a widely-repeated sentiment, Joseph Berenyi, Deputy Chairman of SMK, told Pol/Econ Chief on July 4 that, in general, relations between Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians are good. However, he added that it is less "comfortable" for Hungarians in Slovakia than it used to be. Berenyi ruefully agreed that it is often the "politicians," who create BRATISLAVA 00000316 004 OF 005 tensions; at the same time, Berenyi said that SMK's agenda -- with its persistent focus on language rights, for instance -- was responsive to the expressed concerns of its constituents. Berenyi claimed that since 2006, Hungarians are being fired from state and local institutions in Slovakia, and although this is, to some extent, the natural result of the power shift that took place at that time, Berenyi expressed concerns about the implications of the trend for the minority community. He also pointed to the recent decision of the regional parliament in Nitra (Nitra region is home to a large percentage of ethnic Hungarians) to revise the electoral districts for 2009 regional elections, such that the likely result will be decreased representation for the Hungarian party. Berenyi fears this move will have a precedential effect and plans to present legislation that would require such changes to be approved by the national parliament. When asked about SMK's potential openness to partnering with Smer, Berenyi was unabashed and unapologetic: it wouldn't be the most comfortable arrangement, he acknowledged, but it would be worth it in order to ensure that ethnic Hungarians' interests were protected. (Comment: Fairly or not, SMK's focus on "national" issues nourishes a strain of skepticism among the other political parties, even erstwhile partners SDKU and KDH, regarding SMK's "loyalty" to the Slovak state.) 12.(C) Despite the Slovak MFA's efforts to emphasize broader themes in the bilateral relationship, it is likely that issues related to the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and its relationship with Hungary will continue to unduly influence the bilateral agenda. The unrealized and growing aspirations of a small, but influential segment of the Hungarian minority for a status akin to that of Finland's Swedish minority (an oft-cited example) is bumping up against SNS's distinctly mono-ethnic brand of nationalism. With the return of Slota and Meciar to political prominence, Hungarian bashing (at least rhetorical) is back and tacitly accepted by many. (Comment: Deputy Speaker of Parliament Miroslav Ciz acknowledged to us that he hadn't minded Slota's comments about Goncz, because he believes the Hungarians are so vocally critical of Slovakia.) At the same time, the Hungarian Coalition Party, out of power and led since 2007 by less moderate voices has looked to national issues to boost its sagging preferences. In Hungary, former (and aspiring) PM Viktor Orban stokes Slovak anxieties with calls for "new agreements between Hungary and Hungarian minorities," and reported references to Slovakia as "northern Hungary." Many Slovak officials, including professional diplomats, are convinced that Orban will return to power and express concern that his approach to minority questions will further strain bilateral ties. PM Fico, for his part, has publicly stoked that concern. During his July 4 review of his government's first two years in office, Fico suggested that Orban's return to power would be a problem for the region, adding that "the Slovak government ...would watch very closely the extreme nationalist political forces, which would likely return to power in neighboring Hungary and whose current political declarations, if implemented, would cause instability in the region." In the same speech, he added (again) tacit support for Jan Slota's vulgar condemnation of SDKU presidential candidate Iveta Radicova for having attended SMK's tenth anniversary celebration (at which Orban was also present), saying he had been "shocked to learn that Radicova had accepted without commentary an expression of political support by the political party Fidesz." 13. (C) Comment and Conclusion: In the framework of NATO and EU membership, Slovak-Hungarian relations will maintain a certain equilibrium, yet, paradoxically, the security offered by these alliances appears to have brought old wounds and prejudices -- artificially submerged during Communism and kept under wraps in the EU and NATO pre-accession period -- to the fore. Just as the Greek-Macedonian name dispute defies logic, so do expressions of concern about "Greater Hungary," here. But our strained credulity doesn't render the issues or the emotions they evoke moot. In Bratislava -- known not long ago as Pozsony and Pressburg, too -- questions related to national minorities and territorial integrity are surprisingly salient. And while a web of European and international treaties and commitments should ensure that such issues are dealt with justly and reasonably, we shouldn't be complacent about the challenges posed by nationalism, xenophobia and extremism. Despite an element of political expedience in its criticism, the GOS has a point: the Hungarian Guard is a dangerous phenomenon, out of place in 21st century Europe. Less dangerous, perhaps, but corrosive and divisive nonetheless, is the nationalist rhetoric emerging from prominent figures here. BRATISLAVA 00000316 005 OF 005 One effect of such rhetoric, according to some Slovak and ethnic Hungarian analysts and NGO reps, is that it propagates negative stereotypes, particularly where the two ethnic groups do not live in close proximity. According to one recent survey, 56 percent of young Slovaks polled judged relations between the the Hungarian minority and Slovak majority as "fairly good;" 26 percent evaluated them as "fairly bad." Of the 7 percent who rated relations as "very bad," 60 percent did not live with or near ethnic Hungarians. There also appears to be a growing gap in perceptions between Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians when it comes to issues related to Slovak- hungarian relationas. In a poll conducted by IVO in late 2007, 78 percent of Hungarians surveyed said they were worried about increased tensions between Slovak-Hungarian relations (56 percent of Slovaks expressed concern); 74 percent of Hungarians worried that Jan Slota had too much influence on government policy, as opposed to only 24 percent of Slovaks polled. Embassy Bratislava will continue to stress the importance of tolerance, ethnic diversity and respect for minority rights and will explore potential opportunities that bring the Slovak and ethnic Hungarian communities, particularly their youngest members, together. OBSITNIK |