CONSTRAINING IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN BRAZIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRASILIA 000896

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ELLIOTT ABRAMS AND GARY TOMASULO; DEPARTMENT FOR
S/P, WHA, NEA, AND AF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2018
TAGS: PREL IR BR
SUBJECT: CONSTRAINING IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN BRAZIL

REF: A. 08 BRASILIA 851

B. 08 BRASILIA 756

C. 08 BRASILIA 531

D. 08 BRASILIA 526

E. 08 BRASILIA 420

F. 08 BRASILIA 304

G. 08 BRASILIA 43

H. 08 BRASILIA 9

I. 07 BRASILIA 2262

J. 07 BRASILIA 2217

K. 07 BRASILIA 2151

L. 07 BRASILIA 2132

M. 07 BRASILIA 1990

N. 07 BRASILIA 1889

O. 05 BRASILIA 1252

P. 05 BRASILIA 760

Q. 05 BRASILIA 718

R. 05 BRASILIA 574

Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reasons: 1.4 (B and D).


1. (U) This is an Action Request, please see paragraph 3.


2. (C) Summary: Brazil's participation in the Annapolis
peace conference is now cited by every Itamaraty contact,
from Foreign Minister Amorim to Middle East desk officers, as
the cornerstone of its growing efforts to exert global
leadership. Since Annapolis, discussion of Middle
East-related topics has become a key agenda item in almost
all high-level bilateral discussions. So far, Brazil's
Middle East-related initiatives can best be described as
clumsy, and statements by senior GOB officials regarding key
issues in the region have often been unhelpful.


3. (C) Most worrisome is that the GOB's increasing focus on
the Middle East coincides with aggressive efforts on the part
of Iran to extend its influence in the region beyond Caracas
to other countries in Latin America, including Brazil, in the
hope of forming a front that will resist U.S. influence and
look favorably on Tehran. Although a wholesale buy-in by
Brazilians is not likely, Tehran's anti-imperialist
sentiments play well with the Brazilian left, and senior GOB
officials have made it clear that they are looking to
increase and cultivate their relations with Iran, which they
view as a key regional economic and political power. In
post's view, although we are unlikely to persuade the GOB to
take an approach fully in step with ours, it is critical to
engage the GOB both to ensure they have a complete
understanding of U.S. policy and concerns in the region, and
to demonstrate that we take Brazil's leadership aspirations
seriously. End summary.


4. (C) Action request: A number of recent factors point
towards a new opportunity to engage Brazil on its Middle East
policies. In light of this, post seeks Washington support
for a high-level briefer or briefers from NEA or other
agencies, preferably at the DAS-level or higher, to come to
Brasilia for detailed discussions with Brazilian government
officials, members of Congress, and, where appropriate,
press, regarding U.S. policy as it relates to the
Israel-Palestine conflict, Syria, the ongoing situation in
Lebanon, our policies with regards to designated terrorist
groups Hamas and Hizballah, and Iran nuclear proliferation,
support for terrorism, and activities inside Iraq. End
action request.

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Whether We Like it or Not: Brazil In the Middle East
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5. (C) Although Brazil's national interests in the Middle
East traditionally have veered towards commerce and trade,
Brazil increasingly is dabbling in political matters there.
In practice, this often means taking potshots at U.S policies

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in order to burnish its credentials as a relevant,
influential, and independent player on global issues.
Brazilian officials hold the belief that the country's global
leadership aspirations depend in part on having a role on the
most pressing international issues in the global agenda.
Foreign Minister Celso Amorim has indicated as much, noting
that he is "sick of trade" and is looking for opportunities
to spotlight Brazil's global leadership. He sees Brazil's
invitation to Annapolis and continued participation in
Mideast peace issues as an opportunity to do just that (Ref
J).


6. (C) Extreme GOB sensitivity to being seen as taking
Washington's side has led to a consistent tendency to express
sympathy toward countries in Washington's crosshairs, such as
Iran and Syria. These sympathies have provoked a number of
statements and actions running counter to U.S. interests and
sometimes contradicting long-held tenets of Brazil's foreign
policy. Some examples of unhelpful Brazilian actions over
the past three years include:

-- Mum on Syria out of Lebanon: During its last Security
Council stint, Brazil abstained on UNSCR 1559 calling on
foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon and refused to echo
U.S.-French calls for withdrawal of Syrian forces from
Lebanon, claiming it was concerned that France, as the former
colonial power, would attempt to fill the void left after
Syrian withdrawal (Ref R).

-- No need to consult with U.S.: In 2005, after a nine
country Middle East trip by Foreign Minister Amorim in which
he criticized U.S. and Israeli actions, Itamaraty officials
rebuffed U.S. requests that Brazil consult with the United
States before making pronouncements that might complicate
delicate peace talks. Itamaraty stated that Brazil had no
need to ask permission of the United States in carrying out
foreign policy initiatives and that the United States should
expect more Brazilian statements on Middle East issues (Ref
R).

-- Arab States-South America (ASSA) Summit: During the 2005
summit, despite assurances to the USG that the summit
declaration would not contain language that the United States
or Israel would consider problematic, Brazil lost control of
the Summit and caved to Arab countries on all controversial
issues. The declaration included language on politically
sensitive and highly controversial topics, such as a demand
that Israel withdraw to its June 4, 1967 frontiers and comply
with the International Court of Justice July 2004 decision on
dismantling the security wall. The declaration also
specifically expresses "profound concern with the unilateral
sanctions imposed on Syria by the Government of the United
States and considers the so-called 'Syria Accountability Act'
a violation of the principles of international law and
constitutes a transgression against the objectives and
principles of the United Nations..." The declaration also
praised the Government of Sudan for "facilitating
international assistance to the humanitarian crisis in
Darfur." Furthermore, Brazil refused to grant the United
States observer status at the summit, claiming the summit's
purpose to be expanding cultural and commercial ties, and not
political issues that concerned the U.S. (Refs O and P)

-- Nuclear Proliferation and Iran: The GoB opposed the
effort to refer Iran to the Security Council until the vote
in the IAEA had become a foregone conclusion, when the PRC
and Russia agreed to a western compromise proposal. Brazil
did not vote to condemn Iran's nuclear activities until Iran
missed the UN-mandated deadline for allowing international
inspectors to visit suspicious nuclear facilities.

-- Iran, cont: In September 2007, President Lula defended
Iran's record of compliance with IAEA and UNSCR regarding its
nuclear program, even after UNSC had passed two resolutions,

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1737 and 1747, requiring Iran to fully suspend its
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and after the IAEA
had found Iran to be in violation of UNSC. Lula publicly
defended Iran's record, stating: "Iran has the right to
conduct its own experiments provided they are for peaceful
purposes...so far Iran has not committed any crime against
the direction of the United Nations in relation to nuclear
weapons." Afterwards, Itamaraty refused to accept our
demarche points asking for clarification of Lula's remarks.
(Ref N)

-- Terrorism and Iran, cont: Brazil twice failed to vote to
issue international capture notices for the Iranians
suspected of involvement in the AMIA Jewish center bombing in
Buenos Aires in 1994. Although the principal reason for
their abstention probably had to do with their refusal to
accept a link between the bombing and the Triborder Area,
press reports and Argentine contacts speculate that Brazil
wanted to avoid upsetting its relations with Iran after
Iranian officials lobbied Brazilian officials prior to the
vote. (Ref I)

-- Terrorism, cont: During his February 8-14, 2008 trip to
the Middle East, Amorim took several opportunities to
criticize U.S. policy, in particular the U.S. and the West's
efforts to "isolate" "parties" to the peace process, among
whom he included Hamas and Hizballah. This stance is
particularly problematic considering the presence of elements
of those groups within Brazilian territory and the latter's
demonstrated capability to carry out terrorist operations in
the region. (Ref F)

-- Possible Lula/Ahmadi-Nejad meeting: Itamaraty contacts
have told us a meeting between the two presidents is
inevitable and Lula himself confirmed his interest in
visiting Tehran during Secretary Rice's March 2008 visit to
Brasilia. In a January, Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture's
Secretary for International Relations Celio Porto told the
Arab-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce that Tehran was on the
list of countries Lula would visit on his next Middle East
trip.

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Aggressive Iranian Diplomacy in the Region
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7. (C) Brazil's increased engagement on Middle East issues
comes at a time of intensified Iranian activities in South
America and Brazil. Although trade-related discussions
represent a substantial portion of the bilateral
agenda--Brazilian exports to Iran, about US$1.8 billion in
2007, have almost quadrupled since Lula took office and
account for about 30% of total Brazilian exports to the
Middle East--Iran is keen to expnd their engagement with
Brazil into non trade-reated areas. Brasilia has seen the
visit of seveal high-level Iranian officials in the past 8
moths, including visits by the Iranian Supreme Councl for
National Security's Muhammad Nahavandian, by Iranian Deputy
Minister for Petroleum and former Ambassador to Brazil Dr.
Mansour Moazami, and two visits by Iranian Deputy Foreign
Minister Ali Reza Sheikh-Attar, the last of which to take
part in bilateral talks with Brazilian officials on a range
of trade and political topics.


8. (C) When Iranian officials visit Brasilia, they make a
point of extending their outreach to the legislative branch,
holding talks with members of Congress to specifically make
their case denying their non-compliance with UNSC resolutions
and exhorting Brazil to join other South American countries
friendly to Tehran in resisting pressure from the U.S. to
support action against Iran. According to Senator Heraclito
Fortes, chairman of the Foreign Relations and National
Defense Committee, Sheikh-Attar visited Brasilia to press
Brazil to join an anti-American bloc in South America

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composed of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. These are also
the countries that Sheikh-Attar usually visits during his
trips to South America (Ref D). Two other influential
Senators have approached U.S. Embassy officials to express
concerns about Iranian activities in Brazil and to warn us of
the dangers of Iranian efforts to fan anti-Americanism
throughout South America (Refs K and M). Itamaraty contacts
have also indicated that the Iranian Embassy as well as
Iranian visitors waste no opportunity to press for a meeting
between President Lula and President Ahmadi-Nejad--a meeting
Itamaraty contacts have called "inevitable."


9. (U) Iran is also using soft power to engage Brazilian
society. Visiting officials from Tehran usually conduct
extensive press interviews to draw parallels between Brazil's
peaceful nuclear energy program and their purported wish for
a "peaceful" one for their own. The Iranian Embassy also
arranges for visiting professors to provide lectures at the
Catholic University of Brasilia several times a year.

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Key Year in Middle East Diplomacy: A Window of Opportunity?
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10. (C) Brazil currently is engaging in another round of
intense Middle East activity, following on its attempt to
step out of its traditional geopolitical comfort zone in
2005, when it organized and hosted the ASSA Summit. Already
this year, Amorim traveled earlier this year to Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, and Israel. He
also participated in the late February Arab-South American
foreign ministers' meeting in Buenos Aires. After that,
Brazilian officials expect to receive visits of Syrian
president Asad and the King of Jordan, plan to open new
embassies in Oman and Qatar, hope to reach trade accords with
Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, and seek to finish the
long-delayed trade accord with the Gulf Cooperation Council.
President Lula is also tentatively scheduled to travel to the
Middle East in the second half of this year, with likely
stops in Saudi Arabia, Israel (his first trip there),and the
Palestinian territories. It is possible Lula will delay his
travel to coincide with the ASSA Summit in Doha Qatar early
next year.


9. (C) Itamaraty also has indicated that it intends to follow
up on Lula's August 2007 letter to Palestinian leader Mahmoud
Abbas offering to form a Friends of Peace group with other
interested countries, such as those in IBSA (India and South
Africa),to seek further engagement in the peace process.
Amorim also mooted his interest in hosting a conference for
Israeli and Palestinian civil society leaders during the
Annapolis meeting and in a subsequent meeting with Ambassador
Sobel, although there are currently no specific plans on this
front (Refs A and B).


10. (C) Despite Brazil's independent streak, often unhelpful
actions, and frequently critical comments, in recent months
we have noted a growing tendency among Brazilian officials to
engage U.S. officials in broad discussion on Middle East
issues, during which they never fail to tout their
participation in the Annapolis conference and to thank us for
being invited. Since Annapolis, high-level talks have
included Secretary Rice, WHA A/S Shannon (Ref H),and S/P
Dr. Gordon (Ref B),in addition to multiple conversations
Ambassador Sobel and other Embassy officials have held with
Amorim and other Itamaraty officials on Middle East issues
(Refs A, C, E, F and J).

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Comment:
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11. (C) Brazil's unhelpful positions and sometimes inaccurate
statements with regard to the Middle East muddy the waters

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for U.S. policy and interests in the Middle East. Moreover,
as an increasingly influential global player with aspirations
to a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, Brazil is
seeking to use its new alliances, such as the IBSA forum
(India, Brazil, South Africa) and the BRICs (Brazil, Russia,
India, and China),to exert leadership on issues outside the
geographical confines of those groupings. Finally, Brazil
has real influence in the region. The Arab-South America
Summit was a Brazilian initiative, and during the 2005
summit, many Latin American governments with little
experience on issues related to Middle East peace deferred to
Brazil as it negotiated and eventually caved to Arab
countries on controversial language of the summit declaration
(Refs O, P, and Q).


12. (C) On Iran, although Brazil is in no danger of falling
into the Iranian "orbit", Brazil's almost obsessive interest
in pursuing "balanced" relations tends to come at our
expense, leading the GOB to stay neutral on such issues as
Iranian support of Hizballah, Iranian activities in Iraq, and
Tehran's flouting of UNSC resolutions, while remaining blind
to aggressive Iranian moves in the region.


13. (C) Combined with the concern expressed by various
Senators, we may be seeing a window opening up to bridge the
gap in our Middle East dialogue with Brazil that should be
taken advantage of while Brazil is focused on issues of
strategic concern for the U.S. In a year when Brazil will
engage in intense Middle East diplomacy we should seize the
opportunity to try to steer Brazil away from its usual role
of sideline sniper and make an attempt to recruit Brazil into
a helpful or at least truly neutral role. Although we are
aware that some briefings have occurred in Washington with
individual players, we believe there would be immense value
in a concerted effort here in Brazil to engage the full range
of interested players within Brazilian society, from the
executive and legislative branches, to academics, analysts,
and other opinion-makers. We believe this to be a propitious
time for a visit by subject matter experts from Washington to
provide a detailed look at current U.S. efforts on the
Palestine-Israeli track, Lebanon- and Syria-related issues,
our policy with regards to Hamas and Hizballah, Iranian
activities in Iraq and Iran's nuclear program. Although we
are unlikely to persuade the GOB to take an approach fully in
step with ours, it is critical to engage the GOB both to
ensure they have a complete understanding of U.S. policy and
concerns in the region, and to demonstrate that we take
Brazil's leadership aspirations seriously. It is our hope
that doing so will encourage Brazil to consult with the U.S.
more frequently and will serve to minimize the least helpful
aspects of current Brazilian policy toward the Middle East.
SOBEL