SCENESETTER FOR POLICY PLANNING DIRECTOR GORDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 BRASILIA 000469

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA AND WHA/BSC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON BR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR POLICY PLANNING DIRECTOR GORDON

REF: BRASILIA 00369

Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel. Reasons: 1.4 (B) & (D)


1. (C) Summary: The relationship between the United States
and Brazil is as productive and broad-based as it as ever
been, the result of the excellent relationship between
President Bush and President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, new
cooperation mechanisms on biofuels, business issues, and
economic matters, and our shared goals of fostering
hemispheric stability, promoting democracy, developing a
consensus on next steps regarding climate change, and
achieving a mutually satisfactory conclusion to the Doha
round of WTO negotiations. At the same time, U.S.-Brazil
cooperation is often limited by the GoB's unwillingness to
speak out against anti-democratic actions in the hemisphere
(Venezuela and Cuba),take proactive steps to address key
issues such as nuclear proliferation and counterterrorist
concerns, and expand its international leadership in
meaningful ways. End Summary.

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Lula Popular, But What Comes Next?
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2. (C) With a 67 percent approval rating, President Lula is
more popular than at any other point since he took office in

2003. Continuity and legacy are the guiding lights of Lula's
second term. Lula continues to shape his legacy as a friend
of the poor and builder of a foundation for prosperity for
the lower and middle classes through broad social welfare
programs and a vast, new economic growth program of public
works and growth incentives. At the same time, Lula has
failed to promote needed reforms to abolish a political
culture of corruption, clientelism, and spoils. Although a
seemingly endless series of corruption scandals has not
dented his personal popularity or that of his government,
these scandals have felled political allies, including
cabinet ministers, in recent years.


3. (U) President Lula and his economic team,s prudent fiscal
and monetary policies and reform efforts are a major reason
for his popularity, and have resulted in Brazil,s position
as the tenth largest economy in the world, with a trade
surplus and BB-plus credit rating. Annual GDP growth was
approximately 4.5 for 2007, as was inflation. Buoyed by
exports and investment inflows, Brazil's currency, the Real,
has remained strong, and the government has succeeded in
paying down its external debt. However, there are major
structural challenges to long term growth. Real interest
rates are among the highest in the world. The informal
sector constitutes an estimated 40 percent of the economy, in
part due to the tax burden (34.2 percent of GDP in 2006),one
of the highest among large developing economies. Brazil,s
opaque and onerous regulatory and legal system, as well as
poor transport and other infrastructure, continue to
constrain growth.


4. (C) Lula is concerned with finding an electable successor
for 2010, and appears to be grooming his top domestic policy
adviser, Minister Dilma Rousseff, while keeping other options
open. Attention in the media and among the political elite
is already focused on the race; the opposition governor of
Sao Paulo state and former presidential candidate, Jose
Serra, currently leads the pack of possible candidates.


5. (U) Despite a healthy economy and a slight drop in
homicides registered over the past several years, public
opinion polls consistently show that the top concerns for
Brazilians continue to remain public security and lack of
jobs. These are normally followed by quality of health care
and education, corruption, low wages, and lack of
opportunities for youth. These will likely remain issues
heading into the municipal elections later this year, and
into the 2010 presidential elections.

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Foreign Policy: Hesitant Globally; Cautious Regionally

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6. (C) Brazil's foreign policy is dominated by symbolic steps
to burnish its South-South credentials and status as an
emerging leader, rather than by resolute attention to core
political and economic interests, including strengthening
bilateral political and trade relations with the United
States. The attainment of a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council has been a central tenet of Brazil's foreign
policy under President Lula da Silva's government, and most
of its actions on the international stage are geared toward
that goal. However, Brazil has largely failed to assume the
international leadership role that would make it a strong
candidate for such a position. Brazil's latest two-year
stint on the UNSC, which ended in January 2006, was
characterized by caution and equivocation rather than vision
and leadership. The GoB has so far not used its significant
contribution to stability in Haiti as a step along the road
to becoming a champion of international peace and security.
For example, the GoB has yet to respond to repeated requests
for assistance with peacekeeping in Darfur.


7. (C) Regionally, Lula has maintained Brazil's historic
focus on stability, seeing dialogue and good relations with
all parties as the best way to achieve this goal. As a
result, Brazil maintains an active dialogue with and refuses
to criticize human rights violations in Venezuela and Cuba,
has worked hard to restore relations with Bolivia even at the
expense of its own economic interests, and stood firmly on
the principle of respect for sovereignty, with only minimal
mention of counterterrorism concerns, in responding to the
dispute between Colombia and Ecuador (ref A).

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Foreign Policy: Leader in Regional Integration
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8. (C) In the end, Brazil,s actions during the recent crisis
between Ecuador and Colombia showed that it values regional
integration and sovereignty above all else, where it played
an active but low-key role. In keeping with the basic
precepts on which it bases its foreign policy )
non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations,
working within regional and international organizations to
resolve problems through consensus, and an almost obsessive
preoccupation with evenhandedness ) Brazil worked behind the
scenes at the OAS special session and the subsequent Rio
Group Summit in Santo Domingo to help diffuse the crisis.
Brazil refrained from making any strong public statements
admonishing Venezuela for interfering in what Brazil saw as a
bilateral issue between Ecuador and Colombia, or condemning
the FARC for its terrorist activities that precipitated the
crisis. Lula made calls to Presidents Correa (who he also
met with in Brasilia) and Uribe to discuss the situation
between the two countries and to Argentine President Kirchner
to coordinate diplomatic strategy. Overall, GOB actions
during the crisis provided some insight into how it prefers
to exercise what it sees as Brazil,s natural role as a
regional leader. It does not prefer to lead from the front,
but rather from within the pack. Brazil sees regional
integration as a highly desirable goal to be obtained through
consensus and suasion rather than direct confrontation with
potential destabilizing influences such as Chavez and his
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.


9. (C) During the two Bush/Lula meetings in March 2007,
President Lula stated that the U.S. and Brazil should work
together to promote regional integration in South America.
Since then, however, certain elements within the GOB,
Itamaraty in particular, appear to be trying to walk back
initiatives aimed at increasing U.S./Brazil cooperation on
bilateral and regional issues. This opposition to an
increased U.S. role in the region is on the one hand based on
a traditional mistrust of the U.S. especially among the
Brazilian elite, of which Itamaraty is a part, and on the
other hand the perception that Brazil,s position as regional
leader would be diminished by a strong and active U.S.
presence in the region. Those who adhere to the latter

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position see increased cooperation with the U.S. as a zero
sum game and may believe that proposed regional organizations
such as the South American Defense Council, and to a lesser
extent, the Bank of the South, would serve to exclude the
U.S. from playing a greater role in regional integration
initiatives and as a counterbalance to U.S. influence.
Others in the GOB and Congress believe that Brazilian
participation in the new regional organizations would provide
the means by which Brazil can influence and moderate the
potentially destabilizing behavior and activities of Hugo
Chavez and his allies such as Evo Morales.

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Foreign Policy: Cooperative Relations with China
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10. (C) Sino-Brazilian relations are officially excellent,
characterized by a booming economic relationship and a
political relationship that has become increasingly closer,
especially since the exchange of visits by Presidents Hu and
Lula in 2004. The economic relationship is based on
"complementarity," not competition: Brazil exports to China
low value added commodities such as iron ore, soy, and
petroleum, with these three commodities representing about
70% of the export value, while China exports high value added
goods such as electronics and industrial equipment. There is
some discontentment in the Brazilian private sector over the
unbalanced trade relationship and low level of Chinese
investment in Brazil, but both governments are taking a
long-term view and believe a patiently constructed
relationship will increasingly yield political fruits.
Brazil and China have designated each other a Strategic
Partner. In 2006, they inaugurated the High Level Committee
on Consultation and Cooperation (COSBAN),which meets
biennially, and they agree to support each other in
international organizations, work toward a successful
conclusion of the Doha Round, and cooperate in many political
areas to strengthen south-south relations and the voice of
the developing world globally. Yet China does not support
Brazil's top foreign policy goal: a seat on the UN Security
Council. The Sino-Brazilian relationship is both competitive
and cooperative, and they have much to offer each other, but
it is not clear whether over time the two sides will manage
the relationship to maximize its potential for each side.

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Foreign Policy: "Balanced" Mid-East Approach
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11. (C) As part of its efforts to burnish its global
leadership credentials, Brazil has a very active Middle East
agenda. Already this year Foreign Minister Amorim has
undertaken a five-country Middle East (ref B),followed by an
Arab-South American foreign ministers meeting in Buenos Aires
also in February, and bilateral talks with Iran in March.
Still on deck for the year: possible state visits by Syrian
president Asad and the King of Jordan; a probable trip to the
Middle East by President Lula; opening of new embassies in
Oman and Qatar; potential trade accords with Egypt, Jordan
and Morocco and the hope of finishing the long-delayed trade
accord with the Gulf Cooperation Council; and capping off the
year, the Arab-South American Summit in Qatar. Itamaraty
also intends to follow up on Lula's August 2007 letter to
Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas offering to form a Friends
of Peace group with other interested countries, such as those
in IBSA (India and South Africa),to seek further engagement
in the peace process.


12. (C) The GoB is cautious about taking an active role in
non-proliferation efforts, and has consistently refused to
take a strong position against Iran's nuclear efforts.
Brazilian officials consider their seat at the table in
Annapolis as a foreign policy success and see themselves as
balanced in their dealings with Israel and the Palestinians,
but they have yet to define a substantive role for Brazil. FM
Amorim's suggestion that Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hizbollah
should be included in the negotiations suggest continuing
naivete regarding the peace process and Middle East

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relations, as does his recent remark to a U.S. official that
Brazil's growing "friendship" with Iran will prove useful
should the United States, in the future, decide to engage
Iran.


13. (C) Brazil likes to characterize its relationship with
Iran as correct and balanced, one cognizant of Iran's
troubled status within the international community, but one
that does not repudiate Tehran either. Iran, for its part,
is looking to drum up increased Brazilian investment in Iran,
develop closer bilateral ties, and secure a long-delayed
meeting between Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad and President
Lula. Iran is also seeking for increased opportunities to
balance its trade, which currently overwhelmingly favors
Brazil. Exports to Iran account for about 30% of total
Brazilian exports to the Middle East, or about US$1.8
billion, which accounts for about 99% of trade volume between
the two countries. With regard to Iran's nuclear program,
Tehran seeks out Brazil in order to draw parallels between
Brazil's peaceful nuclear energy program and Iran's nuclear
activities. although Brazil voted in favor of referring Iran
to the UN Security Council in February 2006, from the onset,
the GOB opposed the effort until the vote in the IAEA had
become a foregone conclusion, when the PRC and Russia agreed
to a western compromise proposal. Brazil did not vote to
condemn Iran's nuclear activities until Iran missed the
UN-mandated deadline for allowing international inspectors to
visit suspicious nuclear facilities. As is often the case
with its Mideast diplomacy, Brazil's pursuit of a "correct"
relationship likely will continue to produce decidedly mixed
results which at times will be at odds with the policy
objectives of most Western countries.

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Friendly Cooperation, Not Strong Friendship
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14. (C) Bilaterally, the GoB has pursued generally friendly
relations with the United States, but continues to favor
building ties with developing nations over closer relations
with the United States and other developed nations. While
seeking to expand our bilateral dialogue, the GoB has
studiously avoided working closely with us on broad strategic
issues important to us. Those issues on which it has been
willing to work with us--biofuels, investment, and climate
change, for example--are areas where the GoB considers itself
a visibly equal partner. The exception may be
security-related issues, where the appointment of Nelson
Jobim as Defense Minister has brought new interest in
cooperation. But it appears that in this area, as with our
efforts on counternarcotics, environmental protection,
counterterrorism, and other issues, the Foreign Ministry is
seeking to maintain its historic dominance and distance from
the United States, which it does by controlling the agenda
and throwing up barriers that delay and sometimes scuttle
bilateral efforts that other ministries support.


15. (SBU) We continue to seek opportunities for positive
bilateral cooperation through the mechanisms including the
Economic Policy Dialogue (EPD),the second session of which
was held March 6 in Washington. The EPD provides an
important opportunity to reinforce our view of Brazil as
partner in areas of mutual interest. Cooperation to foster
innovation and agricultural coordination, to possibly include
assistance to African countries, are new topics of
conversation bilaterally. Additionally, we have been working
to develop a regional infrastructure initiative. We have
been exploring one another,s regulatory frameworks in hopes
of addressing barriers and achieving a Bilateral Tax Treaty
and a Bilateral Investment Treaty. Civil aviation is an area
of renewed focus with the next round of talks expected in

2008. There are also continuing efforts under the auspices
of the bilateral CEO Forum to address issues of common
interest.


16. (U) The growing bilateral relationship is reflected in
the number of high-level officials who have visited Brazil.
Most recently, Secretary Rice A/S Shannon (who has visited

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twice in the past 4 months),and A/S Lowery had productive
meetings with Foreign Minister Amorim and other high-level
Brazilian officials. During the last several months others
have made stops in Brazil, including Commerce A/S David
Bohigian, Treasury DAS Brian O'Neill, Deputy Assistant USTR
Chris Wilson, A/S Sullivan, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General
George Casey, FTC Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras, Commerce
Secretary Gutierrez, National Economic Council Director, Al

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Hubbard, Treasury Secretary Paulson, U/S for Democracy and
Global Affairs Dobriansky. At least six CODELs have visited
Brazil in the past six months.


17. (C) USAID has sought to target its efforts in Brazil
towards promoting sustainable livelihoods through working on
issues such as health, the environment, and small and
medium-sized enterprises. Our bilateral dialogue with the
GoB on development assistance to Brazil and in third
countries contains positive elements, including promising
potential in biofuels, but is constrained by differences in
approach to anti-poverty efforts, with the GoB focusing on
cash transfers, while the USG prefers more finely targeted
assistance. The Brazilian Government's multi-billion dollar
poverty alleviation program -- Bolsa Familia -- receives
technical assistance from the World Bank and IDB, but USG
budget constraints and the fact that it is a cash transfer
program (albeit with conditions) keep us from actively
cooperating with the initiative. The GoB also rejected our
flagship regional environmental program, the Amazon Basin
Cooperation Initiative, which will now be pursued on a
bilateral basis. Cuts in USAID's budget may severely impact
our ability to continue these programs.


18. (SBU) The Brazilian public has a mixed view of the United
States. Seventy-five percent say relations between Brazil
and the U.S. are very good or fairly good, and Brazilians by
a wide margin consider the U.S. the most important country in
the region for Brazil. Those who follow the news know that
U.S.-Brazil cooperation on trade issues has global importance
and new areas of cooperation such as biofuels are potentially
significant. There has been a much more positive view of
U.S.-Brazil cooperation since the signing of the biofuels MOU
last year. On the other hand, there is a good deal of
skepticism about U.S. foreign policy, particularly on issues
such as Iraq and Cuba. There is resentment over the long
wait times for U.S. visa applications, a product of a spike
in demand without commensurate increases in staffing. There
is also an unfounded fear that the U.S. or other foreigners
want to take over or internationalize the Amazon.

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Areas of Cooperation: Mixed Bag on Mil-Mil Relations
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19. (C) While mil-mil cooperation on the forces level
continues to grow, the policy level of the Brazilian
government, particularly the MRE, continues to hold back the
relationship. As long as the current government remains in
power, this situation is unlikely to change. We can,
however, pursue initiatives with Brazil that Brazil perceives
to be in its interest-- a General Security of Information
Agreement, for example -- while we enhance existing ties
between militaries. As a stable multi-ethnic democracy,
Brazil is a key partner for the U.S. in helping maintain
stability in Latin America, as evidenced by its role in
managing the Columbia-Ecuador confrontation. Brazil has
recently made much of its proposal for a South American
Defense Council (SADC),although the idea appears to have
little traction among Brazil's neighbors (excepting
Venezuela). The SADC could be useful in coordinating
peacekeeping, along the lines of the African Union, but the
Brazilians see its value more in terms of reinforcing
Brazilian leadership, moderating Venezuela President Chavez
and facilitating common military production (primarily in
Brazil). Should the Brazilian proposal lead to formation of
such a Council, the U.S. should encourage a focus on
practical matters such as maximizing the effectiveness of
peacekeeping, and avoiding duplication of activities
currently carried out by the OAS or Inter-American Defense

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Board.


20. (C) Brazil's apparent determination to look at real
restructuring of its military offers important opportunities
for U.S. engagement to build a partnership to export
stability throughout the hemisphere. Brazil would like
access to U.S. technology and expertise, although any
appearance of dictating Brazil's future military structure
will have negative results. An open exchange of ideas and
willingness to provide advanced U.S. military technology
(subject to appropriate export control regulations) will have
far reaching benefits to the bilateral relationship and could
begin to undermine some of the reflexive anti-Americanism
among Brazil's policy elite. As a first step, we should
indicate we would be willing to discuss sale of non-nuclear
U.S. technology to Brazil's submarine program, even if Brazil
plans to build a nuclear powered submarine. By doing so, we
will be treating Brazil as an important, responsible partner
and will be supporting their most prestigious defense program
without violating nonproliferation standards.

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Areas of Cooperation: Science and Environment
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21. (C) Brazil has first class scientists and facilities in a
number of areas. The U.S. Government (USG) has
well-developed scientific cooperative arrangements in two
areas with Brazilian counterparts: the Agriculture Research
Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA/ARS) with
EMBRAPA of the Ministry of Agriculture (this includes
long-term exchanges of researchers); and the National
Institutes of Health with the Ministry of Health, FIOCRUZ (an
institution that works with vaccines),and other health
institutions. The National Science Foundation (NSF) and a
variety of other U.S. agencies have modest or limited
collaborative scientific activities with Brazilian
counterparts. Many elements of the U.S. private sector,
academia and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have
established scientific ties with Brazilian counterparts.
Brazil has demonstrated remarkable scientific and
technological prowess in a number of areas, most notably with
deep sea oil and gas exploration by PETROBRAS, aviation
technology with EMBRAER, and information technology.


22. (C) Brazil is a key player in the ongoing negotiations
for a new international climate change agreement to succeed
the Kyoto Protocol. It has become an active participant in
the Major Economies process. While a fierce defender of the
principle of "common, but differentiated responsibilities,"
the GoB sees a need for an appropriate balancing of
environmental and economic concerns when addressing the
problem. Brazil is home to the largest remaining tropical
forest ) the Amazon ) and any agreement will need to
address the problem of large-scale deforestation there. For
its part, the GoB recognizes the importance of reducing
deforestation, but is fearful of accepting binding goals
which might be used to justify trade sanctions or other
punitive measures. Despite the increasing interest in
climate change, the USG has sharply cut-back its support for
climate change research in the Amazon and winding down its
environmental cooperation. The decade long, multi-million
dollar environmental research project (LBA),which had been
run by NASA and which had studied the Amazon, is closing
down. Further, the LANDSAT satellites that used to assist
Brazil on monitoring the Amazon are reaching the end of their
useful lifespans with no substitute in sight, and thus Brazil
has turned to China for assistance with satellite monitoring.



23. (C) There are a variety of small environmental
cooperative efforts. The U.S. Forest Service is helping the
newly created Brazilian Forest Service. The U.S. Geological
Survey, the Smithsonian Institution, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
and the Department of Energy have in recent years had limited
environmental activities in Brazil. Interestingly, U.S. NGOs
and academia have become quite active in Brazil and frankly

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bring far more resources to the table. NGOs such as the
Moore Foundation, the Packard Foundation, the World Wildlife
Fund, The Nature Conservancy and others provide many times
more the assistance that the USG provides.

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Areas of Cooperation: Biofuels
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24. (C) Your visit comes just after the one year anniversary
of your signing the Biofuels MOU and the March 3 meeting of
the Biofuels Steering Group. This initiative has provided
the groundwork for increasingly positive bilateral relations
and has produced some notable results, including a model for
biofuels standard regimes internationally, cooperative
efforts to aid Haiti, El Salvador, St. Kitts and Nevis, and
the Dominican Republic in developing their own ethanol
capacity. The GoB and USG are pursuing cooperative
scientific activities to develop the next generation of
biofuels. The more numerous and often better-funded U.S.
scientists and laboratories can benefit greatly from this
cooperation with Brazil,s world-class cadre of scientists
and laboratories, which have established an impressive record
over the last 30 years. We anticipate a visit by Energy
Secretary Bodman in the coming months and hope to use the

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opportunity to broaden our energy cooperation beyond biofuels
to other areas for expanded collaboration. In spite of
President Lula's enthusiasm for closer biofuels cooperation
and apparent GoB readiness to cooperate, the Foreign
Ministry, though, appears to be trying to delay
implementation of some of the provisions in the MOU.

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Proud to be Energy Self-Sufficient
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25. (C) Brazil is very proud of the fact that it recently
became, at least on the books, self sufficient in petroleum.
They export some of their production but due to the level of
their crude, they are still obliged to import other grades of
fuel. Brazil hopes to become a leading oil exporter with the
development of the recently discovered deep water reserves in
the Santos basin, near Sao Paolo. Petrobras, which has been
working in the Gulf of Mexico as the world,s leader in deep
water technology, hopes to capitalize on this find; an
interest that has led to worries on the part of U.S. and
international oil companies that the government may be trying
to set up the parastatal Petrobras to have, if not exclusive,
at least primary rights to these new finds. This concern was
amplified by the withdrawal of the auction blocks for
exploration rights related to this area just before the
auction was to take place. Brazil, which has one of the
world,s greatest reserves of uranium but has only a small
civilian nuclear operation, also has ambitions of becoming a
world yellow cake exporter. Brazil has been a gas importer
from Bolivia, a relationship was has been complicated by
Morales, unilateral renegotiating of contracts with
Petrobras. Brazil also has an unfulfilled contract for gas
imports from Argentina, shares its largest hydroelectric dam
with Paraguay, and has ongoing conversations with
Venezuela,s Chavez over a possible gas pipeline and a
cooperative oil refinery near Recife, for which despite
rhetoric, Petrobras continues to bear the financial costs.
Judging by recent talks with GoB officials, more energy
cooperation with the U.S. is welcome. We anticipate a visit
by Secretary Bodman in mid-May to broaden our energy
cooperation beyond biofuels to other areas for expanded
collaboration.

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Areas of Cooperation: Fighting Discrimination
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26. (SBU) Comprising close to half of Brazil,s population,
over 90 million people, Afro-Brazilians are widely
discriminated against not only by the broader society, but
also by &lighter-skinned8 people of African descent who
often do not identify themselves as black. Brazilians often

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reject the notion that discrimination is widespread, both as
a result of differing conceptions of race from that generally
accepted in the U.S.--officially, only seven percent of
Brazilians are considered Afro-Brazilian--and because of the
overlap of racial discrimination with poverty. Nonetheless,
there is increasing recognition that discrimination is
tarnishing Brazil,s image as a modern, multi-racial,
multi-ethnic democracy. President Lula is personally
committed to tackling Brazil,s racism issue. He has
appointed more Afro-Brazilian members to his cabinet than any
previous president, named the first black justice to the
Supreme Federal Tribunal, and created the Cabinet-level
position of Special Secretariat for Policies to Promote
Racial Equality (SEPPIR). His Worker,s Party (PT) is
pressing the Chamber of Deputies to pass a bill that would
create Brazil,s first Racial Equality Statute (which the
Senate approved in November 2007). The statute would mandate
racial/ethnic quotas at federal universities, although the
private sector and some state and federal universities
already implement them. The effort is nonetheless
controversial, with critics claiming that quotas only create
a conscious divide between races.

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Engaging with Brazilians: Public Diplomacy
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27. (U) The total public diplomacy budget for Brazil is
roughly four million dollars, excluding salaries. Major
programs include our highly successful Youth Ambassador
program, English Immersion USA, an active speakers program,
and about 50 International Visitors per year. Other
exchanges include community college students and
administrators, high school administrators, and university
student leaders. We are increasing support for English
language programs with more money for English Access Micro
Scholarships and for student advising through Opportunity
Initiative Grants. Both programs are funded by ECA. We work
closely with Binational Centers whenever we can to leverage
our resources.


28. (U) Brazil,s growing economic development and
increasingly affluent population will increase demand for
English and overseas study in the U.S. While we are
increasing resources in both those areas, we lack the staff
to handle the growing demand.

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Engaging with Brazilians: Expanding Academic Outreach
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29. (U) Although there is no degree-granting American Studies
program in Brazil, several academic centers that focus on US
topics are starting to emerge. The eight ECA sponsored Study
of the U.S. Summer Institutes for university professors
receive many Brazilian applicants, although only three were
chosen this year. ECA,s excellent initiative to create a
university student leaders seminar on U.S. studies received
over a thousand applicants from Brazil for 18 slots. The
program was a great success, with many of the participants
changing the focus of their academic research to the U.S. as
a direct result of the experience.


30. (U) The post has a large and active Fulbright program
which currently has 183 Brazilians in the U.S. and 57 U.S.
students and scholars in Brazil. The program receives
approximately $5.1 million form the U.S. side, a figure that
includes tuition waivers from U.S. universities. The USG
directly supports the program with about $1.5 million. The
Brazilian contribution, through CAPES, is approximately $6.3
million in support of Brazilians in U.S. universities and a
more limited number of U.S. citizens in Brazil. A separate
program, the CAPES-FIPSE annual grant competition, funds ten
new academic partnership projects each year. These programs
are co-funded by the U.S. and Brazilian governments at the
rate of USD 50,000 per year per side for a period of four
years. To date over 50 partnerships involving over 200
universities have been established.

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SOBEL


HENSHAW