2008 U.S.-BRAZIL POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000343 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR PM, WHA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018 TAGS: BR MARR PREL PTER SUBJECT: 2008 U.S.-BRAZIL POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATIONS AGENDA REF: SECSTATE 20259 Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen Liston ¶1. (U) Mission delivered the reftel agenda to Foreign Ministry Special Advisor Marcos Pinta Gama who indicated that Brazil would be prepared to host AA/S Mull for this year's political military consultations April 15. Pinta Gama said that he needed to consult other members of the Brazilian delegation before providing specific comments on the proposed agenda, but offered several preliminary thoughts on agenda items. ¶2. (SBU) DEFENSE COOPERATON AGREEMENT: Pinta Gama claimed that the MRE was awaiting an "official" version of the text from the MOD. (Note: POLOFF had visited the MOD three days early and saw a copy of the memo that had been sent to the MRE.) As yet there had been no internal discussion of the DCA, so Pinta Gama was unable to offer any idea as to how long MRE clearance might take.(Comment: MRE has had an unofficial copy of the DCA since the Ambassador provided it to U/S for Political Affairs Everton Vargas on January 11. End comment.) ¶3. (SBU) GSOMIA/GSOIA: The MRE believes that a GSOIA would be far more useful than a GSOMIA as it would have broader application and would be more consistent with Brazil's system of having one government agency in the lead for protecting classified information. Pinta Gama said he strongly supprted a GSOIA and recommended consulting with the GSI, Brazil's information security agency on a way forward. ¶4. (SBU) SOFA: Pinta Gama was cautious on the idea of a SOFA. He said he believed the one signed with France was more limited than the SOFA the U.S. had proposed. The problem, he stated, with the U.S. SOFA was that it would confer "diplomatic-like" status on U.S. forces, and this would be impossible under Brazilian law.(Comment: this is the standard retreat of Itamaraty when faced with accords not to their liking; the French were also told by Itamaraty that the SOFA they sought would be unconstitutional. End comment.) ¶5. (U) NONPROLIFERATION: Pinta Gama welcomed further consultations noting Brazil's "good credentials" with global nonproliferation regimes. He cited the proliferation of small arms and light weapons as the biggest threat to global security. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: Pinta Gama, who is chief of staff to the fervently anti-American MRE Secretary General (Deputy Minister) Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes, is also Itamaraty's recognized pol-mil expert and designated liaison with the MOD. A firm defender of Itamaraty's interests, he nonetheless believes the bilateral consultations are useful and notes that it would be positive to build upon the good relations between the U.S. and Brazilian militaries. Despite having accompanied Defense Minister Jobim to France in February, he avoided the popular rhetoric trumpeting the "strategic partnership" with France and was clearly interested in Jobim's upcoming Washington trip as a possible means of opening new possibilities for cooperation. SOBEL