Brazil: 2008 Country Report on Terrorism

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001664 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV ECON CO BR SUBJECT: Brazil: 2008 Country Report on Terrorism Ref: STATE 120019 ¶1. (U) The Brazilian government continues to be a cooperative partner in countering terrorism and related activities that could contribute to the facilitation of attacks in the region or elsewhere--to include investigating potential terrorism financing, and document forgery networks and other illicit activity. Operationally, elements of the Brazilian Government responsible for combating terrorism, such as the Federal Police, Customs, and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency, effectively work with their U.S. counterparts and diligently pursue investigative leads provided by U.S. intelligence, law enforcement and financial agencies regarding terrorist suspects. ¶2. (U) Brazil's intelligence and law enforcement services are concerned that terrorists could exploit Brazilian territory to support and facilitate terrorist attacks, whether domestically or abroad, and have focused their efforts in the areas of Sao Paulo, the tri-border areas of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay; Brazil, Peru and Colombia; and the Colombian and Venezuelan borders. Brazil's recognition of the potential threat from terrorism prompted a reform of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) that raised the profile of the issue by upgrading the counterterrorism division to the department level. ¶3. (U) Brazil's intelligence and law enforcement forces work closely with regional and international partners. In 2008, ABIN hosted a multilateral conference on counterterrorism involving the security services of several South American countries. Also in 2008, the Federal Police and ABIN, together with the United Nations Organization for Crime and Drugs, co-hosted an international conference on terrorism finance. In addition, Brazil actively participates in international counterterrorism fora such as the 3+1 Mechanism on Security in the Triborder Area, Mercosul's Working Group on Terrorism and the Sub-working Group on Financial Issues, the latter of which discusses terrorism financing and money laundering among the Mercosul countries. ¶4. (U) Bilaterally, the USG provided a variety of training courses throughout Brazil in counterterrorism, combating money laundering, detection of travel document fraud, container security, and international organized crime. In 2008, Brazil and the United States began exchanging information on critical infrastructure protection issues. ¶5. (U) Although Brazil has no official list of terrorist groups and does not recognize the FARC as one, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has been more critical of the FARC's use of violence and has publicly called on the group to desist in the armed struggle against the Colombian government. President Lula also signaled a renewed commitment to cooperate with the Colombian government that, if implemented in 2009, could help curtail the FARC's activities along the border with Brazil. In July, Lula and Colombian President Alvaro Uribe signed bilateral accords to cooperate on combating the illicit trafficking of weapons and munitions, enhance defense cooperation, and, together with Peru, combat transnational criminal active, particularly the trafficking of drugs, weapons, munitions, by increasing intelligence sharing and joint patrolling of border river ways. ¶6. (U) Brazil is capable of monitoring domestic financial operations and effectively utilizes its financial intelligence unit, the Financial Activities Oversight Council (COAF),to identify possible funding sources for terrorist groups. Through the COAF, Brazil has carried out name checks for persons and entities on the UNSCR 1267 and 1373 terror finance lists, but has so far not found any assets, accounts or property in the names of persons or entities on the UN terror-finance lists. ¶7. (U) Brazil also continues to undertake steps to enhance its capabilities to combat money laundering. Since 2003, fifteen specialized money laundering courts have been established, including two in Sao Paulo, with each court headed by a judge who receives specialized training in national money laundering legislation. In addition, in 2008, the United States and Brazil established a working group with money laundering judges to share best practices and training needs. ¶8. (U) A 2006 national anti-money laundering strategy goal was formed aimed to build on the success of the specialized courts by creating complementary specialized federal police financial crimes units in the same jurisdictions. In 2008, the Federal Police established such units in the Federal District (Brasilia),and the states of Rio de Janeiro and Sco Paulo. In addition, the Ministry of Justice funded the creation of technology centers to combat money BRASILIA 00001664 002 OF 002 laundering in the Federal District and Rio de Janeiro, the latter of which received two such centers, one embedded with the Public Ministry and one with the state Civil Police. In 2008, the Ministry signed accords to establish additional centers in Bahia, Goias, and Rio Grande do Sul. ¶9. (U) Although the Government of Brazil vigorously condemns terrorism, it does not acknowledge the presence of terrorist groups on Brazilian soil and insists that no identifiable terrorist incidents have occurred in the country. The Government of Brazil's counterterrorism strategy consists of deterring terrorists from using Brazilian territory to facilitate attacks or raise funds, by aggressively monitoring and suppressing transnational criminal activities that could support terrorist actions. It accomplishes this through increasing effective actions between its law enforcement entities and through cooperation with the United States and other partners in the region. ¶10. (U) In 2008, the GOB and the USG continued to work together through the Container Security Initiative in Santos, Brazil to promote secure containerized cargo to the United States and through the establishment of a Trade Transparency Unit to detect money laundering through trade transactions. ¶11. (U) The Brazilian government is achieving visible results from recent investments in border and law enforcement infrastructure that were executed with a view to gradually control the flow of goods -- legal and illegal -- through the Tri-border Area (TBA) of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, the proceeds of which could be diverted to support terror groups. The inspection station at the Friendship Bridge in the TBA that was completed by Brazilian Customs (Receita Federal) in 2007 has continued to take effective action to suppress the smuggling of drugs, weapons, and contraband goods along the border with Paraguay. According to Brazilian Customs (Receita Federal) in 2008 the agency interdicted more than $76 million in smuggled goods, including drugs, weapons, and munitions, an increase of eight percent from 2007. As a result of the effective crackdown on the Friendship Bridge, most smuggling operations now take place through the Parana River and Lago Itaipu and some have migrated to other sections of the border such as the towns of Guiara and Ponta Pora. The Federal Police has Special Maritime Police Units in both Foz de Iguacu and Guaira that aggressively patrol the maritime border areas but because of the scale and complexity of the endeavor to curtail smuggling and trafficking activities through the waterways, Brazil is currently considering using an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle to assist law enforcement in monitoring the border, a development that could further improve border security. ¶12. (U) Brazil's overall commitment to combating terrorism and the illicit activities that could be exploited to facilitate terrorism is undermined by the GOB's failure to significantly strengthen its legal counterterrorism framework. Two key CT-related legislative initiatives continued to languish in 2008. An anti-terrorism bill that would have established the crime of terrorism and other associated crimes was drafted but shelved before its introduction in Congress and a long-delayed anti-money laundering bill has not been approved by Congress. If passed, the latter bill would facilitate greater law enforcement access to financial and banking records during investigations, criminalize illicit enrichment, allow administrative freezing of assets, and facilitate prosecutions of money laundering cases by amending the legal definition of money laundering and making it an autonomous offense. ¶13. (U) Post POC Javier A. Gonzalez can be reached at GonzalezJA@state.gov or (55-61) 3312-7509. KUBISKE