BAHIA SUMMITS, PART 3: THE SURPRISE OF BAHIA:

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001638 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2018 TAGS: PREL KSUM ECIN MARR BR MX SUBJECT: BAHIA SUMMITS, PART 3: THE SURPRISE OF BAHIA: MEXICO COZIES UP TO BRAZIL REF: A. BRASILIA 1636 ¶B. BRASILIA 1637 ¶C. BRASILIA 1301 Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) In a meeting on December 19 with Ambassador Sobel regarding the outcome of the regional summits hosted by Brazil December 15-17 in Costa do Sauipe, Bahia (see septels),Mexican Ambassador to Brazil Andres Valencia Benavides (protect),just back from Bahia, revealed that President Calderon's remarks during the closing session regarding a possible "Union of Latin American and Caribbean Nations" were purely Calderon's idea and had not been mooted previously with either other leaders or the Mexican foreign ministry. Clearly at a loss to explain them, Valencia stressed that, "In the ministry, we are focusing on strengthening the Rio Group. Perhaps sometime in the future it will lead to a union." Noting that he understood Brazil and Mexico were looking to restart trade talks, Ambassador Sobel suggested that Mexico could be a good "bridge builder" between Brazil and North America as a whole. "If asked," Valencia said, "Mexico stands ready" to help engage Brazil in this regard. ¶2. (C) Later that day, in a meeting that also dealt extensively with the Bahia summits, Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim (protect) confided to Ambassador Sobel that the "biggest surprise" of the CALC was Mexico's enthusiastic support for the new Latin America/Caribbean forum and for sending a strong message on Cuba to the United States. Jobim's take is that Calderon took a risk by attending the summit and expressing strong support for Cuba because of a lack of support in his own party. He had done so, Jobim said, because he wants a closer relationship with Brazil and is playing to his broader domestic audience that is more supportive of these positions. Jobim reported that Calderon had invited him to Mexico to define strategies and be briefed on the South American Defense Council. Calderon also invited President Lula to visit Mexico, specifically asking Lula to accompany Calderon to "the wall" along the U.S.-Mexico border. When Ambassador Sobel asked if Lula would go, Jobim responded, "If Calderon presses, yes." ¶3. (C) Comment: It is generally taken as gospel here that Mexico is the only other LAC country besides Brazil with the ability to convene a region-wide gathering and that, in general, Mexico and Brazil seek to check each other's ambitions to be the leader in the region and "representative" of the region in other fora. In the wake of Brazil's CALC initiative, Mexico's emphasis on strengthening the Rio Group appears to be a not too subtle attempt to do just that. So Calderon's overtures, which seem to have caught the Brazilians and perhaps Calderon's own foreign ministry by surprise, will be welcome in Brasilia. A closer partnership between Lula and Calderon could well set the stage for a more cooperative dynamic among these two regional leaders in shaping the region's message to the United States and in global fora. SOBEL