BAHIA SUMMITS, PART 2: BRINGING LATIN AMERICA AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001637 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019 TAGS: PREL ECIN KSUM MARR XM XL BR MX CU SUBJECT: BAHIA SUMMITS, PART 2: BRINGING LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN TOGETHER...AROUND CUBA REF: A. BRASILIA 1636 ¶B. BRASILIA SEPTEL "THE SURPRISE OF BAHIA: MEXICO COZIES UP TO BRAZIL ¶C. BRASILIA 1301 ¶D. BRASILIA 1405 ¶E. BRASILIA 1534 BRASILIA 00001637 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Ambassador Sobel met with ministerial level contacts on December 18 and 19 who commented with varying degrees of detail on the series of summits (Mercosul, UNASUL, Rio Group, and Latin America/Caribbean--CALC) hosted by Brazil in Costa do Sauipe, Bahia December 16-17 (Ref A). Senior GOB officials stressed that Cuba was the dominant issue and played down the anti-United States elements of the summits that dominated the press headlines and commentary. According to Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, the main purpose of the Rio Group and CALC was to begin a process to reintegrate Cuba into the hemispheric community and to send a message to the new U.S. Administration on the need for an overture on Cuba as an essential element of engaging the region. Without such a gesture, Jobim said, the April Summit of the Americas (SOA) would be "horrible." In a separate meeting, Mexican Ambassador to Brazil Andres Valencia Benavides (protect) also told Ambassador Sobel that an overture on Cuba by the Obama Administration was "expected" and that, without one, the rest of the SOA agenda would be "contaminated." End summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - Lula's Chief of Staff: Region "Can't Leave the United States Behind" - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) In a December 18 meeting with Presidential Chief of Staff Minister Gilberto Cavalho (held while President Lula was meeting Cuban President Raul Castro in the office next door),the Ambassador raised the Bahia meetings, asking about Brazil's regional agenda in light of press reports that had focused on anti-American comments by a few leaders at this Lula-organized event. Carvalho stated that, while the GOB policy has been to seek to diversify its trade relationships, it remains undeniable that the United States is Brazil's "major partner" and a person "would have to have something wrong with his head" to think that Brazil or the region could "leave the United States behind." Carvalho stressed that Lula's and other GOB officials' remarks must be taken in the context of the Bahia meetings, where the environment was "conspiratorial" and Lula was trying to play a moderating role. Brazil's problems with Ecuador and Bolivia have been a learning experience, Carvalho said, and Lula now understands better the position that the United States is in. - - - - - - - - - - - - All About Cuba... - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) On December 19, Central Bank President Henrique Meirelles told Ambassador Sobel that the Bahia meetings were "difficult" and complained that they were "all about Cuba, Cuba, Cuba." In a separate meeting, however, Defense Minister Nelson Jobim told the Ambassador that the Bahia summits had gone well. UNASUL had approved the South American Defense Council, while the CALC had helped solidify relations with the region, and especially Mexico (septel). Jobim dismissed as "nonsense" comments by Morales about expelling U.S. ambassadors, but stressed that there was broad confidence among regional leaders that the new U.S. Administration should and would make a gesture toward Cuba. "The key goal of Bahia," Jobim stated, was to send a message that "to get (the hemisphere) together, we have to solve Cuba." "Lula wanted to signal to the United States that there is a way to have a strategic alliance with Latin America," Jobim continued, and that involves the new Administration making a gesture toward Cuba. Such a gesture would start an "irreversible" process in Cuba and would then allow other Latin countries to press Cuba. - - - - - - - - - - - - ...And Regional Leadership - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Jobim stressed that Lula had taken a risk in calling BRASILIA 00001637 002.2 OF 003 for a change in Cuba policy by the United States, as his leadership position in the region will diminish, while that of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez would rise, if no U.S. overture on Cuba is forthcoming. He said that Chavez and Bolivian President Evo Morales were opposed to any move toward resolution of issues between the United States and Cuba. Chavez had asserted in closed sessions that such an overture would "pull a rug out from under him" because his discourse is related Cuba. Without a gesture by the United States, Jobim said, the April SOA would be "horrible," and Lula would be forced to take a harder line on the issue so that Chavez is not strengthened. The Ambassador asked whether Raul Castro even wanted a gesture from the United States. Jobim responded that "we won't know until later." But he also said that Cuba's position on engaging the United States is closer to Brazil's than to Venezuela's. ¶5. (C) In a December 19 meeting with the Ambassador, Mexican Ambassador to Brazil Andres Valencia, just back from Bahia, likewise described the summits as a GOB success, saying they highlighted Brazilian leadership in the region and President Lula's personal role as someone who "can talk to everyone." Although the summits solved none of the outstanding problems Brazil has with various neighbors, he said, neither did these problems "blow up" in any of the meetings. Valencia reported that "only a few" leaders were vocally anti-American, and he described Lula's tone with regard to the United States as conciliatory, noting that Lula had stated the region needed to give the new U.S. Administration time to elaborate its policies. ¶6. (C) Asked about Calderon's remarks regarding a possible "Union of Latin American and Caribbean Nations," Valencia said that it was purely Calderon's idea, and was not discussed by other leaders at the meeting. Benavides recognized that the pronouncement had raised questions about the Organization of American States (OAS) and the SOA, which would have to be dealt with over the next months. Trinidad and Tobago was concerned about the implications of the Bahia meetings for the success of the April SOA but he observed that neither Trinidad and Tobago nor anyone else mentioned the SOA during the meetings. For its part, Mexico hopes that the new CALC forum will eventually become redundant as the Rio Group grows in membership and significance, Valencia said. Jamaica is planning to join the Rio Group, and they are hopeful other CARICOM countries will, as well. Venezuela had originally offered to host the second CALC, but Mexico and Brazil both wanted to avoid having Venezuela lead the follow-up process to Bahia. As a result, a CALC foreign ministers meeting will be hosted by Jamaica in 2009, and Mexico will host a Rio Group Summit in February 2010 that will serve as a follow-up mechanism to the CALC. Venezuela will host the next CALC in 2011. - - - - - - - - - - - - Regional Dynamics on Cuba...with Implications for the SOA - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) In the absence of any other concrete agreement--except a decision to meet again--Cuba was the big issue on the agenda in Bahia, Valencia said. It was Brazil that pushed for the presidential-level meeting of the Rio Group to endorse the decision to admit Cuba, Valencia said. Such a meeting was technically not necessary. Only one country, Peru, had dissented on holding the extra Rio Group meeting, and Valencia was certain that Peruvian President Garcia was the only leader who did not attend the Bahia summits for political reasons, reportedly saying he was not going to sit with dictators. Valencia described the sentiment on the need for the United States to lift the embargo against Cuba as "universal" among LAC leaders. The most important thing that the new U.S. Administration can do to improve relations with the region, Valencia said, is to address Cuba: "Everyone expects it." The results of the Bahia summits with regard to Cuba had complicated the scenario for the SOA. Without a change on Cuba policy, Valencia said, the rest of the agenda will be contaminated. ¶8. (C) Comment: Jobim's assertion that the purpose for the CALC centered on resolving the Cuba issue is a bit of revisionist history. Although from the time it was first announced many contacts told us that Cuba would be an underlying issue at the CALC, post contacts also repeatedly told us that the meeting had no firm agenda and was a BRASILIA 00001637 003.2 OF 003 political exercise aimed gathering the region without any "outside" (i.e., non-Latin/Caribbean) influence (reftel C-E). While the "exclusion" of the United States and Canada from the CALC dominated press coverage and were widely criticized here, the emergent challenge to the United States to change our approach to Cuba has broad acceptance in Brazil and seems more likely to be the enduring message from Bahia. SOBEL