THE FX2 COMPETITION: OVERCOMING KEY CHALLENGES

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001589 SIPDIS STATE FOR PM/RSAT AND WHA/BSC E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018 TAGS: PREL ETTC MASC BR SUBJECT: THE FX2 COMPETITION: OVERCOMING KEY CHALLENGES REF: A. BRASILIA 1373 ¶B. SECDEF REPORT ON JOBIM MEETING 12/10/08 ¶C. IIR 6 809 0043 09 Classified By: DCM Lisa Kubiske. Reason: 1.5(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. A December 9 meeting with Boeing representatives highlighted several key issues for the success of Boeing,s bid for Brazil,s next generation fighter aircraft, the FX2. As noted in ref a, technology transfer continues to be Brazil,s most important criterion for selecting a fighter. While there is some scope for interpretation of transfer of technology, several factors, namely weapons integration and source codes, will be seen as key to a successful bid, as will the potential for Brazilian manufacture of components. In a December 10 meeting, Brazilian Air Force finance officials informed Embassy reps about financing requirements and expressed concern that in the past USG inflexibility has got in the way of FMS financing. With French President Sarkozy visiting later in the month a major effort to establish the French aircraft as a presumptive choice is likely. While all these factors provide challenges for the success of Boeing,s bid, there are immediate steps that the USG can take to keep the Super Hornet in the lead. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) As Boeing completes its submission for the Brazilian Request for Proposal (RFP) for a next generation fighter, its representatives highlight several issues that will be critical to winning the competition. Ref a noted the importance of technology transfer for the Brazilians, and Embassy contacts continue to place a priority on this as a deciding factor. The Brazilians have generally avoided specific demands for technology but have made clear that they expect that technology transferred under the FX2 program should benefit their industry and that they expect technology equal to that of other major air forces. Defense Minister Jobim was recently quoted as saying that &national (industrial) capacity is fundamental to this sort of deal.8 He told Secretary Gates that Brazil had declined to choose the Lockheed Martin F16 as a FX2 finalist because it is seen as older technology (ref b). Boeing is expected to present a strong industrial cooperation package to include significant incentives for Brazilian industries, but when evaluating the candidates, the Brazilian Air Force will likely also consider the specific technologies on offer. For example, excluding the AIM 9x missile, which has been approved for export to such countries as South Korea, Switzerland and Saudi Arabia, would be seen as evidence of an unwillingness to transfer technology that we have offered to others and confirm Brazilian suspicions about U.S. trustworthiness as a supplier. ¶3. (C) Based on what Brazilian Air Force leaders have told the Embassy and Boeing, there are two aspects of tech transfer in particular that should be seen as redlines for Brazil: source codes and weapons integration. While the Brazilian Air Force understands that there are some source codes that no manufacturer will provide, its Commander, Brigadeiro Saito, has stated publicly that he expects source code to be provided. The key for Brazil will be to have such codes as are necessary to operate the aircraft and make use of technology derived for its domestic industries, but Saito will use openness to provide codes as a litmus test for the larger question of technology transfer. Brazil also will need to be able to say that it can use domestically-produced weapons on its new aircraft. Given the high importance the government places on supporting Brazilian defense industries, it would be unthinkable for a major purchase not to make use of local products. ¶4. (C) In a December 10 meeting with Embassy reps, Brazilian Air Force planning chief Brig.Alvaro Knupp dos Santos (3 star) discussed Brazilian concerns about financing its fighter purchase. The original plan was to make an outright cash purchase to be financed by selling bonds. Current market rates, however, make this prohibitively expensive. Brazil will need seller financing and is asking all three candidates about possible arrangements. The Brazilian Air Force is particularly concerned that it will have to &defend8 its deal to the Ministry of Finance and answer detailed questions about why proposed finance arrangements would be in Brazil,s best interests. Knupp further commented that financing as part of U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procurements has been a problem in the past because of &lack of flexibility8 on the U.S. side and &demanding lawyers8 on the Brazilian. He requested a copy of the standard provisions for FMS cases as soon as possible so as to identify and address any possible obstacles. Knupp was clear that he does not want finance arrangements to get in the way of a possible sale and indicated a strong willingness to engage with the USG and Boeing so as to avoid potential pitfalls. ¶5. (SBU) French President Sarkozy is expected to visit Brazil during the week of December 22. While in country, he is expected to sign an agreement on the purchase of diesel electric submarines and a defense cooperation agreement. With Brazil,s new defense strategy paper due out at about the same time, there should be considerable public momentum given to the &Strategic Partnership8 between the two countries. While Brazilian Air Force leaders have told Embassy reps that there will be no movement on the fighter purchase, the French will seek to reinforce perceptions that the Rafale is the leader in the competition and its selection is a virtual fait accompli. Boeing is conscious of the public relations impetus that the French will gain from the visit and is looking for an opportunity to generate some press coverage for the Super Hornet by sponsoring a visit by Brazilian journalists to Boeing,s U.S. facilities and providing them access to pilots who have flown the plane in combat. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: During the December 10 meeting, it became clear that among Air Force personnel, the Super Hornet is the current competition leader. The F18,s superior capabilities, technology and overall cost give it an advantage. However, these factors will not, in the final consideration, outweigh possible perceptions that other planes could offer better technology transfer and financing. Decisions on technology release should set appropriate limits on what technology will be made available, but the key to a successful outcome will be to ensure that such decisions are briefed to the Brazilians in terms of what they will be receiving rather than in terms of what we are withholding. It will be important to be able to reassure the Brazilians that they are being treated consistently with other friendly countries in terms of technology release and that the technologies on offer will benefit Brazilian industry. For the two key issues of weapons integration and source codes, the answer to the Brazilians should be &yes, but...,8 Brazil will get the necessary codes for the industrial cooperation envisioned in the offset package even if some source code will not be transferred. Similarly, Brazil needs to hear that it would be able to use its weaponry, even if it may not immediately choose to undertake the expense of proceeding with integration. We should also engage with the Brazilians as early as possible on the issue of FMS sales and how to avoid potential legal roadblocks in a financing package. It will also be important to complete information sharing arrangements for the FX2 program as early as possible and continue to press the Brazilians for a more comprehensive agreement. ¶7. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Following upcoming Washington discussions on technology transfer and financing, which should provide a clearer picture of the possible technology transfer package, post will seek to review with Washington agencies the potential transfers against our understanding of Brazilian requirements and the precedents set by technology release decisions to other non-NATO countries. Given the SecDef,s assurance to MOD Jobim in ref b that the U.S. tech transfer package would be strong, the final interagency recommendation should reflect this view. We should then expedite contact with Boeing to ensure that the RFP submission takes into account the USG position. As there will have to be restrictions on the technology to be released, it will remain critically important for post to be engaged in the process to craft an approach that explains why the technology package is attractive for Brazil and gives supporters of the F18 in the Air Force the arguments they need to make the Super Hornet Brazil,s choice. SOBEL