Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BRASILIA1266
2008-09-22 21:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:
BRAZIL FOREIGN MINISTRY ON BOLIVIA SITUATION
how-toVZCZCXRO8748 OO RUEHRG DE RUEHBR #1266 2662116 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 222116Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2503 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 7075 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 4737 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 5816 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 4252 RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 6596 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 3959 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 7527 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2602 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 0591 RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE PRIORITY 8487 RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 6640 RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO PRIORITY 2781 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0273
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001266
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2018
TAGS: PREL KDEM PREF BR BO
SUBJECT: BRAZIL FOREIGN MINISTRY ON BOLIVIA SITUATION
REF: A. SECSTATE 99473
B. BRASILIA 1253 (NOTAL)
C. LA PAZ 2036 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen M. Liston, reason 1.4 (b) an
d (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001266
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2018
TAGS: PREL KDEM PREF BR BO
SUBJECT: BRAZIL FOREIGN MINISTRY ON BOLIVIA SITUATION
REF: A. SECSTATE 99473
B. BRASILIA 1253 (NOTAL)
C. LA PAZ 2036 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen M. Liston, reason 1.4 (b) an
d (d)
1. (C) PolCounselor delivered ref A demarche on September 22
to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry South AMERICA 1 Division
(Mercosul countries) Chief, Minister Joao Luis Pereira Pinto,
who is handling all of South AMERICA in the absence of his
counterpart who handles the Andes and Under Secretary for
South AMERICA Enio Cordeiro. (Note: Per ref B, PolCounselor
had previously delivered the demarche to the presidency on
September 19.) Pinto thanked PolCounselor for the
information on the expulsions and indicated that he thought
the U.S. response was entirely appropriate.
2. (C) Despite local press reports that negotiations between
the Bolivian government and opposition were stalled, Pereira
Pinto said that the press was overstating the problems.
Although the talks were difficult and patience would be
required, he said that it was essential to keep the parties
at the negotiating table. Pereira Pinto thought that the
Catholic Church had the most credibility with both sides and
would therefore have a key role in keeping negotiations
moving. He confirmed that Ambassador Macedo Soares, a former
Under Secretary for South America, was leading Brazil's
delegation to observe the talks. Pereira Pinto also said
that, as head of the UNASUL "logistics" committee (one of
three created at the September 15 emergency meeting),
Brazilin Defense Minister Nelson Jobim would host the
Bolivian Defense Minister on September 25. The goal is to
see what type of material support the GOB needs, and to pass
these requests along to other UNASUL countries.
3. (SBU) PolCouns asked about the number of people coming
across the border into Brazil as a result of the instability.
Pereira Pinto said that there are no hotels rooms left in
Brasileia, the border town in the Brazilian state of Acre
across from Bolivia's Pando Department, but described this as
an indication that most of those crossing were middle class
or above and able to care for themselves. He indicated that
the numbers of those seeking shelter in Brazil--including
both Bolivians and Brazilian farmers--were small enough that
it was not a problem. Pereira Pinto confirmed that Bolivians
enjoy de facto access to Brazilian social services even
though an agreement providing legal access has not yet been
signed. Asked about any official requests for asylum or
refugee status, Pereira Pinto said he was not aware of any.
He added that there was no truth to news reports that the
Bolivian Government had requested the Brazilian government
return Bolivian citizens allegedly involved in
anti-government violence in Pando.
4. (C) Comment: The GOB is eager to promote a peaceful
resolution to the Bolivia crisis and help restore stability.
Nonetheless, the GOB is walking a difficult line. Sensitive
to protect what it sees as the overriding principles of
non-interference and sanctity of borders, the GOB is
supporting the "constitutional government" in Bolivia and
insisting that the Bolivian government should determine how
the international community plays a role. Although the GOB
sees this as the best way to keep a lid on the crisis and
encourage Evo Morales to stay at the negotiating table, the
GOB's support for the Bolivian government, particularly if it
extends to material support, may undermine its credibility
with the opposition as a neutral partner. At the same time,
Brazilians in states bordering Bolivia strongly support the
Bolivian opposition, Brazilian commercial interests remain at
risk from violence, and the GOB has already taken criticism
domestically for its previous "appeasement" of Morales. For
the GOB, the safest route is support for dialogue in Bolivia,
in its capacity as a member of UNASUL. Even should talks
break down and violence increase, however, the GOB is likely
to maintain its support for the "constitutional government,"
absent egregious, public, and continuing violations of human
rights.
KUBISKE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2018
TAGS: PREL KDEM PREF BR BO
SUBJECT: BRAZIL FOREIGN MINISTRY ON BOLIVIA SITUATION
REF: A. SECSTATE 99473
B. BRASILIA 1253 (NOTAL)
C. LA PAZ 2036 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen M. Liston, reason 1.4 (b) an
d (d)
1. (C) PolCounselor delivered ref A demarche on September 22
to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry South AMERICA 1 Division
(Mercosul countries) Chief, Minister Joao Luis Pereira Pinto,
who is handling all of South AMERICA in the absence of his
counterpart who handles the Andes and Under Secretary for
South AMERICA Enio Cordeiro. (Note: Per ref B, PolCounselor
had previously delivered the demarche to the presidency on
September 19.) Pinto thanked PolCounselor for the
information on the expulsions and indicated that he thought
the U.S. response was entirely appropriate.
2. (C) Despite local press reports that negotiations between
the Bolivian government and opposition were stalled, Pereira
Pinto said that the press was overstating the problems.
Although the talks were difficult and patience would be
required, he said that it was essential to keep the parties
at the negotiating table. Pereira Pinto thought that the
Catholic Church had the most credibility with both sides and
would therefore have a key role in keeping negotiations
moving. He confirmed that Ambassador Macedo Soares, a former
Under Secretary for South America, was leading Brazil's
delegation to observe the talks. Pereira Pinto also said
that, as head of the UNASUL "logistics" committee (one of
three created at the September 15 emergency meeting),
Brazilin Defense Minister Nelson Jobim would host the
Bolivian Defense Minister on September 25. The goal is to
see what type of material support the GOB needs, and to pass
these requests along to other UNASUL countries.
3. (SBU) PolCouns asked about the number of people coming
across the border into Brazil as a result of the instability.
Pereira Pinto said that there are no hotels rooms left in
Brasileia, the border town in the Brazilian state of Acre
across from Bolivia's Pando Department, but described this as
an indication that most of those crossing were middle class
or above and able to care for themselves. He indicated that
the numbers of those seeking shelter in Brazil--including
both Bolivians and Brazilian farmers--were small enough that
it was not a problem. Pereira Pinto confirmed that Bolivians
enjoy de facto access to Brazilian social services even
though an agreement providing legal access has not yet been
signed. Asked about any official requests for asylum or
refugee status, Pereira Pinto said he was not aware of any.
He added that there was no truth to news reports that the
Bolivian Government had requested the Brazilian government
return Bolivian citizens allegedly involved in
anti-government violence in Pando.
4. (C) Comment: The GOB is eager to promote a peaceful
resolution to the Bolivia crisis and help restore stability.
Nonetheless, the GOB is walking a difficult line. Sensitive
to protect what it sees as the overriding principles of
non-interference and sanctity of borders, the GOB is
supporting the "constitutional government" in Bolivia and
insisting that the Bolivian government should determine how
the international community plays a role. Although the GOB
sees this as the best way to keep a lid on the crisis and
encourage Evo Morales to stay at the negotiating table, the
GOB's support for the Bolivian government, particularly if it
extends to material support, may undermine its credibility
with the opposition as a neutral partner. At the same time,
Brazilians in states bordering Bolivia strongly support the
Bolivian opposition, Brazilian commercial interests remain at
risk from violence, and the GOB has already taken criticism
domestically for its previous "appeasement" of Morales. For
the GOB, the safest route is support for dialogue in Bolivia,
in its capacity as a member of UNASUL. Even should talks
break down and violence increase, however, the GOB is likely
to maintain its support for the "constitutional government,"
absent egregious, public, and continuing violations of human
rights.
KUBISKE