2008 RECOMMENDATION FOR RENEWAL OF PRESIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001214 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/BSC AND L E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2018 TAGS: SNAR PREL MOPS BR SUBJECT: 2008 RECOMMENDATION FOR RENEWAL OF PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION FOR BRAZIL'S SHOOTDOWN PROGRAM REF: A. STATE 54183 ¶B. BRASILIA 806 ¶C. 07 BRASILIA 1868 ¶D. BRASILIA 987 ¶E. BRASILIA 1079 ¶F. BRASILIA 1124 ¶G. BRASILIA 1170 ¶H. IIR 6 809 0259 08 ¶I. IIR 6 809 0267 08 ¶J. IIR 6 809 0210 08 Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reason 1.5 d ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In accordance with ref a instructions, Post has conducted an extensive review of Brazil's Air Bridge Denial (ABD)/Shootdown program. Following site visits, conversations with Brazilian government officials and analysis of Brazil's shootdown procedures, (reftels) post has a clearer picture of Brazil's institutional controls. For the first time, the Brazilian government has provided us with an official written version of its procedures (ref g), filling what ref a identified was the crucial gap in our confidence in Brazil's safety procedures. Based on our ongoing monitoring of Brazil's program and supplemented by Brazil's openess in sharing its procedures, post recommends that the Presidential Determination (PD) on the Brazilian Shootdown Law be renewed for 2008. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) As noted in refs a and b, Post remains engaged with the Government of Brazil to maintain confidence that Brazil's safety procedures for its ABD provide protection against innocent loss of life in connection with interdiction. Based on evaluations of Brazil's ABD program, the President has been able to certify annually since 2004. Based on post's contacts with the Brazilian Air Force and Air Control facilities (reftels),it is clear that Brazil's safety procedures are at least as strong as in previous years. In each contact we have had with Brazilian officials, we have heard the view that there is no chance that an actual shootdown will be ordered and that the passage of time makes a shootdown less likely as the notion that the shootdown authority is not to be used becomes more entrenched. PROCEDURES -------------- ¶3. (C) As requested in ref a, Mission Brazil has worked this year to deepen our knowledge of GOB shootdown procedures. As transmitted in ref g, we now have obtained from the Brazilian Air Force an official copy of Brazil's procedures which are consistent with those briefed previously (most recently described in refs c and h). One area of ambiguity exists in the written procedures: who the "competent authority" would be to order the actual destruction of an aircraft. Post has confirmed that only the Commander of the Air Force is considered competent to do this and that this is understood clearly at all levels of the chain of command. Indeed, Air Force pilots and controllers have said privately that they in no way would want responsibility for any use of lethal force and are content to depend on high level authorization. ¶4. (C) In discussing the procedures with the Brazilian Air Force, two other salient facts emerged. First, only a small number of pilots are authorized to conduct intercept operations and receive special training before receiving such authorization. Second, there is a complete separation between controllers of military and civilian air traffic. While all controllers work for the Ministry of Defense, for operational security reasons, those on the military side have separate locations and access to restricted data feeds not available to the civilian side. They are also able to employ AWACS aircraft for additional situational awareness. Given this separation, military controllers were unable to imagine any circumstances under which a civilian controller could become involved in the procedure for ordering a shootdown. Similarly, problems in civilian aviation and air traffic control cannot impact the safety procedures followed on the military side. These factors show the importance the Brazilian Air Force places on safety, particularly concerning potential intercept operations. BRASILIA 00001214 002 OF 002 VISITS -------------- ¶5. (C) During the past year, post has been able to visit two (Brasilia and Manaus) of the four regional air control centers (CINDACTAS) (refs f,h,k). These visits each showed that CINDACTA staff were well-versed on shootdown procedures. The CINDACTAS themselves were equipped to modern air control standards and set up to maintain operational security. CINDACTA personnel reaffirmed to Embassy visitors that they do not have shootdown authority and, in the exceedingly unlikely event an actual shootdown were contemplated, would depend on instructions from the Commander of the Air Force to be passed by Air Defense Command Headquarters (COMDABRA). ¶6. (C) The visit to COMDABRA (ref i) did not result in the good fortune to witness an intercept as did last year's visit, but command staff were able to provide post representatives with a detailed walkthrough of their procedures using photos taken during intercepts. COMDABRA staff also provided detailed information to Air Attache on response times for various areas of the country and air control staffing procedures. Both during CINDACTA and COMDABRA visits, controllers for military traffic told post personnel that although there has never been a shootdown ordered, the existence of the law has made interdiction of illicit trafficking by air more effective. PROGRAM STATISTICS -------------- ¶7. (C) The Brazilian Air Force is compiling this year's statistics on the shootdown program. Post will forward these via septel as soon as they become available. POST RECOMMENDATION -------------- ¶8. (C) As noted in ref b, Brazil has maintained adequate safety standards since its shootdown law came into effect. After conducting our annual evaluation of Brazil's program, we believe that the appropriate safety procedures remain in place. This year's evaluation has been marked by greater openess on the part of the Brazilian Air Force, particularly by hosting multiple visits to Air Control sites. Ref a noted that the key reason for uncertainty as to Brazilian safety standards was that "the USG has no direct knowledge of Brazilian procedures." By providing us with a written version of its procedures, Brazil has filled this gap and given us greater confidence in recommending PD renewal. Post therefore recommends that the Presidential Determination on the Brazilian Shootdown Law be renewed for 2008. SOBEL