MARCH 10 UPDATE ON COLOMBIA DISPUTE WITH ECUADOR,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 000941 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2018 TAGS: PREF PREL PTER VZ EC CO SUBJECT: MARCH 10 UPDATE ON COLOMBIA DISPUTE WITH ECUADOR, VENEZUELA, AND NICARAGUA REF: BOGOTA 919 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: POLITICAL Counselor John Creamer Reasons 1.4 (b, d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Colombia's borders with Venezuela and Ecuador returned to normal March 8-9, following the March 7 Rio Group resolution of the crisis over the GOC's March 1 attack against the FARC in Ecuador. Venezuela agreed to renew diplomatic RELATIONS with Colombia; Ecuador said it would consult with Venezuela before reestablishing ties. President Uribe rejected a GOE proposal to send an international force to the border. OAS officials told us SYG Insulza understands the GOC's FARC dilemma, and wants to help. The OAS will be balanced in its approach to both the Ecuador border and hostage issues. The media voiced relief that the Rio summit defused the immediate crisis, but Colombian legislators told us the underlying problems with President Chavez, the FARC, and hostages would likely make the GOC-GOV detente short-lived. End summary. BORDERS RETURN TO NORMAL -------------- ¶2. (U) Colombia's borders with Ecuador and Venezuela returned to normal over the weekend of March 8, and commercial contacts told us traffic previously held up had crossed the border. Following the March 7 rapprochement at the Rio Group summit in Santo Domingo, Venezuela and Nicaragua reestablished normal diplomatic RELATIONS with Colombia--though the GOV did not announce a specific date for a return of its ambassador. Ecuador said it would take its time, and would consult with Venezuela before reestablishing relations. Venezuelan FM Nicolas Maduro said the GOV would likely announce a new ambassador to Bogota. Maduro also withdrew the Venezuelan threat to nationalize Colombian companies. GOC: NO INTERNATIONAL FORCE FOR BORDER -------------- ¶3. (U) President Alvaro Uribe rejected a March 10 proposal from Ecuadorian Security Minister Gustavo Larrea for the deployment of an international force to the Colombia-Ecuador border. "I do not accept an international peace force to guard the border," Uribe said, "but, I accept the proposal that their (GOE) armed forces will have a presence, and we hope this comes to pass." OAS SYG EXPRESSES SUPPORT -------------- ¶4. (C) OAS Mission for Peace in Colombia (OAS/MAPP) Chief Sergio Caramagna told us OAS SYG Jose Miguel Insulza respects Uribe, believes he deserves international support, and wants to help. Caramagna said Insulza understands the context of GOC action against FARC Secretariat member Raul Reyes, and recognizes that sovereignty cannot be absolute in a war against terrorist groups. The SYG plans to use the OAS commission visiting Ecuador and Colombia to further damp down regional tensions. Insulza and accompanying OAS Ambassadors met with Ecuadorian officials, including President Correa, March 9-10 to discuss the GOC attack on Reyes' camp, and will meet with President Uribe and GOC officials on the same issue from March 10-12. ¶5. (C) Caramagna said Insulza also wants to help the GOC reach agreement on a humanitarian exchange with the FARC, but does not support the French/Venezuelan proposal to create a "group of friends" to undertake this task. Insulza knows the GOC would not accept the return of Venezuelan President Chavez in a facilitation role, and will seek a balanced formula when the moment is right. Caramagna confirmed that Insulza would not take any actions without coordinating with the GOC. REACTION: RELIEF, BUT PROBLEMS REMAIN -------------- ¶6. (C) Colombian media voiced relief that the immediate crisis with Ecuador and Venezuela had passed, but many fear the GOC has not resolved the fundamental issues at stake. GOC coalition (Cambio Radical) Representative Roy Barreras and opposition (Polo) Senator Jaime Dussan told us after the Rio summit they expect the GOC-GOV detente to be short-lived, BOGOTA 00000941 002 OF 002 since the issues that drove the crisis--including Chavez "support for the FARC" and his insistence on a key role on the hostage issue--remain. Brownfield