MARCH 7 UPDATE ON COLOMBIA'S DISPUTE WITH ECUADOR,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 000919 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL PTER VZ SP FR SZ EC CO SUBJECT: MARCH 7 UPDATE ON COLOMBIA'S DISPUTE WITH ECUADOR, VENEZUELA--AND NICARAGUA REF: A. BOGOTA 903 ¶B. BOGOTA 533 Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The flow of goods and people into Venezuela along the Colombian border was further restricted on March 7, but passage of food and perishables continued. The Colombia-Ecuador border remained open. The Ambassador reiterated to Acting Foreign Minister Mejia and Defense Minister Santos the USG's willingness to help the GOC at the OAS and elsewhere. Mejia and Santos confirmed the GOC was satisfied with USG support, and requested a low-key, USG public approach for now. Mejia requested USG help to squash a French proposal to create a "group of friends" on the hostage issue. Santos said he did not expect a GOV attack, but asked us to consider our response in the event of a quick GOV strike. Santos also said the military likely killed FARC Secretariat member Ivan Rios. The Rio Group meeting ended SIPDIS with commitments from Uribe, Chavez, Correa, and Ortega to solve their differences through dialogue. Ortega said he would renew diplomatic ties with Colombia; Uribe said he would not take Chavez to the International Criminal Court. END SUMMARY. BORDERS: MORE GOV RESTRICTIONS IN PLACE, ECUADOR OPEN -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) The Colombian border with Venezuela remained only partially open on March 7, with more restrictions on goods and people. Most food and medicine continued to enter, but all goods were stopped at the remote Puerto Carreno (Vichada) border crossing. Other goods, mainly construction materials, remained restricted at all points of entry. The flow of people was mixed: Cucuta remained open, but Cesar and Arauca were stalled over visa/permit delays. The border with Ecuador remained open, but the flow of goods and people was reportedly half of normal levels. GOC PLEASED WITH USG SUPPORT AND COOPERATION -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador called Acting Foreign Minister Adriana Mejia to reiterate--as previously conveyed to President Uribe and Foreign Minister Araujo--our willingness to help the GOC at the OAS and elsewhere. Mejia told the Ambassador the GOC was satisfied with the current level of USG support. She added that it would be best if USG support remained low key, since highly visible backing could cause tactical problems for the GOC. Mejia said she would let us know if that changed. ¶4. (C) Mejia said there were two areas where we could be supportive: --First, Mejia told us there were rumors Ecuador might push a resolution at the UN Security Council. The GOC considers the OAS the proper forum to discuss the current crisis. Mejia asked that we help the GOC block any resolution if Ecuador took this route. The Ambassador told Mejia he had not received instructions, but was almost certain that this would be the USG's approach. The Ambassador assured Mejia he would pass her concern to Washington. --Second, Mejia told us the Colombian Mission in Brussels reported that France was circulating a non-paper to other EU and some Latin American missions in Brussels proposing the creation of a "Group of Friends" in exchange for a FARC commitment to free its "civilian" hostages. The group could then help achieve an exchange of the remaining hostages, as well as support a final peace process with the FARC. Mejia said the GOC opposed this initiative because it believed the Catholic Church and the French, Spanish and Swiss represented the best chance to address the hostage issue. The Ambassador assured her we would consult with our mission in Brussels to see what we could do to help. BOGOTA 00000919 002 OF 002 CONSIDERING CONTINGENCIES -------------- ¶5. (C) Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos told the Ambassador March 7 that he was content with U.S. intelligence sharing on Venezuela and Ecuador. He considered a planned GOV or GOE military confrontation at the border unlikely. His concern was that Chavez was acting irrationally, perhaps because he felt responsible for the phone call that led to Raul Reyes' death. Santos said the most likely confrontation scenario would be Chavez ordering a quick strike in Colombia before the GOC could react. He asked what the USG would do in such a case. The Ambassador told Santos we agreed that any planned confrontation at the border was extremely unlikely. ¶6. (C) Santos also told us FARC Secretariat member Manuel Jesus Munoz Ortiz (aka Ivan Rios) may have died in combat with the military in northwest Colombia on March 7. The military was trying to get forensic confirmation from a severed hand. Santos said the FARC unit led by Rios was surrounded and lower level fighters wanted to surrender. Rios refused; his men then killed him and handed themselves in. ¶7. (C) Santos added that he would likely travel to Washington on March 9 to meet with Congress and make a national security-based pitch for the U.S. Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement. He added that the GOC was considering the timing on how to proceed on a Cooperative Security Location (CSL) at Palenquero (reftel B). Moving ahead now would send a clear military message to Chavez, but would also allow others in the region to criticize Colombia for its excessive closeness to the USG. Santos said the GOC would have to consider the details of any OAS or other proposal to exchange military liaison officers with Ecuador. He noted that the GOC would not release additional materials from the Reyes computers through press conferences by National Police director Oscar Naranjo. GOC FIGHTS BACK IN THE Dominican Republic -------------- ¶8. (U) President Uribe used the March 7 Rio Group meeting in Santo Domingo to make the GOC case that continual FARC attacks against Colombia from Ecuador justified the March 1 attack against the FARC in Ecuador. The meeting ended with Uribe, Chavez, Correa, and Ortega agreeing to solve their differences through political dialogue. Ortega said he would re-establish diplomatic relations with Colombia; Uribe said the GOC would not take Chavez to the International Criminal Court. Brownfield