COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE FOR SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER

id: 144651 date: 3/6/2008 23:29 refid: 08BOGOTA905 origin: Embassy Bogota classification: SECRET destination: 07BOGOTA3096|07BOGOTA5002|07BOGOTA7453|07BOGOTA7625|07BOGOTA8091 header: VZCZCXYZ0040 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHBO #0905/01 0662329 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 062329Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1817 INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0062 RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR LIMA 5987 RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 1356 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6639 RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4324 RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP ADMIN/CHAIRS// -------------- header ends -------------- S E C R E T BOGOTA 000905 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/06/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER MARR PGOV CO SUBJECT: COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE FOR SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 2007 REF: A. 07 BOGOTA 3096 ¶B. 07 BOGOTA 5002 ¶C. 07 BOGOTA 7625 ¶D. 07 BOGOTA 7453 ¶E. 07 BOGOTA 8091 Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) The military killed two key FARC commanders in the September-December period, prompting desertions from the 16th and 37th fronts. The FARC continued to move forces from the eastern Macarena in Meta to parts of Tolima -Valle zone, leading some analysts to speculate that it is withdrawing some elite units to the central mountains to escape heavy military pressure. An increase in FARC terrorist attacks suggested a possible escalation in terrorism to offset its declining military capabilities. The ELN cooperated with the FARC and other illegal armed groups, as each front struggled to fund and safeguard itself through local alliances. Still, the FARC and ELN continued to fight each other in Arauca. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- DECAPITATION, THEN DISINTEGRATION OF KEY FARC FRONTS -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S) Colombian military takedowns of FARC front commanders aka "Negro Acacio" and "Martin Caballero" (Refs D, E) led to the collapse of the 16th and 37th Fronts. Acacio's death on September 1 triggered mass desertions of his forces, gutting the 16th front in Vichada. Acacio's successor was covertly negotiating his surrender with the Army. One source estimated drug revenues of the FARC's core Eastern Bloc shrank from $800,000 per month under Acacio to $200,000 after his death. FARC leaders told remaining 16th front fighters to break into small units and retreat to remote areas to evade GOC forces. The 37th front in Bolivar received similar orders. After sustained military and police operations against its fighters and militias led to Caballero's death on October 24, the front shift south to alleviate the military pressure. ¶3. (S) Colombian successes against FARC front commanders and the resulting desertions yielded new tactical intelligence, generating a steady stream of new strike targets. At the current pace, desertions will set a record in 2008. Significantly, recent desertions include FARC veterans of 10 or more years. Some are demoralized by food and supply shortages; others alienated by abusive leaders or disillusioned by the loss of a revolutionary ethos. GOC targeting of FARC mid-level commanders and rank-and file with rewards programs is also paying off. In the FARC's heartland, the military is locating and destroying substantial arms and supply caches, thanks to tips from tired and hungry deserters seeking GOC payouts. The snowball effect of leadership takedowns, desertions, and fresh tactical intelligence is likely to unravel more fronts in ¶2008. -------------- FARC FORCES' SHIFT TO THE CENTER -------------- ¶4. (S) The FARC continued to concentrate forces in a zone extending from Meta in the east, across the central ranges of Tolima / Huila, to Cali and Buenaventura in the west. Seventy percent of its fighters were located in this east-west oval, with the outer ends struggling to fulfill leaders' logistics needs. Some analysts speculated that 1300 elite fighters of the Eastern Bloc located in the western end of La Macarena (Meta) are moving west into the central mountains to escape military pressure. The steep terrain in Tolima provides the FARC with a natural fortress. Such a retreat would signal its inability to maintain its presence in the key Macarena region due to sustained military pressure from Joint Task Force Omega. To the west of Tolima are strategic corridors through Florida and Pradeira (Valle) -- where the FARC seeks a demilitarized zone (despeje) -- and to Cali and Buenaventura. FARC terrorist actions centered on these cities and nearby Neiva (Huila). The Eastern Bloc also lost its financial prominence, with drug income now centered in the west. -------------- FARC POLITICAL vs. MILITARY TENSIONS -------------- ¶5. (S) The Secretariat maintained overall command, but the growing military pressure disrupted its internal communications as well as command and control over individual fronts. Some analysts speculated that the FARC's military wing led by aka Mono Jojoy might be losing ground to more "political" leaders such as aka Alfonso Cano as the FARC continues to cede territory to the GOC, suffer supply and cash flows shortages, and lose experienced commanders. Cano and other "political" leaders stress the need to complement military action with political activities, including the creation of Marxist cells ('Bolivarian militias') to infiltrate local government institutions, cultivation of ties to Venezuelan President Chavez, and diplomatic outreach to other European and Latin countries. -------------- FARC TERRORIST ATTACKS MAY SPIKE? -------------- ¶6. (S) Recent attacks suggest the FARC may return to high-profile terrorism to offset its declining conventional capacity. On December 30, the Teofilo Forero Mobile Column (TFMC) responsible for past headline terrorist acts fired a rocket (unsuccessfully) at a Colombian Hercules C-130 aircraft carrying 50 soldiers on the runway in Neiva (Huila), only days after it made a fourth attempt to assassinate the city's outgoing mayor. Earlier in December, police foiled a TFMC plot to kidnap President Uribe's sons. Some military analysts speculated the FARC might resort to new attacks against military, government, and infrastructure targets to reassert its relevance. While the prevailing assumption had been that the FARC would hunker down to 2010 to wait out President Uribe's term, the possibility that its disintegration had reached an unsustainable rate could prompt an escalation. A successful hit against a GOC aircraft, in particular, could radically change the war's dynamic in the FARC's favor. -------------- ELN: GANGING UP WITH FARC, CRIMINAL GROUPS -------------- ¶7. (C) The ELN increasingly cooperated with the FARC and other illegal armed groups, as individual ELN fronts struggled to fund and safeguard themselves through local alliances. ELN and FARC jointly attacked an Army base in Bolivar with bombs and grenades. In Catatumbo, the FARC remained on the sidelines, preferring to leave combat against the military to the ELN. In contrast, the FARC and ELN continued to clash, with ELN frequently winning due to simultaneous military pressure against the FARC. In Narino, the ELN worked with new criminal groups such as the Rastrojos and the Organization Nueva Generacion (ONG) to compete with the FARC for control of drug traffic. These alliances were transaction-driven, and varied from locality to locality. Brownfield =======================CABLE ENDS============================