POLO REMAINS DIVIDED - WEAKENING PROSPECTS FOR 2010

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000590 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM PTER CO VZ SUBJECT: POLO REMAINS DIVIDED - WEAKENING PROSPECTS FOR 2010 REF: A. 06 BOGOTA 11404 B. BOGOTA 376 Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The leftist Polo Democratico Alternativo Party (Polo)'s poor performance in last October's local elections--as well as its ambiguous stance toward the FARC--have exacerbated tensions between its pragmatic, social democratic wing and unreconstructed, orthodox communist elements. Polo leaders consistently denounce political violence, but their reluctance to criticize the FARC has undermined their efforts to expand the Party's base. Pragmatists hope a Polo Congress in 2008 to choose new leaders will strengthen their position, but ideological purists retain significant influence. If the pragmatists do not prevail, moderate, presidential hopefuls such as former Bogota Mayor Lucho Garzon will likely abandon the party. End Summary. POOR RESULT IN OCTOBER ELECTIONS -------------- ¶2. (C) Polo Secretary General Daniel Garcia Pena told us that despite its victory in Bogota's mayoral race, the Polo fared poorly overall in the October local elections. The Party fell well short of its goal of 500 municipal council seats--winning only 378--and also missed its target of 30 state legislator races--garnering only 14. The Polo remains a largely Bogota-based party that lacks a national network. Garcia Pena blamed the poor results on the Party's failure to build cross-party alliances with other opposition groups. Polo hardliners' insistence on ideological purity prevented the party from backing winning left-of-center mayoral candidates in Medellin and Cali. Instead, the party ran its own candidates--both of whom lost badly. Garcia Pena said the sectarian approach favored by the Polo's 1960s style unreconstructed produced defeat after defeat--depriving the Polo of the funding and patronage needed to build a national structure. INTERNAL DIVISIONS -------------- ¶3. (C) The Polo's internal divisions reflect its polyglot origins. The Party was cobbled together from a grouping of smaller leftist parties in 2002-3, and reflects wide spectrum of political views, including old-style communists, 21st Century Socialists, and social democrats (ref A). Former Bogota Mayor and well-known moderate "Lucho" Garzon divides the Party into "reformers and revolutionaries." Garcia Pena 
told us in December that hardline leftists largely control the party machinery. Pragmatists, such as Garzon, hope to use a Party Congress--which under the Polo's rules should be held before November 2008--to take control of key Party positions. He cautioned, however, that the traditional leftists recognize the danger and are trying to delay the Congress until 2009. ¶4. (C) Maoist Senator Jorge Robledo told us only Polo President Carlos Gaviria, who supports the traditional left, represents Polo ideals and policies. Moderates should leave the party if they do not support the Polo's principles or policies. Gaviria told us the party has delayed a full party Congress until November 2008 at the earliest (or as late as February 2009),which will maintain the leftists' control of key party leadership positions. POLITICAL (LACK OF) FOCUS -------------- ¶5. (C) The Polo's ideological and tactical divisions are reflected in the Party's vague platform, especially on security. Garcia Pena told us the Polo's existing security policy could be summarized as, "hoping that the FARC decides to engage in peace talks someday," but added that the party needs to develop a policy to protect Colombians from illegal armed groups as well. Gaviria admitted to us that the Polo lacked a viable security policy, stating that internal splits and a consensus-based decision-making process delay consideration of new security policies. Garcia Pena stressed the need for Polo to formulate a more substantive platform, with a focus on peace and a humanitarian accord, para-political prosecutions, and anti-free trade. POLO ON THE FARC -------------- ¶6. (C) The Polo's ideological confusion is painfully apparent in its ongoing struggle over whether to treat the FARC as a terrorist group. Garcia Pena explained that while "all of Polo rejects the FARC," the Party does not support a military solution to Colombia's conflict. Robledo said the Polo rejects the FARC's tactics, but will not denounce them as a terrorist group and cut off chances for dialogue. The Polo's policy -- denouncing the FARC's tactics and atrocities, but not the group itself -- is becoming untenable. In the February 4 march against the FARC, in which millions of Colombian took to the streets, Polo's leadership voted not to participate (ref B). Still, key Polo leaders such as Bogota Mayor Moreno, Senator Petro, Narino Governor Antonio Navarro Wolff, and former Mayor Garzon publicly marched. Polo leaders understand President Uribe and their opponents will continue to use the FARC as a wedge issue against the party, but have been unable to fashion a party-wide response. POLO ON CHAVEZ -------------- ¶7. (C) The Polo's relations with Venezuelan President Chavez "Bolivarian" movement is another challenge. There is no official Polo position on Chavez, and the Party has not supported Chavez' proposals to give the FARC belligerent status or to remove the group from international terrorism lists. Gaviria told us he and party leadership rejected offers from Chavez in November, and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro in January, to establish closer ties to Chavez' New Socialist Party. Still, he confirmed that approximately twenty percent of the party supports Chavista-style "21st Century Socialism." Gaviria told us he suspected that Chavez' party funded some Polo candidates in the October elections, mainly on Colombia's north coast. RELATIONS WITH THE USG -------------- ¶8. (C) Gaviria, Garcia Pena and other party leaders--all of whom maintain cordial relations with the Embassy--say they want to build a new relationship with the USG based on substance. Still, the Polo remains opposed to key elements of USG policy (aerial eradication, the free trade agreement, and U.S. military assistance). Moreover, the Polo rejects support provided by the International Republican Institute (IRI) on political platform development, and only tacitly accepts technical assistance provided by the National Democratic Institute (NDI). Garcia Pena told us the Polo plans to set up a public policy institute this year. We have offered to cooperate with the institute once it is established, but Garcia Pena has yet to respond. 2010 POLO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE -------------- ¶9. (C) The Polo's evolution will impact the 2010 presidential race, as well as its future as a viable alternative to center-right government. The Party's left-wing favors a Gaviria candidacy, who ran in 2006 and received 2.6 million votes, but Gaviria has told us he will not run again. Former Bogota Mayor and party moderate Lucho Garzon has publicly stated his intent to be the Polo's candidate, but added that he would abandon the party and create a "Party of the Street" if it fails to moderate its policies. Senator Petro--an acknowledged "chavista" who has recently been moderating his views--is also preparing a possible presidential run. Brownfield