EMERGING CRIMINAL GROUPS: POLITICAL THREAT WITHOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 004430 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM KJUS CO SNAR SUBJECT: EMERGING CRIMINAL GROUPS: POLITICAL THREAT WITHOUT POLITICAL AIMS REF: A. 08BOGOTA1136 ¶B. 07BOGOTA8458 ¶C. 08BOGOTA3506 ¶D. 07BOGOTA5882 ¶E. 08BOGOTA4310 Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Emerging criminal groups (ECGs) persist despite recent GOC successes, with narcotrafficking profits and continuing weak state presence in some areas enabling them to bribe local officials and recruit new members to replace those killed or captured by security forces. The ECGs are largely dedicated to narcotrafficking and other crimes, but corrupt local officials, politicians, and civic leaders in coca-growing areas and on trafficking routes. The ECGs are fragmented and lack the centralized command structure of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). Their lack of national influence has led the GOC to define ECGs as a criminal, vice political, threat. Still, the OAS Mission in Support of the Peace Process (MAPP/OAS) estimates ECGs operate in 153 of Colombia's 1100 municipalities and continue to commit serious human rights abuses. A local human rights group estimated ECGs killed 233 civilians between July 2006 and June 2007. End summary. MUCH SMALLER THAN PARAS -------------- ¶2. (C) The Colombian National Police (CNP) and human rights groups agree that ECGs persist despite recent GOC successes. Still, estimates of the groups' size vary widely. Captain Jhon Puentes of CNP police intelligence (DIPOL) told us in late October there were no more than 2000 members, a figure CNP Commander Naranjo repeated publicly in mid-December. In contrast, center-left think tank Nuevo Arco Iris assesses the number as closer to 10,000. Nuevo Arco Iris believes ECGs operate in 246 of Colombia's 1099 municipalities (counties); the MAPP/OAS estimates a presence in 153; while Naranjo puts the number at only 94. ECGs are particularly active in areas such as Uraba (Antioquia),Cesar, Narino, Norte de Santander, and Cordoba. Most of the 23 ECGS listed by the CNP have fewer than 50 members. The GOC believes only a handful operate along the lines of the demobilized United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC),including the Colombian Antiterrorist Popular Revolutionary Army (ERPAC) in eastern Meta and Vichada, the New Generation Organization (ONG) in Narino, and the Aguilas Negras of Norte de Santander. STILL CRIMINAL AND APOLITICAL -------------- ¶3. (C) There are no signs that ECGs have--or are trying to create--a national command structure or coordinated decisionmaking. They also lack the legitimacy the AUC enjoyed among some regional elites. Still, Naranjo told us in late October that he believes ECG leader Daniel Rendon Herrera (Don Mario) is attempting to use his dominance of the Uraba region to recreate an AUC-like structure, and local analysts argue ECGs threaten at least three key long-term GOC political priorities. First, ECGs have penetrated local governments and security forces through corruption. Second, fighting among ECGs undermines implementation of the Justice and Peace Law and continues to generate high numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Last, new working arrangements between ECGs and the FARC and ELN have helped all these groups to survive military and police pressure. ¶4. (C) The ECGs continue to operate in areas of high criminality such as coca cultivation zones, drug trafficking corridors, or economic sectors (refineries, pipelines, ports, etc.) vulnerable to extortion. Many ECG leaders are former mid-level paramilitary commanders, but former para fighters make up a shrinking share of the rank-and-file. The percentage of "recycled" demobilized paramilitaries within the ECGs has fallen from 18 to 12 percent, according to the CNP. Finally--and unlike the AUC--ECGs try to minimize violence against civilians to avoid attracting the attention of the security forces, preferring to corrupt local officials, politicians, and civic leaders in coca-growing areas and along trafficking routes. Still, the ECGs often become embroiled in local political disputes--leading to some targeting of community and political leaders. SIGNIFICANT GOC ADVANCES -------------- ¶5. (C) The GOC has scored significant victories against ECGs due in large part to the projection of greater Colombian military and police presence into regions formerly held by the FARC and AUC, along with better training and intelligence for all public forces. The CNP reported in October that public forces have killed or captured nearly 6000 ECG members since 2006, with nearly 2300 this year alone. The GOC in September captured the main subordinate of Daniel Rendon Herrera and killed 11 members of the Rastrojos ECG in Argelia (Cauca). In November and December, public forces in Narino killed ONG chief John Jairo Garcia Ordonez and captured the five top underlings of ECG leader Pedro Guerrero (Cuchillo) in Meta. In July, the GOC created five special regional task forces to target ECGs. NORTHEAST: NEW GROUPS, OLD NETWORKS -------------- ¶6. (C) This area includes the departments of La Guajira, Cesar, Magdalena, Bolivar, and Norte de Santander. The most prominent group in the area is the Aguilas Negras (Black Eagles). Groups using the Aguilas label are active in Magdalena, Cesar, Bolivar, and Norte de Santander, although the CNP and most analysts agree these groups share only a name and not a unified command. Some speculate that various ECGs use the Aguilas label to appear larger and more intimidating. Still, the Aguilas in Norte de Santander control criminal networks extending into Venezuela. Also active are the Codazzi with about 50 men in northern Magdalena, and the Wayuu Counterinsurgency Front (WCF) with about 50 men under alias "Pablo" in La Guajira. Daniel Rendon also has a presence in La Guajira to guard Caribbean trafficking routes. ¶7. (C) ECGs operate as part of a deeply rooted network of organized crime that exploits historic smuggling routes to Venezuela and the Caribbean. Christophe Beney of the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) told us that the Aguilas Negras in Cucuta (Norte de Santander) operate more like an urban street gang than a politically oriented paramilitary group. Still, some continuities with former paramilitary groups are apparent. Some ECGs appeared only months after the Northern Front (BN) of the AUC demobilized, and both the Codazzi and WCF are led by ex-BN commanders who never demobilized. Both the International Crisis Group (ICG) and Nuevo Arco Iris note high levels of corruption due to traffickers' efforts to keep smuggling routes open. In addition, conflicts between the WCF and the Wayuu have led to a spike in killings. Nuevo Arco Iris claims that the FARC and Rendon's ECG work together in this area and clash with the Aguilas Negras. SOUTHWEST: CAULDRON OF CONFLICT -------------- ¶8. (U) This region, including the departments of Narino, Putumayo, Caqueta, and Cauca, has seen intense conflict among ECGs--as well as between ECGs, the FARC and ELN--for control of the region's numerous drug trafficking corridors. The Carabineros cite at least five active groups: the New Generation Organization (ONG),los Rastrojos, los Traquetos, los Machos, and Aguilas Negras. The ONG, which grew out of the AUC's Libertadores del Sur bloc (BLS),is primarily active in Narino and focuses on exporting cocaine via the Pacific. GOC security officials told us in September that the ONG has sustained major losses and that most of its leadership has been taken over by deserters from the FARC's 29th front. The Rastrojos operate in southern Cauca, northern Narino, central Caqueta, and southern Putumayo. Both the CNP and Nuevo Arco Iris told us the Rastrojos have allied with the ELN against the FARC in Narino. ¶9. (C) The GOC reports Narino and Putumayo were the two departments with the most significant increases in homicide rates since 2001--a period during which most other areas of the country saw significant decreases. Narino has one of the highest IDP rates in Colombia due to fights over control of major drug routes. The ICG says ECGs enjoy the complicity of local security forces in many parts of Narino and have also penetrated the Fiscalia (Prosecutor General) and Procuradoria (Inspector General) in the department. MAPP/OAS analyst German Sanchez told us community leaders claim the local police work with Los Rastrojos; local military units collaborate with what is left of Los Machos. He said local commanders often treat ECGs as a second priority even though the GOC sees them as a major threat. The MAPP/OAS's draft twelfth report (see reftel E) notes that the heavy presence of armed groups in Narino makes the population and local authorities hesitant to participate in the Justice and Peace process. URABA AND BEYOND: EX-PARA HEARTLAND STILL PROBLEMATIC -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) This area includes the departments of Antioquia, Cordoba, Sucre and Choco. MAPP/OAS analysts estimate that ECGs in Uraba (straddling northwest Antioquia and eastern Choco) may number as many as 2000 men. CNP Chief Naranjo told us the most dangerous of the ECGs belongs to major narcotrafficker and former paramilitary Daniel Rendon (Don Mario),who operates in the entire area. Naranjo estimates that Rendon has up to 350 armed men in Uraba, plus 1200-1500 support personnel, and his group in the last year has absorbed several smaller criminal bands. Although a group recently appeared in the area calling itself the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC),GOC officials told us the AGC is merely a propaganda front--and possible negotiating tool--for Rendon, who remains committed to drug trafficking. Historical rivals Los Paisas control some territory and routes in Cordoba and Sucre, although the CNP has information suggesting elements of Los Paisas may now be cooperating with Rendon's group. ¶11. (C) Medellin CNP Colonel Fabian Cardenas told us narco penetration of the CNP and the Army in Uraba, Cordoba and Medellin remains a serious problem. The CNP recently arrested a 17th Brigade captain for collaborating with Rendon's men, while the Army anti-kidnapping unit in Cordoba served as the "right arm" of Los Paisas until the CNP detained its commander last April. Police attribute recent spikes in homicides in Medellin, Uraba, Cordoba, and Choco to fighting among narcotrafficking groups. 17th and 15th Brigade Colonels Forero and Mejia told us Rendon has a pact with the 58th FARC Front to export coca via the area between Turbo and the Gulf of Morosquillo and that the 5th FARC Front in the Nudo de Paramillo region in Antioquia controls coca growing and ships coca to Rendon's men in the Curvarado region of Choco. In northern Choco, Rendon's men make deals with elements of the FARC's 57th Front to ship drugs through Panama. Forero and Mejia assess the FARC and Rendon's men avoid combat with each other to protect their drug commerce. EASTERN LOWLANDS -------------- ¶12. (C) This area includes the sparsely populated departments of Casanare, Vichada, Guaviare, and Meta, where the high dependence of the local economy on coca helps ECGs flourish. The two largest ECGs are the Colombian Popular Revolutionary Antiterrorism Army (ERPAC) under Pedro Guerrero ("Cuchillo") and the Autodefensas Campesinas de Casanare (ACC) under Hector German Buitrago ("Martin Llanos"). Cuchillo has between 700-1000 men in southern Meta and northern Guaviare, while Llanos has several hundred in southern Casanare and northern Meta. These estimates may include logistical personnel as well as armed fighters. Cuchillo and Llanos are allied in parts of Casanare and Meta, probably to protect their coca fields and trafficking routes from recent encroachment attempts by Los Paisas. Analysts from Nuevo Arco Iris also told us Don Mario's group is working with ERPAC in the region. ¶13. (C) Cuchillo and Martin Llanos were midlevel AUC commanders who never demobilized, and the names of both ECGs suggest continuity with the AUC. Still, most analysts believe the groups are exclusively focused on the cocaine business, with little interest in politics beyond bribing officials to maintain their routes. The 43rd FARC Front fought with ERPAC in Vichada and Meta, according to press. The CNP, however, thinks parts of ERPAC and the 43rd have forged temporary alliances to protect narco routes. NICHOLS