NARINO--PROGRESS ON SECURITY AND ALTERNATIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 004231 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PTER PHUM CO SNAR SUBJECT: NARINO--PROGRESS ON SECURITY AND ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT ALONG THE ECUADOR BORDER Classified By: Political Counselor John Creamer Reasons 1.4 (b and d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The poor, coca-growing department of Narino--which borders Ecuador along the Pacific coast--has seen significant security gains against the FARC, ELN, and new illegal armed groups since 2006. Governor Navarro Wolff and local security officials told us the illegal armed groups have been pushed from their traditional strongholds in coca growing areas to more remote jungle areas near the coast. The New Generation Organization (ONG),a group of 150 fighters which operated much like the former paramilitaries, is being dismantled. Narino's government is exploiting the security gains to launch a pilot alternative development project (with 4.5 million in EU funding) that will impact 4,000 families. Still, GOC presence in many areas remains spotty, and achieving sustainable development will not be easy. End summary. NARINO: DRUGS, POVERTY, VIOLENCE--AND OPTIMISM -------------- - ¶2. (U) The Department of Narino is the main transit corridor from Colombia into Ecuador and one of the most important coca growing areas in Colombia. Twenty-seven percent of Narino's population of 1.5 million (11% indigenous and 19% Afro-Colombian) live in extreme poverty. NAS sprayed approximately 37,000 hectares of coca in Narino in 2007, and the GOC--with U.S. support--maintains a base at Tumaco along the Pacific coast for at least six months per year to carry out coca eradication missions. Violence in the department fell over the past five years, but murder rates remain high. There were 364 killings in the first half of 2008, mostly involving members of illegal armed groups. ¶3. (U) Governor Antonio Navarro Wolff, Pasto Mayor Eduardo Alvarado, and local security officials told us that illegal armed groups in the region had been weakened by security services; the local economy is improving, and the government is set to launch an ambitious alternative development pilot program to eliminate coca production in two key municipalities. Navarro, a member of the leftist Polo Party (also an ex-leader of the M-19 rebel group, ex-senator, ex-minister, and a former Mayor of Pasto) is widely considered an innovator. Conservative Party Department Assemblywoman Liliana Burbano and Alvarado told us Navarro is a consensus building pragmatist, focused on results and anti-corruption. They said the political opposition supported Navarro's policies, and marveled at his energy in searching for creative solutions to local problems. SECURITY: THE FOUNDATION -------------- ¶4. (C) Narino's topography (rugged mountainous terrain in the east, jungle and mangrove estuaries in the west along the Pacific coast),combined with its poverty and poorly developed infrastructure, made the department a haven for terrorist groups and drug traffickers. Still, a beefed up security presence has allowed the GOC to reestablish state presence and authority in large parts of the department over the past two years. Three major FARC Units (the 29th Front, the Daniel Aldana Column, and the Mariscal Sucre Front) operate in the department, along with the Comuneros del Sur Front of the ELN. Two significant new criminal groups also operate in Narino: the Rastrojos, and the New Generation Organization (ONG). Officials from the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS) told us that the ONG, in particular, represented a major threat and most resembled the former structures of the AUC paramilitaries due to its military tactics and attempts to interfere in politics. ¶5. (C) Navarro Wolff, Boyaca Battalion Commander Colonel Fernando Guzman, and Narino Police Commander (CNP) Colonel Fernando Jimenez told us that the FARC, ELN, and new groups were on the defensive and isolated in Narino's western coastal area--away from large population centers. Guzman said the FARC 29th Front was down to less than 150 poorly equipped fighters. The FARC had not staged any attacks in urban areas of Narino in 2008. Small numbers of urban militia previously in Pasto and the port city of Tumaco had been called back to the mountains to replenish decimated FARC ranks. The military deployment of a mobile brigade in the Leiva and Rosario municipalities and an ongoing major offensive against the FARC and ONG that started in May, 2007 continues to push those groups out of their traditional coca growing strongholds. ¶6. (C) Jimenez told us the once-feared ONG was being steadily dismantled, but completely eliminating the group would be difficult since many members were locals with family support in the area. Jimenez and Guzman confirmed that the ONG had been reduced from 400-500 fighters in 2006 to less than 180 "hungry and rag-tag" fighters in 2008. Most ONG members--and its entire leadership-- were now former members of the 29th FARC Front who had deserted to seek drug proceeds for themselves. Jimenez said the deployment of 150 "Carabineros" (rural Police),the doubling of police presence in Narino since 2006, and the opening of two new stations had led to the capture of 80% of the ONG's leadership, with the remaining leaders--including ONG leader John Jairo Garcia Ordonez--on the run. Three new police stations are planned for the coming year with up to 250 new police. ¶7. (C) The military and CNP successes have led the FARC and ONG to fight each other for control over remaining, less productive, coca fields and drug routes in the coastal region. Guzman said that the FARC 29th Front believes it has been infiltrated by the Colombian military, and have murdered more than 100 men this year as a result of paranoia. Jimenez said both FARC and ONG members had become so desperate for income by September 2008, that some had resorted to extorting truck drivers for as little as $2 to $5 in rural areas. The biggest remaining security challenge is mines laid by illegal armed groups. Guzman confirmed seven soldiers killed and 14 wounded from mines in Narino in 2008. POLITICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (RELATIVELY) TRANQUIL -------------- -- ¶8. (U) Pasto's Uribista Mayor Eduardo Alvarado and Conservative Party Department Assemblywoman Liliana Burbano told us that ideological differences in Narino had been mostly set aside to focus on security, infrastructure, and economic development. Burbano said Navarro's efforts to attract international assistance and investment had generated results--with new programs in place to export broccoli and premium coffee (to Starbucks) in the agriculturally productive area along Narino's eastern mountain slopes--an area previously dominated by opium poppy cultivation. ¶9. (C) Navarro told us that the military and CNP had received few human rights complaints in Narino, and that civilian-military relations were improving. Army Colonel Guzman told us his Battalion had received U.S. military training in human rights, and regularly consulted with MAPP/OAS, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),and the UN. Guzman said The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) training in refugee/displacement issues had been valuable, but he noted that many displaced in the department were newly unemployed coca workers. ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT: A BIG TEST -------------- ¶10. (U) Navarro Wolff recently launched a pilot alternative development project in the historic coca-growing areas of Rosario and Leiva, taking advantage of security gains. The project will involve nearly 4,000 families, and provide them with a continued heavy police and military presence, 33 full-time on-the ground experts in agriculture and crop substitution (including 11 police specially trained in agriculture),and direct access to markets in Cali through the NGO Valle de Paz. The EU provided $4.5 million in funding for the project. Navarro hopes to expand into neighboring Policarpa and Cumbitara municipalities in 2010, and has sought USAID funding for the expansion. ¶11. (C) Guzman and Jimenez were optimistic that development projects in Rosario and Leiva would succeed due to their market-oriented, self-sustaining design. They claimed locals were tired of the insecurity of growing coca for ever-changing groups of criminals, and eager to move to licit crops. Families that did not voluntarily participate (expected to be 20%) would see their coca crops manually eradicated. Rosario and Leiva Mayors Jose Espana and Ciceron Bolanos told us the program's short and medium-term subsistence packages combined with expert advice, pre-arranged market access (a component missing from other plans),and realistic income planning for small farmers made the plan viable in the long-term. Both said they had received telephone threats from the FARC and ONG for helping organize the program, but voiced confidence in GOC security due to "overwhelming popular support" for the program in their regions. ECUADOR BORDER CHALLENGES -------------- ¶12. (C) Assemblywoman Burbano, who is from the key border town of Ipiales, told us the most unstable parts of Narino were the 14 municipalities along the Ecuadorian border. Out of 63 border crossings, 27 were uncontrolled and in remote areas with no roads. Recent Ecuadorian trade restrictions and criminal sanctions on formerly legal imports (rice and potatoes) and contraband (propane and gasoline) had severely damaged the local economy. Sixty percent of the border economy had historically depended on cross-border trade (much of it through "informal" crossings) and at least 600 families had been affected by Ecuador's cutoff of the propane trade alone. Previously, eighty trucks per day had crossed into Colombia carrying grain and other commodities; a number that had fallen to zero. ¶13. (C) Jimenez said that arms trafficking and trafficking in persons (many Chinese) had increased as former propane/gasoline traders searched for alternatives. Burbano and Navarro said they maintained good relations with their counterparts in Ecuador, but that "protectionist" policies from Quito had increased instability. There is only one road in the remote southwest region, from Pasto to Tumaco's port, which lies 20 to 30 miles north of border. Navarro said the absence of infrastructure reflected a lack of state presence that allowed the FARC and other illegal groups to operate. He is pushing the GOC for a new road project on the border. Guzman said that while official relations between the COLMIL and Ecuadorian counterparts are largely shut down, there are still unofficial communications between commanders in the border area. BROWNFIELD