SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF SENATOR HAGEL AND

UNCLAS BOGOTA 003093 CODEL SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETRD PGOV PREL PTER SNAR CO SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF SENATOR HAGEL AND DELEGATION TO BOGOTA AND CARTAGENA - AUGUST 28-31, 2008 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: With U.S. support, Colombia finds itself safer, economically stronger, better governed, and more democratic than it has been in decades. Murders, kidnapping, and violence are down nationwide. Increased security has led to an economic boom that has reduced poverty by 20 percent since 2002, lowered unemployment by 25 percent, and attracted record levels of investment. Almost 48,000 combatants, mostly paramilitaries, have laid down their arms and are participating in GOC reintegration programs. The captures or kills of key leaders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),the July 2 rescue of 15 hostages held by the FARC including three Americans, and rising desertions have weakened Colombia's largest terrorist group. Consolidating recent gains and making further advances on human rights, security, and poverty reduction -- while also managing tense relations with Venezuela and Ecuador -- represent the greatest challenges in the remaining two years of the Uribe Administration. ¶2. (U) The GOC is one of our strongest strategic partners in the world, and shares our commitment in the Americas to greater regional economic integration, security cooperation, and democracy. Colombia cooperates with the USG on counternarcotics and counterterrorism operations, and has already ratified the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Act (CTPA). Our continued commitment to Colombia will help to further consolidate recent security and governance gains as well as promote economic growth and regional stability. End summary. -------------- CTPA Solidifies Advances: Investment, Poverty, and Security -------------- ¶3. (U) President Uribe's democratic security policy and free market economic reforms have spurred the economy. GDP growth reached 8.2 percent in 2007 after averaging more than five percent annually since 2003. The economy is slowing this year, with recent growth at just over four percent. Colombia's trade volume grew more than 65 percent in the same period. The United States remains Colombia's largest trade partner (approximately 37 percent of exports and 26 percent of imports),though Colombia could shift to greater agricultural imports from Canada, which concluded free trade negotiations in June 2008, and the European Union when free trade negotiations with them conclude in 2009. In 2007, the United States exported some USD 1.2 billion in agricultural products to Colombia. Nearly 93 percent of Colombia's exports already receive duty-free access to the U.S. under the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA),which expires December 31, 2008. U.S. exports to Colombia face an average tariff of 12 percent. Investors from around the world have boosted investment in Colombia in anticipation of the CTPA. In 2007, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) exceeded $7.5 billion, 350 percent greater than FDI in 2002. ¶4. (SBU) The Colombian Congress ratified the CTPA in 2007 by a substantial margin, and it remains the Colombian government's highest economic priority. U.S. rejection of the accord would deal a political and economic blow to Uribe and his policy of strong ties with the United States. Venezuela is Colombia's second largest trade partner, but the political and economic relationship has been strained. Venezuela has tightened its import regime, blocking some Colombian exports, such as autos and clothing. ¶5. (U) Analysts estimate the agreement with the United States would add between one and two percent annual GDP growth to the local Colombian economy. This growth would help create the new, formal sector jobs that President Uribe needs to meet his goal of cutting the poverty rate from 45 percent to 35 percent by 2010. Trade-based formal sector growth will also provide the GOC with additional fiscal resources to shoulder a larger portion of its security costs as USG Plan Colombia support falls. -------------- Democratic Security -------------- ¶6. (U) The establishment of greater Colombian government territorial control and the paramilitary demobilization have created the space for civil society and political parties to operate more openly than ever before. The GOC maintains a police presence in all 1099 municipalities for the first time in history. Increased security on roads and highways has allowed for greater freedom of movement for people and commerce. Murders fell from almost 29,000 in 2002 to 17,000 in 2007, and kidnappings fell from over 2,800 a year to less than 600 during the same period. Local elections in October 2007 reflected the improved security with over 86,000 candidates participating. The leftist Polo Democratico Party (PDA) won 1.2 million more votes than in 2003, and its candidate won the key Bogota mayoral race. -------------- U.S. Hostages -------------- ¶7. (U) A bold Colombian military operation on July 2 led to the rescue of three U.S. contractors and twelve Colombians held by the FARC. The three Americans were captured by the FARC in February 2003, and were the longest held U.S. hostages in the world at the time of their rescue. The GOC worked closely with us on hostage issues, and U.S. training of Colombian military personnel contributed to the operation's success. The FARC continues to hold 25 Colombian "political" hostages, as well as an estimated 700 economic hostages. The FARC is believed to continue to hold a U.S. citizen who was kidnapped in Panama in April 2008, and perhaps a Colombian-American dual national kidnapped in 2003, although it has never provided proof of life. -------------- Labor Violence -------------- ¶8. (U) Labor violence and impunity remain major concerns, but the GOC has made dramatic progress. Since 2002, labor union data shows that murders of unionists have fallen by nearly 80 percent. In January, 2007, the GOC launched a special $1.5 million labor sub-unit to prosecute those who commit acts of violence against trade unionists. The unit has 19 prosecutors and 74 investigators. Since 2001, the Attorney General's Office has prosecuted 94 cases, leading to the conviction of 188 perpetrators. The new sub-unit on labor crimes, which began operations in November 2006, resolved 49 cases, convicting 90 individuals. ¶9. (U) In addition to gains stemming from its democratic security policy, the GOC has taken specific steps to protect labor leaders and other vulnerable individuals. In 2008, the Ministry of Interior and Justice's $44 million Protection Program helped protect more than 9,444 human rights activists, journalists, politicians, and other threatened individuals, including 1,959 trade unionists. The murder rate for unionists is now lower than that for the general population. -------------- U.S. Assistance -------------- ¶10. (SBU) In January 2007 the GOC presented a Plan Colombia "consolidation strategy" pledging a Colombian investment of $78 billion through 2013. The proposal emphasizes the importance of building social cohesion, and allocates substantial resources to help strengthen local governance, protect human rights, and assist displaced people, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous communities. It also aims to reintegrate more than 48,000 demobilized ex-fighters and deserters and to promote Colombia's licit exports. The GOC seeks funding from the United States and European countries to complement its own resources. ¶11. (SBU) Under Plan Colombia, the USG has provided more than $5 billion in assistance, including $800 million in economic and social assistance. USG security assistance combats drug trafficking and terrorism through training, equipment, and technical assistance. It supports Colombian military aviation, essential for all programs - civilian or military - outside Colombia's major cities. U.S. social and economic aid focuses on alternative development, displaced and other vulnerable communities, human rights and democratic institutions, and reintegration of demobilized fighters. ¶12. (U) Congress increased economic and social assistance from $140 million in FY 07 to $215 million in FY 08, while security assistance was reduced in FY 08. With additional resources, USAID is launching a new biodiversity program, increasing its assistance for victims of the conflict, enlarging its support to Afro-Colombians and indigenous communities, and expanding its assistance to the GOC's effort to consolidate its presence in areas previously controlled by illegal armed groups. Food aid assistance is also increasing from $6 million/year to $10 million in FY 08 through USAID's Food for Peace support to the World Food Program. -------------- Drug Eradication and Interdiction -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Eradication of coca and poppy crops and interdiction of cocaine and heroin reached near-record levels in 2007. President Uribe supports greater manual eradication, but recognizes that continued aerial eradication is also key. He seeks a complementary approach using both methods. In 2008, the national Police and military forces have set a brisk pace for cocaine, coca base and marijuana seizures, and are on their way to record seizure totals. We continue to work with the Colombian government to maximize our scarce resources to achieve eradication and interdiction targets. We continue our productive dialogue on how best to transfer key tasks from the USG to the GOC. -------------- Extradition -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Since taking office, President Uribe has approved over 750 extraditions to the United States, including a record number of 164 in 2007. The Colombian Government is on pace to break that record, having already extradited 119 criminals to the United States in 2008, including 15 former paramilitary leaders. -------------- Demobilization and Peace Process -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Over 32,000 former paramilitaries have demobilized since 2002, and a further 16,000 have deserted from other illegal armed groups (about one-half from the FARC). The Organization of American States (OAS) estimates there are 30 emerging criminal groups with a combined membership of over 3000 persons. Reintegration programs and targeted law enforcement are working to counter these groups. Under the Justice and Peace Law (JPL) process, many former paramilitary leaders have confessed their participation in violent crimes. To date, the JPL process has revealed the location of the graves of almost 1,200 paramilitary victims and provided information on 3,600 crimes. Over 120,000 victims have registered under the JPL, with the GOC working on measures to accelerate the payment of reparations. The Supreme Court and the Prosecutor--with GOC support--continue to investigate politicians with alleged paramilitary ties. Approximately 70 Congressmen, 19 mayors, and 11 governors have been implicated in the scandal. ¶16. (SBU) The National Liberation Army (ELN) has negotiated with the Colombian government for over two years on a cease-fire agreement, but ELN infighting and FARC pressure have prevented a deal. The ELN kidnap civilians to fund its operations, but its military capability is declining. The FARC has rebuffed GOC initiatives to engage in any meaningful peace talks. -------------- A Strong Regional Ally -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Colombia shares our commitment to promoting regional economic integration, security cooperation, and democracy in the region. After Colombia's March 1 air-strike killing FARC senior leader Raul Reyes at a camp in Ecuador, Venezuela joined Ecuador in breaking relations and deployed military forces to its border. Venezuela called off the buildup after reaching agreement with Colombia on March 7 to reduce tensions and reestablish commercial and diplomatic ties. Computers found in Raul Reyes' camp have information implicating Venezuelan and Ecuadorian government officials in providing support to the FARC, as well as an international support network for the terrorist group. President Uribe and President Chavez met on July 11 and affirmed their commitment to improve ties, but tensions remain over Venezuela's ambiguous relations with the FARC. Ecuador and Colombia have yet to restore relations. -------------- Cartagena - Two Cities, Separate and Unequal -------------- ¶18. (U) You will see two Cartagenas; the beautiful, 450 year-old walled city which has emerged as a fashionable tourist destination, and the impoverished and sometimes lawless section, home to some of the poorest people in Colombia. The predominantly Afro-Colombian population, combined with its location on the Caribbean, gives the city a markedly different culture and pace than land-locked cities like Medellin and Bogota. Cartagena has one of Colombia's principal ports, employing thousands, and would benefit greatly from the CTPA. It also has one of the few Container Security Initiative (CSI) secure ports in the hemisphere. The city has undergone a construction boom, as a result of the sharp drop in violence, with more than 40 high rises currently under construction. International cruise ships have quadrupled their ports of call in Cartagena over the last three years. ¶19. (U) The other Cartagena remains mired in poverty, a vestige of historic economic exclusion and the conflict. The citizens in these areas, mostly Afro-Colombians and internally displaced persons (IDPs),continue to wait for the benefits of the economic boom. Over 50,000 registered IDP's live in Cartagena, one of the largest concentrations in the country. Your delegation will visit examples of the efforts being undertaken by both the GOC and USAID to bridge the two Cartagenas. Cartagena's newly elected Mayor, Judith Pinedo, represents a break from the corrupt city governance that has plagued the city for decades. BROWNFIELD