PRESIDENT URIBE'S NEXT STEPS ON HOSTAGE RELEASE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 000267 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER PREL VZ VT FR SP SZ CO SUBJECT: PRESIDENT URIBE'S NEXT STEPS ON HOSTAGE RELEASE Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- 1.(C) President Uribe has developed a four-part strategy to move ahead on hostages and take some of the initiative away from Chavez: support the Catholic Church facilitation effort, resurrect the European initiative, welcome unilateral release arranged by any other government, and organize an international medical mission to visit the hostages. END SUMMARY. 2.(C) At a Jan 19 meeting with ONDCP Director and accompanying codel, President Uribe offered his most detailed presentation to date concerning the next steps on hostage release and a possible humanitarian accord. Following the meeting, Uribe pulled Ambassador aside and said this reflects GOC thinking on how to proceed. It was the line he would take in his Jan 19-23 trip to Europe; the GOC would also take this stance with the press to reassert the initiative in the face of Chavez' public posturing. -------------- NEXT STEPS -------------- 3.(C) Uribe said the GOC has decided on a four-step process to move on the hostage crisis: --Support efforts of the Colombian Catholic Church. GOC would reiterate in both public and private channels its willingness to engage in dialogue with the FARC on hostages through the Church. At the request of the Church, Uribe would also authorize some sort of "meeting location" (zona de encuentro). He emphasized that this would not be a repeat of the Pastrana government's demilitarized zone (despeje),and would be subject to precise conditions--rural area; no local population; no GOC armed or security force presence in the area; no larger than 150 square kilometers. --Reactivate European initiative. Nearly two years ago, the governments of France, Spain, and Switzerland led an initiative to engage the FARC in dialogue over the hostages. Uribe has given the Europeans the green light to reengage. He expects them to coordinate with, and meld into, the Church's effort. --Accept unilateral release. In order to neutralize Chavez, Uribe and GOC would welcome any unilateral release of hostages produced by other governments (read: Venezuela). "Unilateral," to Uribe, means a release that is not negotiated with or by the GOC. --International medical mission. Uribe at some point expects to be able to pinpoint specific areas where hostages are being held. Once located, he would reach out to the ICRC and international community to organize and seek approval from the FARC for an international medical mission to visit the hostages and treat those with severe health concerns. Uribe thought recent releases of proof of life (POL) showing obviously ill and mistreated hostages would give this initiative serious international support. -------------- THE NON-NEGOTIABLES -------------- 4.(C) Codel members were sympathetic to Uribe's desire to take the initiative from Chavez, and make progress on the hostages. Several reminded him that over the past 40 years, we have learned that to negotiate with or make concessions to hostage-takers only encourages more kidnapping and hostages. Uribe agreed. He noted that he would still insist on three non-negotiable conditions: BOGOTA 00000267 002 OF 002 --No demilitarized zone. Uribe is willing to offer a meeting location, but not a despeje. --Released FARC prisoners could not return to the field. Uribe noted that the FARC members released by the GOC last May at French request had not returned to the field. In fact, it was his opinion that few FARC members, once outside of FARC care and custody, would have any desire to return to the field. --All hostages to be treated as a whole. Uribe would not permit the GOC to discuss the release of some hostages, but not others. 5.(C) COMMENT. Uribe has been wrestling for two weeks with the question of how to respond effectively to Chavez' verbal attacks and continued engagement in the FARC hostage crisis, despite being asked by the GOC to withdraw. He believes this four step plan will attract international support, is ambitious enough to be taken seriously, covers his left flank if Chavez produces more hostage releases, and offers some prospects for success without engaging Chavez. Brownfield