FARC - WITH CHAVEZ GUIDANCE - CHANGES TACTICS BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000259 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER PREF VZ CO SUBJECT: FARC - WITH CHAVEZ GUIDANCE - CHANGES TACTICS BUT NOT STRATEGIC GOALS Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The FARC continues to push its historic goals--belligerent status, removal from international terrorism lists, and GOC acceptance of a demilitarized zone (despeje)--but seems to have adopted more flexible tactics. Abandoning its previous isolation, over a five-month period the FARC has returned the bodies of the 11 murdered deputies, released proof of life for numerous hostages, and freed two others. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' public emergence as a FARC ally has been key to the group's new approach. The local International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegate believes the FARC's shift also reflects its need to alleviate increasing Colombian military pressure and show it remains a viable organization. The FARC and Chavez may continue to release proof of life and individual hostages over the next few months to boost the pressure on Uribe to agree to a despeje for humanitarian talks. End Summary. -------------- FARC Strategic Goals Unchanged -------------- ¶2. (C) The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia's (FARC) overall strategic goals remain unchanged. In its January 10 communique, the group reiterated its call for belligerent status and the accompanying international recognition, GOC demilitarization of two municipalities (Florida and Pradera) for humanitarian exchange talks, and its removal from international terrorism lists. The FARC also wants to continue dominating remote regions of Colombia where it maintains a historic presence, and continue drug trafficking, kidnapping, and other crimes. In a series of communiques the FARC issued in early January, all laden with praise for Chavez, Bolivarian ideals, and Senator Piedad Cordoba, the group stated, "In reality, we are a belligerent force, and we await recognition from the governments of the world." The FARC also reiterated its call for international recognition based on its "legitimate struggle." -------------- But Tactics Have Shifted -------------- ¶3. (C) Local ICRC delegate Barbara Hintermann and Catholic priest Dario Echeverri said the FARC's actions over the last five months break with the group's traditional hermeticism and show a shift to more flexible tactics. They cited the FARC's freeing of "political" hostages Clara Rojas and Consuelo Gonzalez de Perdomo, the release of proof of life for many of its high-profile hostages, and its September release of the cadavers of the eleven departmental deputies murdered by the group last June as evidence of the FARC's new approach. Hintermann said that until September, the FARC's strategy was to release almost no information about the hostages to boost hostage families' desperation and raise the pressure on the GOC. ¶4. (C) Hintermann added that during the GOC-FARC negotiations over the return of the deputies' bodies, the FARC showed some pragmatism--withdrawing its opposition to an OAS role as coordinator of the international forensic commission and giving up its insistence that family members accompany the commission. During the release of Rojas and Gonzalez, the FARC also did not flatly rebuff her requests for access to the hostages and exchanges of family information. Hintermann expects to meet a FARC Secretariat member in February to discuss these issues and to review the January rescue mission. Similarly, Echeverri noted a commitment from Secretariat member Ivan Marquez to meet with the Church to discuss its "encounter zone" proposal for humanitarian exchange. The Church has not met with a Secretariat member since 2004. SIPDIS -------------- Why? -------------- ¶4. (C) Hintermann suggested that the FARC has adopted a more flexible approach due to its need to alleviate growing Colombian military pressure and to show it remains a viable organization. FARC communications and command and control face increasing stress because of Colombian military operations, and the FARC has fewer military options. She said FARC leaders may believe it is important to use one of its few remaining assets--the "political" hostages--before it loses them. Since January 2007, the FARC has lost 14 such hostages--Foreign Minister Araujo, the eleven deputies, policeman Jhon Pinchao, and the child Emmanuel--without receiving any benefit. Still, Hintermann cautioned that the FARC Secretariat continues to control it fronts, unlike the ELN's Central Command. She speculated that the FARC's January 13 kidnapping of six tourists in Choco was consciously designed to show that the group retains the will and capacity to cause harm. -------------- And Chavez -------------- ¶5. (C) Moritz Akerman, guarantor in the ELN peace talks, told us January 16 the FARC change in tactics also reflects the recent influence of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Interior Minister Ramon Rodriguez Chacin with the Secratariat--backed with advice from Cuban Communist Party official Tony Lopez. The group's affinity for "Bolivarian" ideas, and their realization that Chavez would be willing to carry the FARC's political water in exchange for minimal concessions on hostages, prompted their shift in thinking. Colombian National Police Commander Oscar Naranjo agreed that Chavez and the FARC--with Cuban advice--are working together to keep the GOC on the defensive. ¶6. (C) Former President Cesar Gaviria told the Ambassador January 16 that Chavez has a "veto" over any process with the FARC or ELN. Chavez' call for the international community to recognize the FARC was a mistake, but Chavez and the FARC can keep the political initiative through further releases of proof of life or individual hostages. Hintermann agreed Chavez will continue to play a central role on the hostage issue. She speculated that he might prefer the current situation, in which the FARC periodically feeds him proof of life or the occasional hostage, over an exchange accord in which all hostages were released. -------------- Implications: -------------- ¶7. (C) The FARC's apparent tactical shift creates a new dynamic for both the FARC and GOC. Chavez' ability to tie the FARC and hostages to a full range of Colombian-Venezuelan bilateral issues complicates GOC decision making. Colombian Armed Forces Commander General Freddy Padilla told us January 17 the GOC fears Venezuelan political support for the FARC may translate into material aid, including small arms and ammunition. The GOC has reiterated its refusal to accept a despeje for humanitarian talks, but Chavez and the FARC can raise the domestic and international pressure on Uribe to reverse this stance through further hostage and proof of life releases. Still, as shown by the failed Operation Emmanuel, the public closeness of Chavez and the FARC also leaves them vulnerable to each other's mistakes and political needs. The GOC's ability to exploit those vulnerabilities and build support in the international community -- while maintaining its democratic security policy -- remains the challenge. Brownfield