MAPP/OAS NOTES GOC PROGRESS IN COMBATING NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002013

SIPDIS

FOR WHA/AND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2018
TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM PREL CO
SUBJECT: MAPP/OAS NOTES GOC PROGRESS IN COMBATING NEW
CRIMINAL GROUPS

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


Summary
--------------


1. (C) The draft MAPP/OAS (OAS Mission in Support of the
Peace Process) eleventh quarterly report cites recent GOC
progress in combating emerging criminal groups, but notes
that narcotrafficking profits enable these groups to adapt
and recruit even under sustained military pressure.
MAPP/OAS Chief of Mission Sergio Caramagna told us privately
he credits Uribe's personal intervention with security force
commanders for the GOC,s increased operations against the
emerging groups. Caramagna also voiced support for the GOC's
extradition of 15 high-level paramilitary leaders to the
United States, suggesting that the extraditions might
encourage former mid-level commanders to cooperate with the
Justice and Peace Law (JPL) process. End Summary

Spotlight on Emerging Groups
--------------


2. (SBU) The draft MAPP/OAS eleventh report (please protect
until public release) cites recent GOC progress in combating
new criminal groups. (The report's discussion of GOC
reintegration programs, the JPL process, and victims
rights/assistance is reported septel.) The MAPP/OAS applauds
the GOC,s political will to confront the groups and reviews
recent major security force successes such as the April 29
killing of Victor Manuel Mejia Munera and the May 1 capture
of his twin brother, Miguel Angel Mejia Munera. The brothers
were key in rebuilding criminal-narco networks from Bolivar
to Norte de Santander departments. The report also praise
the capture of other emerging group leaders, including former
paramilitary Feris Chadid in Cordoba on April 16, as well as
the surrender of a large band of former paramilitaries known
as the "Cacique Pipinta" in Caldas. In Narino, the MAPP/OAS
notes that increased security force presence produced a 60%
fall in homicides in four municipalities in the first quarter
of 2008.


3. (SBU) The MAPP/OAS also describes GOC advances in
rooting out collusion between some security force elements
and the new criminal groups. The Colombian National Police
(CNP) arrested CNP Lt. Colonel Juan Carlos Martinez who was
providing security to the Mejia Munera brothers in Cesar on
May 21; arrested 11th Brigade Junin battalion commander Lt.
Colonel Alvaro Zambrano and 11th Brigade Gaula commander
Major Julio Parga for promoting extrajudicial killings and
collaborating with new criminal groups in Cordoba on April
16; and detained Army Colonel Hernan Mejia for extrajudicial
killings and collusion with paramilitaries in Cesar in 2004
on May 6. (Note: Defense Minister Santos assigned the highly
decorated Mejia to administrative duty in January, 2006 on
suspicion of collusion with paramilitaries. MAPP/OAS cites
additional investigations into institutional corruption,
noting that breaking security force collusion with such
groups is key to halting their growth.)


4. (SBU) Despite recent combat successes, the report warns
that the groups--using lucrative narcotrafficking
profits--have shown a capacity to adapt, recruit, and expand
even under sustained security force pressure. Many groups
target the demobilized and unemployed youth for forced
recruitment. In some areas, the groups are responding to the
GOC's new aggressive strategy with targeted murders of
military and judicial authorities. Communities affected by
the illegal groups face mobility restrictions, extortion,
forced coca cultivation, threats, and assassination. The
MAPP/OAS notes the apolitical, criminal nature of the
emerging groups, whose primary purpose is the control of drug
routes and coca cultivation areas formerly maintained by the
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC),but cautions
that the groups pose a threat to the long-term success of the
peace process.

OAS Credits Uribe's Intervention
--------------


5. (C) Caramagna credited President Uribe's personal
intervention for the GOC's enhanced targeting of emerging
criminal groups. After a three hour breakfast earlier in
February between Uribe and OAS Secretary General Insulza, the
president ordered Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos and CNP
Chief Oscar Naranjo to make combating the new groups a top
priority. Uribe followed up by repeatedly exhorting the
security forces to capture new group leaders in weekly town
meetings (consejos comunitarios) in key departments such as
Cesar and Cordoba. GOC security forces have complied with
Uribe's order despite some initial resistance from Naranjo.
Caramagna said the rural police or Carabineros, who have
primary responsibility for combating new groups, provide him
with weekly updates on their actions and compare notes on
problem areas.


6. (SBU) The report also credits the CNP with improving its
tracking and reporting mechanisms in response to MAPP/OAS
concerns that the CNP did not regularly identify combat kills
after clashes with emerging groups. It notes that through
February, 2008, 70% of the new criminal group members
reported killed by the CNP were listed as "John Does." In
contrast, since March the CNP has identified 95% of new
criminal group members killed in combat. MAPP/OAS notes that
identification facilitates tracking recidivism and helps
prevent extrajudicial killings.

Extraditions' Impact on JPL
--------------


7. (C) Caramagna told us he supports the GOC's recent
extradition of 15 high-level paramilitary leaders to the
United States and does not believe the extraditions mean the
end of the JPL process. He said the extraditions show Uribe
and the GOC remain in control of the process, and that there
is a cost to non-compliance with JPL obligations. Caramagna
said there was not one incident of violence or protest after
the extraditions, unlike when the GOC moved Diego Murillo to
prison in 2005, and stressed that many mid-level commanders
in the JPL process have a wealth of information about
paramilitary crimes and assets. One mid-level commander
(Iguana) has clarified more crimes by himself than the 15
leaders put together. Caramagna underscored that after the
extraditions, mid-level commanders may now be even more
inclined to talk.
BROWNFIELD