COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE FOR JANUARY-MARCH 2008

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 001895 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR MARR PTER VZ EC CO SUBJECT: COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE FOR JANUARY-MARCH 2008 Classified By: Acting Political Counselor David Zimov Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY: -------------- ¶1. (S) During the first quarter of 2008, the Colombian military scored new successes against FARC leadership, killing two FARC Secretariat members - Raul Reyes and Ivan Rios. These successes, as well as the killing of two key FARC commanders in the last quarter of 2007, led to increased desertions. The FARC continued to concentrate forces in Tolima, Valle and Meta Departments, as Colombian military also moved forces from the north coast towards the south. The FARC may resort to more terrorist actions in response to GOC military success, but no such operations were carried out in the first quarter. The Colombian military located and destroyed multiple arms and explosives caches. ELN activity was minor during the period, but reports of ELN-FARC clashes -- and isolated ELN and FARC collaboration with other illegal armed groups in the drug trade -- continued. END SUMMARY. SECRETARIAT MEMBERS KILLED: "END OF THE END" -------------- ¶2. (S) During the first week of March FARC Secretariat members Raul Reyes and Ivan Rios were killed and Martin Sombra, one of FARC leader Manuel Marulanda's closest confidants, was captured. The Secretariat-level deaths punctured the FARC leadership's long-standing myth of invulnerability and further increased public support for President Uribe and his "democratic security" policy. Uribe's approval rating soared to over 80 percent. The successes also boosted Colombian military morale, and civilian optimism. ¶3. (S) After the attacks, some analysts speculated that these actions signified that the FARC was "militarily defeated," and their decomposition would become more apparent as desertions from the Reyes and Rios fronts came to light. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Representative Barbara Hintermann predicted that the FARC Secretariat's ability to command and control fronts would further weaken, leading to increased demobilizations and greater autonomy for individual front commanders. However, the capacity of the GOC to demobilize FARC deserters in some parts of the country--such as Narino, Putumayo and Choco--remains limited. There is also a increasing need for a more robust state presence -- represented by the Center for Coordination and Action Integral (CCAI) and other civilian institutions -- to fill in behind the successes of the security services. ¶4. (S) Armed Forces Commander General Freddy Padilla called Reyes' death on March 1 the "end of the end," but many analysts claim its effects will be felt more politically than militarily. Reyes' was never a military leader--leaving that role to Joaquin Gomez--and his Southern Block (48th and 32nd FARC fronts) remain as strong as ever. Reyes death will not likely lead to the collapse of his forces, as occurred with the 16th and 37th fronts after the deaths of Negro Acacio and Martin Caballero, respectively. Reyes' death will instead likely disrupt the FARC's communications with the international community and GOC-authorized intermediaries (the Catholic Church, France, Spain and Switzerland). FARC DESERTION HITS ALL TIME HIGH -------------- ¶5. (C) The repercussions of "Negro Acacio's" death in late 2007 were realized during this first quarter of 2008. His death undermined morale, while Colombian military attacks and targeting of logistics and supplies substantially weakened the capabilities of the 16th and 39th FARC fronts in Meta and Vichada, as well as the 47th front in Caldas. While BOGOTA 00001895 002 OF 003 previous numbers of desertions in the 16th, 39th and 44th fronts were minimal, desertions spiked in the reporting period--climbing from 7 in Q4'07 to 139 in the Q1'08. The Defense Ministry reported that overall FARC desertion between January-April totaled 1,097. In all of 2007, FARC desertions totaled 2472. Deserters included many who were forcibly recruited, as well as a large number of FARC fighters from Meta and Vichada with 8-12 years of experience. Higher numbers of deserters has resulted in additional actionable intelligence on FARC leaders, caches, camps, and movements. SHIFTING FOCUS TO THE SOUTH -------------- ¶6. (S) The FARC continued to concentrate troops in the strategic corridor of Meta, Tolima, and Valle, as well as in the municipalities of La Julia and Uribe west of the Serrania of Macarena. In response to these movements, J3 Head of Operations General Carlos Saavedra told us the Colombian military is moving troops to support the 5th Division in Tolima, Joint Task Force (JTF) Omega in the Macarena, and the 3rd and 6th Divisions in Narino and Putumayo. Generals Padilla and Montoya continued to debate whether to move the Joint Forces Decisive Action Unit (FUCAD) from the north coast Montes de Maria--following the annihilation of the 35th/37th FARC fronts--towards the south. Still, some in the military prefer keeping the FUCAD in the Montes region, fearing its absence could lead to increased FARC and new criminal group activity on the coast between Uraba and Cartagena. In-fighting between new criminal groups has led to a surge in homicides in Uraba, as well as Cordoba and Sucre Departments. EMPHASIS ON TERRORISM? -------------- ¶7. (S) Military and intelligence officials predicted that after the Reyes and Rios deaths, the FARC would retaliate with terrorist attacks in major cities. Through intelligence collected from deserters, the military located numerous, large stockpiles of explosives as well as material needed to make explosives near Bogota and Cali. In late March, the GOC seized approximately 30kg of unenriched uranium (useless for military or terrorism purposes) from the FARC just south of Bogota. The FARC launched two attacks on electrical towers that cut off electricity to multiple municipalities in both Narino and Cauca. There were also scattered attacks on the oil pipeline in Arauca and Catatumbo. While the FARC did not carry out a major terrorist attack in the first quarter, it was not for a lack of trying. Evidence indicates the plots were disrupted by the Colombian police and military. Intelligence analysts told us that the FARC leadership has been advising smaller units to stand down and not to clash with Colombian military, or with the ELN or criminal groups to avoid casualties and conserve resources. VENEZUELA AND ECUADOR -------------- ¶8. (S) Colombian military officials stationed along the remote Vichada border with Venezuela told us that, prior to the GOC attack on Reyes in Ecuador, Venezuelan and Colombian soldiers collaborated. Following the attack, the Venezuelans were instructed to stop all collaboration and Venezuelan units were replaced by adversarial, Cuban-trained units. There was one report of a small FARC attack launched from Ecuador into Colombia after the Reyes attack, but the Ecuadorian border remained mostly quiet. ELN, FARC AND CRIMINAL GROUP OPERATIONS -------------- ¶9. (S) Reports of collaboration between the FARC, ELN and BOGOTA 00001895 003 OF 003 elements of new criminal groups continued through the Q1'08, but fighting over strategic drug corridors between all the groups continued at a steady pace. There were several reports of collaboration between FARC fronts and groups associated with "Cuchillo" and "Loco Barrera in Meta and Vichada, and with "Don Mario" in Uraba. There were isolated reports of fighting between ELN and FARC units in western Arauca and Cucuta, but reports of collaboration in eastern Arauca. The ELN launched few operations against the GOC. A narcotrafficking vacuum was created by Negro Acacio's death and the high desertion rates of his 16th and 39th FARC fronts, causing a realignment of the regional drug trade and renewed fighting for control in Meta and Vichada. Illegal armed groups collaborated when in their interests. The FARC's loss of strategic drug corridors towards will likely be highly damaging to future FARC financing. BROWNFIELD