PLAN COLOMBIA: NATIONALIZATION OF FMF/DOD FUNDING

UNCLAS BOGOTA 001167 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR CO SUBJECT: PLAN COLOMBIA: NATIONALIZATION OF FMF/DOD FUNDING -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. In keeping with expected cuts in U.S. military assistance, post has drafted a nationalization plan that steadily transfers current USG funded programs to the GOC. The strategy identifies eight funding priorities aimed at 1) achieving the "irreversibility" of Colombian military momentum against illegal armed groups in the near term; and 2) maintaining the influence needed to lock in the GOC as a strategic regional partner in the long term. The plan proposes to manage the transition to achieve a "soft landing," providing continuity in key programs that safeguard USG counternarcotic and counterterrorism interests. End Summary. -------------- The Nationalization Imperative -------------- ¶2. The U.S. Congress has asked the Departments of State and Defense for a strategy which gradually reduces military assistance under Plan Colombia, while boosting spending on governance, humanitarian, and development programs. Both Foreign Military Funding (FMF) and Department of Defense (DOD) assistance will sharply decline in FY-2008 due to shifting U.S. priorities and the GOC's enhanced capacity to assume more of these costs. Per the Congressional tasking, post's plan to transfer programs funded by FMF and DOD to the GOC aims to manage the transition in a transparent, predictable manner that minimizes disruptions and ensures continuity in key programs vital to USG counternarcotics and counterterrorism policies. Past Plan Colombia Funding: FY'03 - FY'08 -------------- (in USD millions) FY'03 FY'04 FY'05 FY'06 FY'07 FY'08 -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- FMF 14.2 99.7 91.7 90.8 87.2 55.0 DOD 25.0 36.0 48.0 70.2 54.7 47.7 -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- Total 39.2 135.7 139.7 161.0 141.9 102.7 -------------- FMF/DOD Phased Funding Plan -------------- ¶3. Post has divided its engagement with the Colombian military from 2003-2013 into three phases: build, consolidate, and strategic partnership. -- Phase I: FY'03 - FY'07 -- "Build Phase" This phase aimed to build the Colombian military's capabilities, allowing it to project power into unsecured areas and to establish government presence. It enabled the Colombian military to transition from a defensive approach to a mobile offensive strategy. Funding in this phase supported the Colombian military's "Plan Patriota" campaign plan. -- Phase II: FY'08 - FY'10 -- "Consolidate Phase" This phase aspires to help the Colombian military consolidate recent gains and to ensure the irreversibility of territorial, security and infrastructure advances. During this period FMF/DOD funding will decline. Still, Phase II funding must remain as level as possible over the FY'08 - FY'10 period so as not to threaten gains made to date by the Colombian military. -- Phase III: FY'11 and beyond -- "Strategic Partnership Phase" This phase will work to ensure that the Colombian military remains a U.S. strategic regional partner. Funding during this phase will reduce to its lowest levels since FY'03, but must continue at a sufficient level to maintain U.S. influence and to protect core counternarcotics and counterterrorism interests. -------------- Forward Funding Priorities -------------- ¶4. Post's proposed funding strategy continues cuts in U.S. military assistance begun in Phase II, but suggests a more gradual approach that ensures the "irreversibility" of Colombian military gains and will maintain a Colombian "strategic partnership" with the U.S. in Phase III. The strategy builds around maintaining USG funding for those programs which are necessary to both phases. Post identified 20 of its 60 FMF/DOD funded programs as "Golden Threads" - programs vital to "irreversibility" and essential for "strategic partnership". The twenty "Golden Thread" programs are divided below into eight program areas (with the approximate percentage of FY'08 funds (FMF/DOD) dedicated to each program also shown): - Rotary Wing Operations (30%): to support vital air mobility with a training center and a depot, also bridging sustainment costs (for pilots and mechanics) of nationalized helicopters; - Ground Operations (20%): for special operations against high value targets (HVTs),a joint training center for jungle operations, and liaison teams for interservice interoperability; - Riverine Operations (12%): to boost the riverine interdiction and counterguerrilla effort with a Marine training facility, and sustainment costs for riverine forces; - Governability (6%): to fortify GOC presence in all the national territory through civil affairs, countermining operations, and humanitarian assistance programs; - Fixed Wing Operations (10%): for direct air support to military operations through a pilot training school, precision armaments, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),and sustainment of attack and transport aircraft; - Naval Interdiction (7%): to support counterdrug efforts through Coast Guard operations and training, Navy maritime operations, and interoperability among military branches; - Intelligence and Communications (5%): intelligence integration and joint communications networks for secure sharing of information across service branches; - Joint Initiatives (10%): a set of projects to modernize and transform the armed forces in the areas of logistics, military justice, personnel management, mobile training teams, and academic education (e.g. English). -------------- Near Goal: "Irreversibility" -------------- ¶5. From FY'08 to FY'10, the emphasis will fall into three categories--rotary wing, ground, and riverine operations--which remain key to making Colombia self-sufficient in fighting narcoterrorism, per the original aims of Plan Colombia. As articulated by Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos, the goal is to reach a tipping point, or a point of irreversibility, in the GOC's fight against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other illegal armed groups. In this scenario, the GOC will have established sufficient territorial control, governance, and military capacity to prevent a weakened FARC or other criminal groups from ever again threatening the Colombian state, military, or civilian population. To help Colombia achieve this goal, post proposes that FMF funding remain roughly constant at the FY-08 level through the end of President Uribe's term in 2010. This will enable a predictable, smooth transition through the first year of the new administration, as well as allowing for a final assessment of the political and security situation before implementing further budget cuts. Proposed Plan Colombia Funding: FY'08 - FY'12 -------------- (in USD millions) FY'08 FY'09 FY'10 FY'11 FY'12 -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- FMF 55.0 66.4 65.0 55.0 45.0 DOD 47.7 45.0 43.0 35.0 25.0 -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- Total 102.7 111.4 108.0 90.0 70.0 -------------- FY'09 and FY'10 FMF Caveats -------------- ¶6. The FY-09 request closely tracks the FY-08 request, but calls for USD 11 million of additional FMF that would fund aviation repairs, fuel truck support, and counter mine equipment. In FY'10, as detailed in the Mission Strategic Plan (MSP),post seeks USD 65 million in FMF to sustain these activities. Still, to preserve key rotary airlift capability, post recommends that an additional USD 20 million in FMF be included to implement joint sustainment and training programs such as the Joint Rotary Wing School, as well as procure 12 training helicopters and UAVs for enhanced interdiction, river, and border security. -------------- End State: Strategic Partnership -------------- ¶7. From FY'11 onward, the plan moves toward a long-term, steady-state relationship with the Colombian military. The envisioned end state consists of a strategic partnership that works together to achieve bilateral regional security objectives. The relationship will focus on finding value-added ways the U.S. can uniquely support the GOC to strengthen its institutions and skills, as well as its capacity to sustain bi/multilateral operations against narcoterrorists. The vision contemplates an eventual post-conflict scenario, in which the GOC and USG frees its resources from operations against FARC terrorists and can dedicate them to counternarcotics. Ultimately, long-term projects such as training facilities aim to maintain U.S. influence needed to lock the GOC in as a strategic partner supporting U.S. interests in Latin America. -------------- Coordination with the GOC -------------- ¶8. Post has coordinated the "Golden Thread" nationalization strategy with the Colombian military at all levels. Since November 2007, MILGRP officials have met on several occasions with Minister of Defense Santos, Vice Minister of Defense Pinzon, Chief of Defense General Padilla, and all Colombian Service Chiefs. MILGRP met with General Padilla on March 6 to discuss the lower FY'08 FMF funding level. Santos stated that the USG strategy supports the Colombian military's "Consolidation" strategy, as long as funding cuts remain predictable and gradual, especially in Phase II. A well-planned transition and nationalization in Phase II will allow the Colombian military to gradually boost its funding to compensate, thus ensuring irreversibility of GOC security gains by 2010. BROWNFIELD