Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BISHKEK824
2008-08-13 11:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:
TFGG01: KYRGYZ DEPUTY FM ON GEORGIA CRISIS, CIS
how-toVZCZCXRO9464 OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW DE RUEHEK #0824 2261133 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 131133Z AUG 08 FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1278 INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2986 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 0637 RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2615 RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0995 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 3008 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2393 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L BISHKEK 000824
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KG
SUBJECT: TFGG01: KYRGYZ DEPUTY FM ON GEORGIA CRISIS, CIS
ROLE
Classified By: CDA Lee Litzenberger, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L BISHKEK 000824
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KG
SUBJECT: TFGG01: KYRGYZ DEPUTY FM ON GEORGIA CRISIS, CIS
ROLE
Classified By: CDA Lee Litzenberger, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) On August 13, Kyrgyz Deputy Foreign Minister
Ibraimov provided his ministry's views on the conflict in
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan's effort, as CIS chair, to mediate.
Ibraimov explained that the CIS operates primarily in the
cultural and humanitarian sphere, and has very little
authority to act on security issues. In the early 1990's a
CIS Defense Ministers council was created, but it is
ineffective. As holder of the rotating CIS chair, however,
Kyrgyzstan does have the authority to call extraordinary
consultations, which is the mechanism Kyrgyzstan activated to
help resolve the conflict in Georgia. The CIS maintains a
headquarters in Minsk, where CIS Ambassadors to Belarus are
dual-hatted to the CIS headquarters. Kyrgyzstan first
attempted to hold consultations among Ambassadors in Minsk,
but found that they were ill-prepared. Kyrgyzstan next
consulted with those CIS Ambassadors resident in Bishkek
(Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus),and
via Kyrgyz embassies abroad with as many of the remainder as
possible. Unfortunately, Ibraimov said they were unable to
consult directly with any representatives of Georgia before
the announcement that Russia was ceasing military operations.
2. (C) Nonetheless, as a result of the consultations that
were held on August 11 and 12, Ibraimov said a consensus
emerged around three points. These concerned the need for
both sides to agree on a cease-fire, both sides to agree to a
binding agreement on non-use of force, and both sides to
withdraw forces (only peacekeeping forces covered under
previous agreements could be present in South Ossetia). Some
CIS countries, including Kazakhstan, also suggested
organizing a CIS-hosted conference or ministerial with all
CIS Foreign Ministers. Kyrgyzstan had been prepared to offer
to sponsor negotiations under CIS auspices under any formula
acceptable to the parties -- i.e., in a 2 plus 1 format or
among all 12 CIS members. With the announcement that French
President Sarkozy and President Medvedev had negotiated an
end to hostilities, however, Ibraimov said no further CIS
mediation efforts were needed. He did not expect any CIS
statements on the conflict, and thought chances were low that
the issue would be on the agenda for the October CIS summit
in Bishkek.
3. (C) Charge explained U.S. concerns about the
disproportionate use of force by the Russians, and the
violation of Georgia's territorial integrity. Ibraimov said
"no one knows what happened" to start the conflict, but noted
that Russian President Medvedev had instructed the Russian
Prosecutor General to seek evidence of Georgian "genocide"
against South Ossetians. Ibraimov said this means the
Prosecutor General would "find" such evidence, which the
Russians would use to justify the level of force they had
used. Ibraimov said he had no doubts that the U.S. was not
informed by the Georgians in advance of their deployment of
forces into South Ossetia, noting that he had met President
Saakashvili a few times, and knew that he was an impulsive
person.
LITZENBERGER
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KG
SUBJECT: TFGG01: KYRGYZ DEPUTY FM ON GEORGIA CRISIS, CIS
ROLE
Classified By: CDA Lee Litzenberger, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) On August 13, Kyrgyz Deputy Foreign Minister
Ibraimov provided his ministry's views on the conflict in
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan's effort, as CIS chair, to mediate.
Ibraimov explained that the CIS operates primarily in the
cultural and humanitarian sphere, and has very little
authority to act on security issues. In the early 1990's a
CIS Defense Ministers council was created, but it is
ineffective. As holder of the rotating CIS chair, however,
Kyrgyzstan does have the authority to call extraordinary
consultations, which is the mechanism Kyrgyzstan activated to
help resolve the conflict in Georgia. The CIS maintains a
headquarters in Minsk, where CIS Ambassadors to Belarus are
dual-hatted to the CIS headquarters. Kyrgyzstan first
attempted to hold consultations among Ambassadors in Minsk,
but found that they were ill-prepared. Kyrgyzstan next
consulted with those CIS Ambassadors resident in Bishkek
(Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus),and
via Kyrgyz embassies abroad with as many of the remainder as
possible. Unfortunately, Ibraimov said they were unable to
consult directly with any representatives of Georgia before
the announcement that Russia was ceasing military operations.
2. (C) Nonetheless, as a result of the consultations that
were held on August 11 and 12, Ibraimov said a consensus
emerged around three points. These concerned the need for
both sides to agree on a cease-fire, both sides to agree to a
binding agreement on non-use of force, and both sides to
withdraw forces (only peacekeeping forces covered under
previous agreements could be present in South Ossetia). Some
CIS countries, including Kazakhstan, also suggested
organizing a CIS-hosted conference or ministerial with all
CIS Foreign Ministers. Kyrgyzstan had been prepared to offer
to sponsor negotiations under CIS auspices under any formula
acceptable to the parties -- i.e., in a 2 plus 1 format or
among all 12 CIS members. With the announcement that French
President Sarkozy and President Medvedev had negotiated an
end to hostilities, however, Ibraimov said no further CIS
mediation efforts were needed. He did not expect any CIS
statements on the conflict, and thought chances were low that
the issue would be on the agenda for the October CIS summit
in Bishkek.
3. (C) Charge explained U.S. concerns about the
disproportionate use of force by the Russians, and the
violation of Georgia's territorial integrity. Ibraimov said
"no one knows what happened" to start the conflict, but noted
that Russian President Medvedev had instructed the Russian
Prosecutor General to seek evidence of Georgian "genocide"
against South Ossetians. Ibraimov said this means the
Prosecutor General would "find" such evidence, which the
Russians would use to justify the level of force they had
used. Ibraimov said he had no doubts that the U.S. was not
informed by the Georgians in advance of their deployment of
forces into South Ossetia, noting that he had met President
Saakashvili a few times, and knew that he was an impulsive
person.
LITZENBERGER