AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CABLE: REFLECTIONS ON THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BISHKEK 000724 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KG SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CABLE: REFLECTIONS ON THE LAST THREE YEARS BISHKEK 00000724 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Since its independence over 16 years ago, Kyrgyzstan has been hailed for the relative openness of its political discourse, and the March 2005 "Tulip Revolution" raised hopes of greater reform. In the past three years, however, I have seen real political and economic reform put on hold while the President and his family consolidated power. I have also experienced an often difficult environment for U.S. programs and personnel. Nevertheless, the overall U.S.-Kyrgyz bilateral relationship remains strong, and we are able to work with a number of well-placed policy makers to protect and advance U.S. interests. Our top policy priority has been to retain Coalition access to the Manas Air Base, and some Kyrgyz policy makers understand that Operation Enduring Freedom is in Kyrgyz interests. Our assistance programs -- designed to help Kyrgyzstan improve governance, develop economically, and take charge of its security -- do work, and we need to continue to engage with Kyrgyzstan actively, frequently, and at as high a level as possible. While Kyrgyzstan will develop at its own pace and in keeping with its own history and culture, we can provide the positive outside support necessary to help the Kyrgyz develop a country that is economically viable and a better partner for the United States. End Summary. BROKEN PROMISES -------------- ¶2. (C) When Kurmanbek Bakiyev swept to power in the 2005 "Tulip Revolution," optimism prevailed that Kyrgyzstan would make quick strides to democracy after the backsliding under former President Akayev. Since then, however, Bakiyev has given the country a constitution that concentrates power in the presidency, has neutered the parliament, and has divided the opposition and civil society. The press, under significant pressure, actively practices self-censorship. The courts have undergone some reform, in part as a result of the Millennium Challenge Account program, but true judicial independence is still years away. ¶3. (C) While Bakiyev has taken some nominal steps to improve the business climate, the Bakiyev family's increasing stranglehold on the economy, through the control of key sectors and forced acquisition of assets, overwhelms all else. Corruption and the lack of rule of law remain the number one problems in Kyrgyzstan. Political and economic reform is clearly on hold while power is consolidated in the hands of the President and his family. GOVERNMENT FEARS ABOUT THE FUTURE -------------- ¶4. (C) This concentration of power, however, has not produced a leader who is confident of himself or his support. Rather than addressing the problems, Bakiyev and his allies pressure even inactive opposition leaders, and the President continues to name trusted, if inexperienced, southern cronies to leadership positions, thereby increasing dissatisfaction in the north. The administration is concerned that continuing inflation and projected energy and food shortages this fall and winter could lead to spontaneous demonstrations by dissatisfied citzens. The discredited opposition is scheming how to take advantage of the situation and loosely talking of violence in the fall. The Kyrgyz State Committee for Security has flatly told us it intends to use force to break up any demonstrations. And the administration's hardline steps to combat extremism -- specifically Hizb ut-Tahrir, which it considers the greatest threat -- are more likely to create a new generation of disaffected citizens in the south than address an incipient extremism problem. BISHKEK 00000724 002.2 OF 004 SOME BRIGHT SPOTS -------------- ¶5. (C) While acknowledging that recent Kyrgyz domestic events are not positive, we also need to bear in mind the overall context. There are some bright spots. Even today, Kyrgyzstan continues to be the most politically reform-minded country in the region -- and prides itself on this fact. In Kyrgyzstan, there is a freedom of political discourse that is unheard of in other parts of the region. There are reform-minded individuals that we can partner with throughout the government and society -- and we do, whether it is on an innovative educational system, energy links to the south, or human rights issues. AN ACTIVE, BUT DIFFICULT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP -------------- -- ¶6. (C) Kyrgyzstan presents an often difficult environment for engagement. In the past three years, the government took the extreme step of declaring two political officers personae non gratae, accusing them of interfering in domestic affairs. Our Surveillance Detection Team was detained by the intelligence service. The government publicly rebuked me for recommending the HIPC program and privately chastised me for meeting with ethnic minorities in the south and allegedly encouraging an uprising against Bakiyev. The Ministry of Education has threatened accreditation of AUCA's programs, and that same ministry temporarily blocked high school students returning from exchanges in the United States from taking the exams necessary for university admission. American researchers and NGO workers have had their visas canceled for unspecified transgressions. Kyrgyzstan often presents a hostile environment for any person or program that is perceived to challenge an entrenched interest. ¶7. (C) Nevertheless, the bilateral relationship is strong, and we are able to work with a number of well-placed policy-makers to protect and advance U.S. interests. We actively work with the Kyrgyz on a full range of security, economic, and political issues, and both formal and informal cultural exchanges are flourishing. Last year, the two countries established a Comprehensive Policy Dialogue, as a formal mechanism to ensure issues are raised on a regular basis. The Kyrgyz are doing a better job of differentiating the issues that matter, and when there are problems, we no longer find that the entire relationship is held hostage to one issue. ¶8. (C) We are often able to turn issues around, whether it is turning the tide on entering a new IMF program, as happened last month or educating Kyrgyz policy makers, including the President, on the virtues of building a new ramp at the airport, as we are doing now. The President continues to make all the important decisions, often based on partial or biased information. He is neither constant nor predictable, and decisions are often overturned when another individual gets his ear. This can work to our advantage, but it can also be detrimental to our interests, as any issue can be reopened on a whim. ¶9. (C) The Kyrgyz are especially ready to work with us on economic/commercial and security issues. On the economic/commercial side, the Kyrgyz leadership understands that the U.S. has know-how and possibly business to offer, and so USAID's many economic development programs including in agriculture, water management, and improving the business environment are well regarded. The business environment program has even spawned a supplemental project to help the Prime Minister organize government business more efficiently. Our assistance is particularly effective and appreciated when targeted at the community level. On the security side, the Kyrgyz are eager for U.S. expertise, training, and BISHKEK 00000724 003.2 OF 004 equipment. From refurbishing the border posts to standing up a Kyrgyz Air Force with 4 AN-2s and 4 MI-8s, the Kyrgyz are grateful for American assistance and would like more. ¶10. (C) On the democracy side, however, the Kyrgyz are openly suspicious of U.S. actions and motivations, and our influence is more limited. Bakiyev and his allies engineered the 2005 "Tulip Revolution," so they should know that the U.S. was not behind that event. Nevertheless, Bakiyev and some around him believe the U.S. was responsible for the color revolutions. In Bakiyev's view, democracy programming directly touches on his own ability to retain power, and he has personally expressed concern about U.S. "interference" in internal affairs. While our democracy programs continue and should continue, we must also understand that in the present climate, it will be difficult for the Kyrgyz to move forward. It is important to support civil society and political reform, but it is critical that program managers understand the bigger picture, not to give the GOKG a veto over projects, but so that projects can be as successful as possible in the current environment. THE RUSSIAN INFLUENCE -------------- ¶11. (C) Much has been written about the Russian influence. History, culture and language all play a role, as does the Russian media, which blankets Kyrgyzstan. Economically, Russia serves as a critical source of employment for hundreds of thousands of Kyrgyz workers who face unemployment at home. Remittances from Russia and other CIS countries are estimated to total up to $1 billion, roughly equal to the government budget. In addition, Russia is using all tools of state power to assert its prerogatives. Gazprom contracts, frequent meetings, and phone calls between the presidents and other senior government members are just some of the most obvious instruments of influence -- and they are effective. ¶12. (C) While we are never going to have the same relationship with Kyrgyzstan as Russia does (and nor do we need to),we need to ensure that there is enough space for the U.S. to assert and defend its interests. So far we have been able to do so but, partly because of Russian actions, U.S. influence has been declining in Kyrgyzstan over the last three years. We need to reverse this trend with a regional public diplomacy program that provides objective news about the region and the world, highlights the positive about the U.S., and addresses problems in a transparent and timely manner. We strongly recommend the Department review the feasibility of a quality Russian language television channel for the region. WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. DO? -------------- ¶13. (C) We wish that we had big, new ideas that could transform this country into the partner we are looking for, overnight and at a low cost, but we don't. So, we need to keep plugging away in the three areas of good governance, security, and economic development, where we have a competitive advantage, ideas that attract, and a proven track record. We will need the patience of Job and the flexibility to match, plus a willingness to spend both our time and our resources. ¶14. (C) The U.S. needs to engage with Kyrgyzstan actively, frequently, and at as high a level as we can manage, so that this strategically located country develops in a way that is positive for U.S. interests. We want to ensure that we can partner with Kyrgyzstan when necessary, as we have on the Manas Air Force Base. And, we want to make sure that this poor, under-developed and under-governed country does not become a refuge for extremists that -- in a worst case BISHKEK 00000724 004.2 OF 004 scenario -- could do harm to our country. We recommend active engagement by all three branches of government. We also recommend that, if President Bakiyev comes to New York for the United Nations General Assembly meeting in September, he meet with President Bush. ¶15. (C) Our most important priority for the past three years has been retaining Coalition access to the Manas Air Force Base. While there is constant pressure on the Kyrgyz regarding the base, at least some powerful policy makers understand that Operation Enduring Freedom is in Kyrgyz interests and that having a U.S. base in Kyrgyzstan gives the Kyrgyz a boost in its relations with its neighbors. For now, we have been reassured that President Bakiyev wants to retain the base, although this could change as the 2010 presidential elections draw near, if the neighbors start playing hardball regarding the base, or if there is another serious incident, such as the 2006 shooting of a Kyrgyz truck driver by a U.S. servicemember. Responding to Kyrgyz concerns and managing incidents transparently and in a timely fashion helps to reduce tension over the base. The base's public diplomacy program has done much to improve the image of the base and should continue. We should also provide more Russian-language information about Afghanistan to the press and policy makers to remind them why the Manas Air Force Base is so important to Kyrgyzstan. ¶16. (C) Our assistance programs are designed to help Kyrgyzstan govern better, develop economically, and take charge of its security. These programs work -- some in the longer term, others with more immediate results. The progress that Kyrgyzstan has made in judicial reform is the direct result of interest in the Millennium Challenge Account program. The American University of Central Asia teaches kids throughout the region English, the language they need to communicate, and critical thinking, the most important skill they'll need in today's world. USAID's water management program has turned hundreds of hectares into arable land, and the land management program has helped institute a fair and transparent system of land allocation. We need to continue to support these kinds of programs, as an investment now could help Kyrgyzstan develop into a country that is economically viable and a better partner for the U.S. We also need to review seriously how we can assist the Kyrgyz to handle the coming food and energy crisis. We urge the Department consider ways to fund the proposals contained in the 1210 proposal that U.S. Embassy Bishkek recently submitted. CONCLUSION -------------- ¶17. (C) Kyrgyzstan will develop at its own pace and in keeping with its own history and culture. With some of the right decisions, Kyrgyzstan will become a productive country that can provide for its people and control its borders. With some of the wrong decisions, a different fate awaits Kyrgyzstan. There are many here who recognize that without positive outside support, Kyrgyzstan's development will be delayed and skewed away from democratic and market principles. We need actively to cultivate these individuals through cultural programs, through exchanges, through high-level meetings and day-to-day diplomacy, so that Kyrgyzstan develops into a reliable partner rather than a failing state that seeks solutions from Russia or its own Soviet past. We need to be able to pursue our interests here, as necessary, and if we actively maintain the relationship, we will continue to be able to do so. Over the last three years, we have made progress, and we look forward to more progress in the years to come. LITZENBERGER