KYRGYZ SEND MIXED SIGNALS ON U.S. OFFER TO BUILD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000499

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA - DAS KROL AND SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ SEND MIXED SIGNALS ON U.S. OFFER TO BUILD
STRATEGIC RAMP AT MANAS AIR BASE

Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.


1. (C) Summary. Kyrgyz National Security Council Secretary
Mamytov informed the Ambassador on May 13 that the Kyrgyz
government had decided against the U.S. proposal to invest
approximately $30 million to construct a strategic ramp at
Manas Airport for the use of coalition aircraft. Prior to
this call, indications from MFA and MOD were for a positive
decision. Mamytov said he had signed a letter to this
effect, but the Embassy has not received it. Deputy MOD
Oruzbayev told the Ambassador he was aware of the decision,
but did not know how it was reached, and encouraged the
Ambassador to raise the matter with PM Chudinov. FM
Karabayev told the Ambassador he was unaware of the decision,
reiterated his support for the project, and said he would
speak with Mamytov. We are seeking meetings with the Prime
Minister, the President's Chief of Staff and the Minister of
Defense, and hope to clear up the mixed signals and lobby
hard for a positive decision. End Summary.

NSC calls, but no follow-up letter
--------------

2. (C) Late on May 13, Kyrgyz NSC Secretary Mamytov
telephoned the Ambassador, to inform her that he had signed a
letter that was being sent to the Embassy informing the U.S.
that following interagency discussion, the Kyrgyz Government
had decided to decline the U.S. offer to build a strategic
ramp at Manas airport for use of the coalition air base
there. The Ambassador expressed her disappointment with the
decision and asked what had prompted such an outcome, but
Mamytov said it was a "government decision" and that he did
not know. Later that evening, NSC staffers conveyed by phone
the text of the letter, which we still have not yet received
formally. It states that the Kyrgyz government found the
proposal "inexpedient" (netselesoobrazni). Text of the
letter, as transmitted by phone, follows below:

Begin text.

The Security Council has the honor to inform you that the
government of the Kyrgyz Republic has carefully and
thoroughly examined the Embassy's official note # 036 dated 1
February, 2008, in which the embassy requests to consider the
possibility of constructing additional parking for
heavy-weight aircraft of the Coalition forces at the
international "Manas" airport.

As a result of interagency discussions the Government of the
Kyrgyz Republic found the implementation of a project to
construct additional parking at the international airport
inexpedient.

End text.

Oruzbayev: Appeal to Prime Minister
--------------

3. (C) The Ambassador immediately telephoned Deputy
Minister of Defense Oruzbayev, who has been a strong
supporter of the base. Oruzbayev said he had heard about the
decision, but had not seen the letter. He encouraged the
Ambassador to take the matter up with the Prime Minister.

FM Karabayev: Not aware of decision, supports ramp
-------------- --------------

4. (C) At the Ambassador's request, Foreign Minister
Karabaeyv met with her and the DCM on May 15 to discuss the
issue. The Foreign Minister claimed to be unaware of the

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letter or a negative decision on the ramp, noting that he had
not personally participated in the interagency discussion of
the request. He reiterated that he and the MFA supported the
request, and understood the base's contribution to Kyrgyz
security. The Ambasssador noted that her understanding from
several interlocutors was that the decision would be made by
the government, yet the letter was signed by NSC Director
Mamytov, who is not part of the government, but falls under
the Presidency. Karabayev agreed that Mamytov does not
represent the government. In response to the Ambassador's
hope that this was not a final decision, the Minister said,
"Nothing is final until the President decides."

Possible reasons why the proposal was sensitive
--------------

5. (C) Karabayev said that he was confident that a negative
response did not mean there was any question regarding the
base's continued existence. He opined that three factors may
be in play. First, Karabayev suggested that approving the
ramp could be seen by some in the GOKG as leading to renewed
"politicization" of the base, which appeared to be a
reference to internal Kyrgyz and Russian opposition to the
base, in general. Second, Karabayev said, the request to
build the ramp could be interpreted by some as an indication
the U.S. wants a permanent presence. The Ambassador assured
the Minister this was not the case, and the Minister agreed,
noting that a ramp would not change the terms of the
bilateral agreement. A third factor, according to Karabayev,
could be the continued negative public opinion surrounding a
recent traffic incident with Russian military personnel from
the Russian air base at Kant, which he implied could make
sensitive any decision regarding Manas air base. Karabayev
noted, however, that this decision was not a reflection of
Kyrgyz commitment to the base; no one was raising the
question of whether the base should be permitted to remain.

FM will talk to Mamytov
--------------

6. (C) The Ambassador responded that perhaps the GOKG could
deflect some of these concerns by noting that the project
represents a $30 million investment in Kyrgyzstan, and that
we estimate that $15-20 million would go to local Kyrgyz
contractors. The year-long construction would provide jobs
to Kyrgyz workers, and the ramp would remain as a strategic
asset for the airport. At a time of economic challenge, when
Kyrgyzstan is trying to attract investment and create jobs,
this project offers much benefit to the country. Karabayev
took note of these points, and said he was leaving soon for
the airport to accompany the President on a trip to the
south, and he would raise the issue with Mamytov, with whom
he would be traveling. He said he would get back to the
Ambassador once he had learned more details about the matter.


7. (C) Comment. As of COB May 16 Bishkek time, the Embassy
had not received the signed letter from Mamytov, and NSC
staff have declined to provide us a copy. Prior to Mamytov's
phone call, all indications were that, while other agencies
had raised concerns, the MFA and MOD were supportive and were
expecting a positive decision. Karabayev confirmed this
view. We are seeking meetings with the Prime Minister,
President's Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense for
further clarification, to reiterate the benefits the ramp
would provide the Kyrgyz, and in an effort to head off a
negative decision. Unfortunately, all senior officials are
out of touch as they accompany President Bakiyev on his May
16 official trip to Tajikistan. While much remains unknown,
it does not appear that Mamytov's letter was coordinated
well, or at all, among the Kyrgyz interagency, giving us hope

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we may still be able to influence the outcome.
YOVANOVITCH