KYRGYZ OPPOSITION LEADERS PREVIEW KURULTAI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000358 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN - GEHRENBECK E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM KG SUBJECT: KYRGYZ OPPOSITION LEADERS PREVIEW KURULTAI REF: A. BISHKEK 333 ¶B. BISHKEK 295 BISHKEK 00000358 001.2 OF 002 Classified by: CDA Lee Litzenberger for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Opposition leaders Jekshenkulov and Sariyev outlined separately for Charge the agenda and possible outcome of the April 12 "kurultai," or people's assembly. Both predicted a quiet event, with a peaceful discussion of Kyrgyzstan's current political and economic dilemmas. The kurultai's final resolution will apparently include a call for early presidential elections in 2009, and may appoint a single opposition leader. With last-minute government approval to use the central sports stadium, kurultai organizers forecast that approximately 1500 delegates would attend from at least 15 political parties and every region throughout the country. Government officials, including President Bakiyev, were also invited, although no invitations were sent to Parliament. A kurultai is a traditional Kyrgyz forum for discussing issues and expressing views on government performance, and the organizers clearly hope to use this kurultai to unite the disparate opposition. End summary. Jekshenkulov on Past Relations -------------- ¶2. (C) Perhaps trying to repair his relationship with U.S. officials strained during his tenure as foreign minister, Alikbek Jekshenkulov began the April 9 meeting with Charge by confiding discreetly that it was President Bakiyev "and his son," and not himself as foreign minister, who were responsible for the July 2006 expulsion of two U.S. diplomats. (See Ref A) Unprompted, he also deflected any blame for past criticism of the Manas Coalition Airbase, again pointing the blame squarely on the Bakiyevs. A Meeting for the Invited Masses -------------- ¶3. (C) Jekshenkulov, who is the coordinator for the opposition For Justice movement, then turned to the April 12 kurultai. He said that approximately 1500 delegates, representing at least 15 political parties, would attend from all regions. In addition, he said the event would be open to all "patriots" who respond to the open invitation published in the opposition press. Jekshenkulov confirmed that government permission was granted, and fees paid, to use Bishkek's central sports stadium. He said that the delegates would assemble at the nearby Gorky Park prior to the kurultai's noon kick- off, but did not clarify if permission for gathering in the park had been granted by the government. ¶4. (C) Jekshenkulov said the kurultai program would include presentations on the economic and political situation, "parliamentarianism," and morality, with the latter delivered by Jekshenkulov himself. He said the kurultai would adopt a final resolution with "concrete" proposals. He added that the delegates would also call for presidential elections by the end of 2009, in accordance with the previous constitution, under which President Bakiyev was elected. Jekshenkulov also confirmed that ex-MP and "revolutionary committee" leader Azimbek Beknazarov would attend, and he agreed with Beknazarov's public comments regarding the need to unite currently disparate opposition groups. When asked who would lead a united opposition, Jekshenkulov singled-out Ata Meken party leader Omurbek Tekebayev, calling him the appropriate man for the job. A First Step -------------- BISHKEK 00000358 002.2 OF 002 ¶5. (C) In an April 10 meeting, ex-MP and Ata Meken member Temir Sariyev told Charge that, in addition to the 1500 political party delegates, invitations were also sent to selected government officials, including President Bakiyev and Bishkek Mayor Daniyar Usenov. He clarified that, although a wide range of political parties would attend, the pro-presidential Ak Jol party was excluded from the invitation list purposefully. Likewise, no invitations were sent to Parliament, which the opposition considered to be illegitimate. He assured that the event would proceed peacefully, and explained that For Justice would have some fifty security guards with armbands on hand, but noted that it would be the responsibility of Interior Ministry forces to maintain overall security for all Kyrgyz citizens present. Sariyev said that the kurultai organizers (to include members of the For Justice movement and the "public parliament") were still working on a resolution, noting that all parties should be in total agreement on the final text. He confirmed that a call for 2009 presidential elections would be made, and that issues of social concern (including rising food prices and energy sector privatization) would be discussed. ¶6. (C) Sariyev said that opposition groups are also taking steps to determine how best to unite, and who would lead a united opposition. Unlike Jekshenkulov, he did not speculate who that individual would be, or whether the kuraltai would appoint anyone at all, but commented that there was much to consider (like regional alliances, the north-south divide, and whether or not to promote young, "fresh" leaders or seasoned figures) before the presidential election. The kuraltai would be the first step in this process. He then discussed at length his objection to the non-transparent energy sector privatization process, the president's ties to criminal elements within government (notably the Interior Ministry),and the need for judicial reform. He closed by noting that, with rising energy prices and continuing inflation, time was not on Bakiyev's side. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The objective of the kurultai seems to be two- fold: to assess (that is, criticize) the government's performance; and to see if opposition groups can unite on issues -- or possibly a leader. While Kyrgyz opposition groups and civil society representatives have begun serious discussion of issues through the shadow "public parliament" (Ref B),the opposition remains disunited, fractured both by government pressure and competing egos. The kurultai may produce agreed positions on some issues, but it is unlikely to yield agreement on a leader of the opposition. Post will report separately on the outcomes of the kurultai. LITZENBERGER