Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BISHKEK1048
2008-10-15 08:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

RESULTS OF BISHKEK CIS SUMMIT

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR KG 
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INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2708
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1071
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 3095
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2481
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001048 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (GORKOWSKI)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KG
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF BISHKEK CIS SUMMIT

REF: A. A. BISHKEK 1045

B. B. BISHKEK 907

C. C. BISHKEK 1031

D. D. BISHKEK 924

E. E. BISHKEK 1015

BISHKEK 00001048 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana Gfoeller for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001048 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (GORKOWSKI) E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KG SUBJECT: RESULTS OF BISHKEK CIS SUMMIT REF: A. A. BISHKEK 1045 ¶B. B. BISHKEK 907 ¶C. C. BISHKEK 1031 ¶D. D. BISHKEK 924 ¶E. E. BISHKEK 1015 BISHKEK 00001048 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana Gfoeller for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Government of Kyrgyzstan views the CIS Summit, and the first-ever summit of the five Central Asian heads of state, as unqualified successes. The question of recognizing Ossetia and Abkhazia was apparently not discussed, but Foreign Minister Karabayev announced that it would be on the agenda of the next meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Moscow. Statements to the press minimized the importance of Georgia's departure from the organization, and emphasized the "concrete, constructive and content-rich" nature of the CIS meeting agenda. President Bakiev announced that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan had agreed to provide additional energy resources to help Kyrgyzstan get through the winter. According to Presidential Chief of Staff Sadyrkulov, a Russian push for closure of Manas air base was not successful. Curiously, the French Charge relayed what he believed was a Russian proposal for counter-terrorism cooperation between Manas and Kant Air Bases. END SUMMARY. Goodies for Kyrgyzstan -------------- ¶2. (C) The Government of Kyrgyzstan views the CIS Summit, and the first-ever summit of the five Central Asian heads of state, as unqualified successes. (See ref A.) All events appeared to go smoothly, in spite of rolling blackouts around Bishkek. Not only will Kyrgyzstan reap the glories of hosting a prestigious summit, it has also left the conference table with numerous pledges of cooperation and investment from Russia. These include a new Kyrgyz-Russian Investment Fund, a USD 150 million credit for uranium production from the Eurasian Development Bank, and Russian assistance with the construction of Kyrgyz hydropower stations. Not least, the day before the summit, Gazprom signed a memorandum of understanding on buying a 75 percent share of state-owned Kyrgyzgas. Kyrgyzstan and Russia also agreed to expand their military cooperation, and to cooperate in a conference on Afghanistan-related security problems to be held under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Ossetia and Abkhaz
ia not discussed, Georgia welcome -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Responding to press questions following the CIS Council of Foreign Ministers' meeting on October 9, Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Karabayev said that the Ministers had not discussed the question of recognizing Ossetia and Abkhazia, but that it would be on the agenda of the next meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Moscow. CIS Executive Secretary Sergei Lebedev minimized the importance of Georgia's departure for the CIS. He said that the question of Georgia had been discussed only "within a limited circle" and noted that following the crisis, "everything went back to routine pretty quickly." He also said that while Georgia had decided to withdraw from the CIS, it had elected to remain a party to many sub-agreements, and that the "doors remain open" for Georgia to return to the organization. ¶4. (C) Speaking to an impromptu group of reporters in the lobby of the Hyatt following the Foreign Ministers' meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov applauded the "concrete, constructive and content-rich" agenda that the ministers had prepared for approval of the heads of state. (Note: Post will forward the list of 19 signed agreements, including that for a medal commemorating the 65th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War, to SCA/CEN.) Like Lebedev, Lavrov minimized the implications of Georgia's withdrawal for BISHKEK 00001048 002.2 OF 003 the CIS, saying that Georgia's participation had lately only been negative. In response to a question, Lavrov said that the Council had not discussed an arms embargo on Georgia. However, based on the principle of not using force to settle international disputes, Russia is actively drawing the attention of CIS members to the dangers of working with the Georgian leadership. Deal Brokered on Water and Energy -------------- ¶5. (C) Following a meeting of the five Central Asian countries, President Bakiev announced that Uzbekistan had agreed to provide an additional 150 million cubic meters of natural gas in the first quarter of 2009, and that Kazakhstan would provide as much coal as Kyrgyzstan needed for the winter. Bakiev did not disclose prices, but did note that the goal of the agreement was to ensure that there were sufficient levels of water in Toktogul reservoir for spring irrigation in downstream states. This agreement indicates that Uzbekistan's long-standing objections to linking water (which it needs and should be free) and energy (which it has and should be able to charge for) have been overcome, at least temporarily. The implications of this deal for Kyrgyzstan's looming winter energy crisis are still unclear. (See ref B.) And what about the Base? -------------- ¶6. (C) Presidential Chief of Staff Medet Sadrykulov telephoned the Ambassador on Friday, October 10, and told her that her name had come up at the CIS Summit. He said that "our opponents" had expressed concern that "like her predecessor, she has been meeting with the opposition and funneling money to them." The Ambassador told him that this allegation was completely false, as he should know, and asked him whether the base had come up in discussion. He agreed that the allegation was false but did not respond to the Ambassador's question at that time. ¶7. (C) On Wednesday, October 15, however, a jubilant, less-guarded Sadyrkulov called the Ambassador again. Referring to the Summit, he said that the campaign to remove the Base had happened just as he had predicted, but "miy viyderzhali udari," ("we withstood the blows.") (Note: Sadyrkulov previously told the Ambassador that Russia had cut a deal with Uzbekistan to push for closing Manas Air Base at the CIS Summit. See ref E.) Aside from Sadyrkulov, Post has seen no other indication that the closure of Manas Air Base was seriously discussed at the summit. Indeed, a Russian reporter called the fact that Manas had not been discussed as one of the Summit's largest accomplishments. Kant and Manas, Working Together? -------------- ¶8. (C) Ambassador met informally on Saturday, October 11 with French Charge Jean-Pierre Godart. Godart said that he was surprised that Kyrgyzstan had not recognized Ossetia and Abkhazia, as he had predicted. (See ref C.) Godart attributed the failure of his clairvoyance to a recent change in the political atmosphere. He had just met with the Russian military attache to get a readout of the CIS Summit, and had been struck by a change in Russian attitudes. The attache said that the Russian military is learning that they need to portray their efforts at Kant Air Base as more multilateral in character, and to emphasize Kant's contribution to regional security. In that vein, they wanted to reach out to the U.S., and make a stronger contribution to the global war on terrorism. Godart suggested that the Russians might have floated the idea with him in the belief that he would pass it on to the U.S. If the U.S. side took this outstretched hand, good. If not, then at least they BISHKEK 00001048 003.2 OF 003 would not have lost face by making an offer that was then turned down. (Note: On the other hand, Russian Ambassador Vlasov did raise directly (albeit vaguely) the idea of Kant and Manas Air Bases working together to fight terrorism in a meeting with the Ambassador in early September. See ref D.) Comment: A Target On Our Backs -------------- ¶9. (C) It appears that we may have dodged a bullet on the Base this time. Our prompt response to Sadyrkulov's warning -- and especially the Secretary's personal involvement as exemplified by her telephone call to President Bakiyev -- seems to have bought us time. Nevertheless, we are conscious that there is still a target on our backs, and additional potshots may come at any time. GFOELLER

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