Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BERN513
2008-10-06 16:12:00
SECRET
Embassy Bern
Cable title:
VISIT OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
how-toVZCZCXYZ0007 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHSW #0513 2801612 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 061612Z OCT 08 FM AMEMBASSY BERN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5364 INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0752 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0485 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0742 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1140
S E C R E T BERN 000513
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/CPI (KMCGEEHAN),T, NEA/IR, EUR/PRA, AND
EUR/CE (Y.SAIN-ANDRE)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2033
TAGS: PARM KNNP MNUC EFIN GM IR SZ
SUBJECT: VISIT OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
OFFICIALS TO SWISS UNDERGROUND CONSTRUCTION FIRM: SWISS
RESPONSE
REF: A. STATE 97389
B. BERN 476
Classified By: POL/E Counselor Richard A. Rorvig; reasons 1.4(b) and (d
).
S E C R E T BERN 000513
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/CPI (KMCGEEHAN),T, NEA/IR, EUR/PRA, AND
EUR/CE (Y.SAIN-ANDRE)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2033
TAGS: PARM KNNP MNUC EFIN GM IR SZ
SUBJECT: VISIT OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
OFFICIALS TO SWISS UNDERGROUND CONSTRUCTION FIRM: SWISS
RESPONSE
REF: A. STATE 97389
B. BERN 476
Classified By: POL/E Counselor Richard A. Rorvig; reasons 1.4(b) and (d
).
1. (S) On October 1, Juergen Boehler, Head of the Export
Control Licensing Division of the Swiss State Secretariat for
Economic Affairs (SECO) provided poloff the results of the
Swiss government's investigation in response to the USG's
information (reftels) that officials of Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had planned to visit a Swiss
company (Rowa). Boehler said that Rowa is a well-known Swiss
company that specializes in underground construction for
civilian applications. He said that Rowa had approached SECO
in January 2007 regarding a tunnel boring project associated
with the construction of a hydropower dam ("Sirvan Dam") in
Iran. According to Boehler, SECO researched the dam project
and assessed it to be legitimate. He commented that, at that
time, SECO did not have information that the companies in
Iran were of concern.
2. (S) According to Boehler, the Rowa project would require
exporting a tunnel boring machine to Iran. Boehler further
reported that SECO had informed Rowa that, although the
tunnel boring machine is not a controlled item, it is
sensitive. He added that, because the boring machine itself
was to be exported from Germany, the matter was in the hands
of German authorities. Boehler emphasized that SECO has
coordinated with German export control licensing authorities
(BAFA) on this case. He noted that it was his understanding
that Germany had not granted a license for the export of the
tunnel boring machine to Iran, though he presumed that the
USG might obtain this information firsthand from German
officials.
CARTER
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/CPI (KMCGEEHAN),T, NEA/IR, EUR/PRA, AND
EUR/CE (Y.SAIN-ANDRE)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2033
TAGS: PARM KNNP MNUC EFIN GM IR SZ
SUBJECT: VISIT OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
OFFICIALS TO SWISS UNDERGROUND CONSTRUCTION FIRM: SWISS
RESPONSE
REF: A. STATE 97389
B. BERN 476
Classified By: POL/E Counselor Richard A. Rorvig; reasons 1.4(b) and (d
).
1. (S) On October 1, Juergen Boehler, Head of the Export
Control Licensing Division of the Swiss State Secretariat for
Economic Affairs (SECO) provided poloff the results of the
Swiss government's investigation in response to the USG's
information (reftels) that officials of Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had planned to visit a Swiss
company (Rowa). Boehler said that Rowa is a well-known Swiss
company that specializes in underground construction for
civilian applications. He said that Rowa had approached SECO
in January 2007 regarding a tunnel boring project associated
with the construction of a hydropower dam ("Sirvan Dam") in
Iran. According to Boehler, SECO researched the dam project
and assessed it to be legitimate. He commented that, at that
time, SECO did not have information that the companies in
Iran were of concern.
2. (S) According to Boehler, the Rowa project would require
exporting a tunnel boring machine to Iran. Boehler further
reported that SECO had informed Rowa that, although the
tunnel boring machine is not a controlled item, it is
sensitive. He added that, because the boring machine itself
was to be exported from Germany, the matter was in the hands
of German authorities. Boehler emphasized that SECO has
coordinated with German export control licensing authorities
(BAFA) on this case. He noted that it was his understanding
that Germany had not granted a license for the export of the
tunnel boring machine to Iran, though he presumed that the
USG might obtain this information firsthand from German
officials.
CARTER