FM CALMY-REY SAYS DIALOGUE AND "DIPLOMATIC \

167757 2008-08-28 15:09:00 167757 2008-08-28 15:09:00 08BERN443 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO4059\ OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR\ DE RUEHSW #0443/01 2411509\ ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZDK\ O 281509Z AUG 08\ FM AMEMBASSY BERN\ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5286\ INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\ RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0575\ RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0049\ RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 1226\ RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0112\ RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0014\ RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1136 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERN 000443 \ \ SIPDIS \ \ DEPT FOR P (R.RANGASWAMY),EUR/CE (Y.SAINT-ANDRE),EB, AND \ NEA/IR (H.WOOSTER) \ \ E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018 \ TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP PTER SZ SUBJECT: FM CALMY-REY SAYS DIALOGUE AND "DIPLOMATIC \ ENGINEERING" ARE CHIEF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS \ \ BERN 00000443 001.2 OF 003 \ \ \ Classified By: POL/E Counselor Richard A. Rorvig; reason 1.4(d). \ \ ¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 25 address to senior Swiss \ diplomats, FM Calmy-Rey extolled dialogue and facilitation as \ chief Swiss foreign policy instruments. She used the term \ "diplomatic engineering" in describing her vision of \ Switzerland facilitating dialogue on difficult subjects. A \ rhetorical question Calmy-Rey posed in the course of her \ speech was incorrectly spun in some international and Swiss \ press as allegedly advocating dialogue with Usama bin Laden. \ In response to these reports, the Department of Foreign \ Affairs (DFA) released a press statement emphasizing that \ Calmy-Rey did not propose or support such a dialogue. At \ several points in her August 25 speech, Calmy-Rey sought to \ justify the approach she has taken to the Iran nuclear \ problem. She claimed that the "freeze for freeze" concept \ was a suggestion made by Switzerland to "find a way to get \ the blocked talks between Iran and the (P5 1) back in gear \ and into substantive political negotiations." She once again \ argued that the EGL gas deal is in Switzerland's national \ interest and said that it "hardly would have been possible" \ without the diplomatic contacts the DFA had developed with \ Iran in the course of its "dialogue" on the nuclear issue. \ Though she remains very popular with the Swiss Left, \ Calmy-Rey has faced a steady drumbeat of criticism in much of \ the Swiss press this year, not least because of her very \ damaging trip to Tehran in March in support of the EGL deal. \ Calmy-Rey also has felt pressure to clarify her stance on the \ Iran/nuclear issue in the wake of an August 20 press \ conference in which Swiss President Couchepin stated that the \ Federal Council supports the P5 1 initiative and had decided \ that Switzerland will not undertake its own initiatives in \ this area. End Summary. \ \ -------------- \ Annual Gathering of Senior Swiss Diplomats \ -------------- \ \ ¶2. (SBU) In an August 25 address to 170 senior Swiss \ diplomats gathered in Bern for the Department of Foreign \ Affairs (DFA) annual ambassadors/CGs conference, FM Calmy-Rey \ extolled dialogue and facilitation ("diplomatic engineering") \ as chief Swiss foreign policy instruments. Calmy-Rey \ appeared to use the occasion to rebut continuing criticism -- \ primarily from Swiss conservatives -- of her often \ high-profile approach to sensitive issues. While conceding \ some limits to the prospects for dialogue, she argued that \ Switzerland's willingness to talk, for example, with \ Hizballah, Hamas, FARC, and the LTTE, was intended to draw \ them into political solutions without legitimizing such \ groups' terrorist methods that Switzerland condemns. \ \ -------------- \ Press Flap over Reference to Usama bin Laden \ -------------- \ \ ¶3. (U) In her opening remarks, Calmy-Rey asserted that Swiss \ domestic press commentary seems dominated by "moralists" \ advocating strict isolation of problematic state and \ non-state actors. She asked rhetorically, "should we listen \ to these moralists? And, if not, should we seek dialogue \ without discrimination, even if that means sitting at a table \ with Usama bin Laden?" Calmy-Rey did not answer the question \ explicitly in the course of her speech, but instead argued \ that in each case the prospects for dialogue need to be \ carefully reviewed. She maintained that dialogue most of the \ time is better than isolation, but does not mean "accepting \ the unacceptable." \ \ ¶4. (U) French daily "Le Monde" subsequently incorrectly \ reported that Calmy-Rey had advocated dialogue with Usama bin \ Laden, prompting a brief frenzy of criticism in the Swiss \ media and an August 26 press release by the DFA emphasizing \ that Calmy-Rey's question was rhetorical, that she had not \ promoted nor proposed dialogue with bin Laden, and that "in \ practice there is no question of the DFA proposing a dialogue \ with Usama bin Laden." Swiss press commentators generally \ accepted the clarification, but some argued that the Foreign \ Minister unnecessarily had risked creating misunderstanding \ on a very sensitive topic. \ \ -------------- \ \ BERN 00000443 002 OF 003 \ \ \ Diplomatic Engineering \ -------------- \ \ ¶5. (SBU) Calmy-Rey used the term "diplomatic engineering" in \ describing her vision of Switzerland facilitating dialogue on \ difficult subjects with ideas, in addition to logistical and \ other material support. She claimed that the "freeze for \ freeze" concept in the context of the P5 1 offer to Iran was \ a result of just this kind of engagement. Even while lauding \ Swiss diplomacy, Calmy-Rey said more needs to be done to \ develop Swiss competencies with a view to making and managing \ "diplomatic engineering" as a Swiss "trademark." At the same \ time, she assessed that Switzerland's lack of EU membership \ and the Swiss form of government -- which lacks a unitary \ Executive -- make Swiss international engagement more \ difficult. \ \ -------------- \ Iran, P5 1, and the EGL Gas Deal \ -------------- \ \ ¶6. (C) At several points in her August 25 speech, Calmy-Rey \ sought to justify the approach she has taken to the Iran \ nuclear problem. In this context, she said that Switzerland \ "is in close contact with the P5 1 and other important actors \ and had calibrated suggestions that made possible for all \ sides to come closer together and to save face." She claimed \ that the "freeze for freeze" concept was a suggestion made by \ Switzerland to "find a way to get the blocked talks between \ Iran and the (P5 1) back in gear and into substantive \ political negotiations." Calmy-Rey claimed that "we were \ always transparent with all partners and have in no case \ undermined agreed international measures -- to the contrary." \ \ ¶7. (C) Calmy-Rey also used this opportunity to seek to defend \ her support for the Swiss firm EGL's billion dollar gas deal \ with Iran. She once again argued that the deal is in \ Switzerland's national interest and something that "hardly \ would have been possible" without the diplomatic contacts the \ DFA had developed with Iran in the course of its "dialogue" \ on the nuclear issue. Referring to criticism that her \ support for the deal had damaged Swiss-U.S. relations, \ Calmy-Rey said that "the United States questioned our support \ for the gas delivery agreement signed by EGL, but we have \ good and constructive relations with the United States -- \ contacts were never so numerous as now." \ \ -------------- \ Calmy-Rey on Defense \ -------------- \ \ ¶8. (C) Though she remains very popular in her Swiss Socialist \ Party and with others on the Swiss Left, Calmy-Rey has faced \ a steady drumbeat of criticism in much of the Swiss press \ this year, not least because of her very damaging trip to \ Tehran in March in support of the EGL deal. More recently, \ allegations by Colombian officials that a DFA envoy acted \ sympathetically to the FARC have kept her on the defensive, \ as has, to a lesser degree, criticism that the ongoing crisis \ in Georgia is a "boomerang effect" of recognizing Kosovo \ independence, which Calmy-Rey strongly advocated. The \ rightist Swiss People's Party (SVP),having gone into \ parliamentary opposition and no longer feeling bound by Swiss \ government tradition of "collegiality", has maintained the \ most vociferous criticism. That said, the SVP is by no means \ alone, with commentators from the Swiss political middle \ frequently lamenting Calmy-Rey's often high-profile approach \ to sensitive issues. Responding to such critics, Calmy-Rey \ asserted in her August 25 speech that "we were never a land \ of courtly secret diplomacy -- transparency and \ predictability of our foreign policy are the core of our \ credibility." \ \ ¶9. (C) Regarding the Iran/nuclear issue, Calmy-Rey also has \ felt renewed pressure to clarify her stance in the wake of an \ August 20 press conference in which Swiss President Couchepin \ said that Switzerland supports the P5 1 initiative and added \ that the Federal Council had decided that Switzerland will \ not undertake its own initiatives in this area. In an \ interview with the "Neue Zuercher Zeitung" published August \ 23, Calmy-Rey was asked about Couchepin's comments and \ responded that Switzerland had not launched its own \ \ BERN 00000443 003.2 OF 003 \ \ \ initiative, but had offered "diplomatic engineering" \ (including the idea of "freeze for freeze") that had resulted \ in the July "Geneva Talks" that the P5 1 and Iran had asked \ the Swiss to host. She further said that the Federal Council \ "had good reason to be cautious," since Switzerland seldom is \ engaged in international security policy matters of such high \ importance. Calmy-Rey added that the Federal Council had \ feared that Swiss involvement in the issue could damage Swiss \ relations with other states, but argued that the "Geneva \ Talks" had "shown that not to be the case." \ CARTER \ Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO4059\ OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR\ DE RUEHSW #0443/01 2411509\ ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZDK\ O 281509Z AUG 08\ FM AMEMBASSY BERN\ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5286\ INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\ RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0575\ RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0049\ RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 1226\ RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0112\ RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0014\ RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1136 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERN 000443 \ \ SIPDIS \ \ DEPT FOR P (R.RANGASWAMY),EUR/CE (Y.SAINT-ANDRE),EB, AND \ NEA/IR (H.WOOSTER) \ \ E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018 \ TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP PTER SZ SUBJECT: FM CALMY-REY SAYS DIALOGUE AND "DIPLOMATIC \ ENGINEERING" ARE CHIEF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS \ \ BERN 00000443 001.2 OF 003 \ \ \ Classified By: POL/E Counselor Richard A. Rorvig; reason 1.4(d). \ \ ¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 25 address to senior Swiss \ diplomats, FM Calmy-Rey extolled dialogue and facilitation as \ chief Swiss foreign policy instruments. She used the term \ "diplomatic engineering" in describing her vision of \ Switzerland facilitating dialogue on difficult subjects. A \ rhetorical question Calmy-Rey posed in the course of her \ speech was incorrectly spun in some international and Swiss \ press as allegedly advocating dialogue with Usama bin Laden. \ In response to these reports, the Department of Foreign \ Affairs (DFA) released a press statement emphasizing that \ Calmy-Rey did not propose or support such a dialogue. At \ several points in her August 25 speech, Calmy-Rey sought to \ justify the approach she has taken to the Iran nuclear \ problem. She claimed that the "freeze for freeze" concept \ was a suggestion made by Switzerland to "find a way to get \ the blocked talks between Iran and the (P5 1) back in gear \ and into substantive political negotiations." She once again \ argued that the EGL gas deal is in Switzerland's national \ interest and said that it "hardly would have been possible" \ without the diplomatic contacts the DFA had developed with \ Iran in the course of its "dialogue" on the nuclear issue. \ Though she remains very popular with the Swiss Left, \ Calmy-Rey has faced a steady drumbeat of criticism in much of \ the Swiss press this year, not least because of her very \ damaging trip to Tehran in March in support of the EGL deal. \ Calmy-Rey also has felt pressure to clarify her stance on the \ Iran/nuclear issue in the wake of an August 20 press \ conference in which Swiss President Couchepin stated that the \ Federal Council supports the P5 1 initiative and had decided \ that Switzerland will not undertake its own initiatives in \ this area. End Summary. \ \ -------------- \ Annual Gathering of Senior Swiss Diplomats \ -------------- \ \ ¶2. (SBU) In an August 25 address to 170 senior Swiss \ diplomats gathered in Bern for the Department of Foreign \ Affairs (DFA) annual ambassadors/CGs conference, FM Calmy-Rey \ extolled dialogue and facilitation ("diplomatic engineering") \ as chief Swiss foreign policy instruments. Calmy-Rey \ appeared to use the occasion to rebut continuing criticism -- \ primarily from Swiss conservatives -- of her often \ high-profile approach to sensitive issues. While conceding \ some limits to the prospects for dialogue, she argued that \ Switzerland's willingness to talk, for example, with \ Hizballah, Hamas, FARC, and the LTTE, was intended to draw \ them into political solutions without legitimizing such \ groups' terrorist methods that Switzerland condemns. \ \ -------------- \ Press Flap over Reference to Usama bin Laden \ -------------- \ \ ¶3. (U) In her opening remarks, Calmy-Rey asserted that Swiss \ domestic press commentary seems dominated by "moralists" \ advocating strict isolation of problematic state and \ non-state actors. She asked rhetorically, "should we listen \ to these moralists? And, if not, should we seek dialogue \ without discrimination, even if that means sitting at a table \ with Usama bin Laden?" Calmy-Rey did not answer the question \ explicitly in the course of her speech, but instead argued \ that in each case the prospects for dialogue need to be \ carefully reviewed. She maintained that dialogue most of the \ time is better than isolation, but does not mean "accepting \ the unacceptable." \ \ ¶4. (U) French daily "Le Monde" subsequently incorrectly \ reported that Calmy-Rey had advocated dialogue with Usama bin \ Laden, prompting a brief frenzy of criticism in the Swiss \ media and an August 26 press release by the DFA emphasizing \ that Calmy-Rey's question was rhetorical, that she had not \ promoted nor proposed dialogue with bin Laden, and that "in \ practice there is no question of the DFA proposing a dialogue \ with Usama bin Laden." Swiss press commentators generally \ accepted the clarification, but some argued that the Foreign \ Minister unnecessarily had risked creating misunderstanding \ on a very sensitive topic. \ \ -------------- \ \ BERN 00000443 002 OF 003 \ \ \ Diplomatic Engineering \ -------------- \ \ ¶5. (SBU) Calmy-Rey used the term "diplomatic engineering" in \ describing her vision of Switzerland facilitating dialogue on \ difficult subjects with ideas, in addition to logistical and \ other material support. She claimed that the "freeze for \ freeze" concept in the context of the P5 1 offer to Iran was \ a result of just this kind of engagement. Even while lauding \ Swiss diplomacy, Calmy-Rey said more needs to be done to \ develop Swiss competencies with a view to making and managing \ "diplomatic engineering" as a Swiss "trademark." At the same \ time, she assessed that Switzerland's lack of EU membership \ and the Swiss form of government -- which lacks a unitary \ Executive -- make Swiss international engagement more \ difficult. \ \ -------------- \ Iran, P5 1, and the EGL Gas Deal \ -------------- \ \ ¶6. (C) At several points in her August 25 speech, Calmy-Rey \ sought to justify the approach she has taken to the Iran \ nuclear problem. In this context, she said that Switzerland \ "is in close contact with the P5 1 and other important actors \ and had calibrated suggestions that made possible for all \ sides to come closer together and to save face." She claimed \ that the "freeze for freeze" concept was a suggestion made by \ Switzerland to "find a way to get the blocked talks between \ Iran and the (P5 1) back in gear and into substantive \ political negotiations." Calmy-Rey claimed that "we were \ always transparent with all partners and have in no case \ undermined agreed international measures -- to the contrary." \ \ ¶7. (C) Calmy-Rey also used this opportunity to seek to defend \ her support for the Swiss firm EGL's billion dollar gas deal \ with Iran. She once again argued that the deal is in \ Switzerland's national interest and something that "hardly \ would have been possible" without the diplomatic contacts the \ DFA had developed with Iran in the course of its "dialogue" \ on the nuclear issue. Referring to criticism that her \ support for the deal had damaged Swiss-U.S. relations, \ Calmy-Rey said that "the United States questioned our support \ for the gas delivery agreement signed by EGL, but we have \ good and constructive relations with the United States -- \ contacts were never so numerous as now." \ \ -------------- \ Calmy-Rey on Defense \ -------------- \ \ ¶8. (C) Though she remains very popular in her Swiss Socialist \ Party and with others on the Swiss Left, Calmy-Rey has faced \ a steady drumbeat of criticism in much of the Swiss press \ this year, not least because of her very damaging trip to \ Tehran in March in support of the EGL deal. More recently, \ allegations by Colombian officials that a DFA envoy acted \ sympathetically to the FARC have kept her on the defensive, \ as has, to a lesser degree, criticism that the ongoing crisis \ in Georgia is a "boomerang effect" of recognizing Kosovo \ independence, which Calmy-Rey strongly advocated. The \ rightist Swiss People's Party (SVP),having gone into \ parliamentary opposition and no longer feeling bound by Swiss \ government tradition of "collegiality", has maintained the \ most vociferous criticism. That said, the SVP is by no means \ alone, with commentators from the Swiss political middle \ frequently lamenting Calmy-Rey's often high-profile approach \ to sensitive issues. Responding to such critics, Calmy-Rey \ asserted in her August 25 speech that "we were never a land \ of courtly secret diplomacy -- transparency and \ predictability of our foreign policy are the core of our \ credibility." \ \ ¶9. (C) Regarding the Iran/nuclear issue, Calmy-Rey also has \ felt renewed pressure to clarify her stance in the wake of an \ August 20 press conference in which Swiss President Couchepin \ said that Switzerland supports the P5 1 initiative and added \ that the Federal Council had decided that Switzerland will \ not undertake its own initiatives in this area. In an \ interview with the "Neue Zuercher Zeitung" published August \ 23, Calmy-Rey was asked about Couchepin's comments and \ responded that Switzerland had not launched its own \ \ BERN 00000443 003.2 OF 003 \ \ \ initiative, but had offered "diplomatic engineering" \ (including the idea of "freeze for freeze") that had resulted \ in the July "Geneva Talks" that the P5 1 and Iran had asked \ the Swiss to host. She further said that the Federal Council \ "had good reason to be cautious," since Switzerland seldom is \ engaged in international security policy matters of such high \ importance. Calmy-Rey added that the Federal Council had \ feared that Swiss involvement in the issue could damage Swiss \ relations with other states, but argued that the "Geneva \ Talks" had "shown that not to be the case." \ CARTER \