Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BERLIN906
2008-07-10 10:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

JUNE 30 GROUP OF FRIENDS MEETING: AD REF AGREEMENT

Tags:  PREL PGOV NATO MARR EUN RS ZJ GG 
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VZCZCXRO3642
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0906/01 1921024
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101024Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1623
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000906 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MARR EUN RS ZJ GG
SUBJECT: JUNE 30 GROUP OF FRIENDS MEETING: AD REF AGREEMENT
ON THREE-PHASE PLAN FOR RESOLVING ABKHAZIA CONFLICT

REF: BERLIN 811

Classified By: DCM JOHN KOENIG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000906 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MARR EUN RS ZJ GG SUBJECT: JUNE 30 GROUP OF FRIENDS MEETING: AD REF AGREEMENT ON THREE-PHASE PLAN FOR RESOLVING ABKHAZIA CONFLICT REF: BERLIN 811 Classified By: DCM JOHN KOENIG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a June 30 meeting in Berlin, the Friends of the Secretary General on Georgia agreed ad ref to a three-phase approach for the settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia. The resulting document is far less detailed and prescriptive than the original German draft, proposed on June 12, especially for phases 2 (confidence building) and 3 (political settlement). In an unprecedented demonstration of interest, German Foreign Minister Steinmeier dropped by the meeting to urge the participants to show that the Group of Friends is up to the challenge of helping the Georgians and Abkhaz get out of their "escalation spiral," and to express the German Government's full political support for the Friends' effort. The German chair pressed for concurrence from capitals with the ad ref text as soon as possible so that the approach can be formally presented to and adopted by the Georgians and Abkhaz before the summer break. The Russian representative downplayed the need to act urgently and indicated that Moscow may not be prepared to give its blessing until after a planned meeting between Medvedev and Saakashvili in September. The German chair countered that the Group of Friends was "down to its last bullet" and had to show that it was still relevant in helping to resolve the Abkhazia conflict. He warned that if the Friends did not act, "other formats" -- such as the New Group of Friends, which does not include Russia -- would come to the fore. END SUMMARY. Participants -------------- ¶2. (C) Germany hosted a meeting of the Friends of the Secretary General on Georgia in Berlin June 30, chaired by German Special Envoy for Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia Hans-Dieter Lucas. France was represented by Deputy Director of the MFA Political Affairs and Security Directorate Veronique Bujon-Barre; the UK, by Special Representative for the South Caucasus Sir Brian Fall; Russia, by Director of the MFA Fourth Department of CIS States Andrey Kelin; and the U.S., by EUR DAS Matt Bryza. Also attending was UN SRSG Jean Arnault. Ad Ref Agreement on German Non-Paper -------------- ¶3. (C) The June 30 meeting was devoted to a line-by-line review of a revised
version of the German non-paper tabled at the June 12 Friends meeting (reftel),which outlines a three-phase approach for the peaceful settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia. Although Kelin (Russia) claimed to have instructions on only phase 1 on the non-paper, the German chair (Lucas) prevailed upon him to allow the group to review and reach ad ref agreement on the entire document. ¶4. (C) While the amended non-paper retains the basic three-phase structure (phase 1: guaranteeing security and the return of Georgian IDPs, phase 2: confidence building, phase 3: political status),it was significantly shortened during extensive editing. The ad ref document is far less detailed and prescriptive than the original German draft, especially for phases 2 and 3. The core element of the non-paper is the exchange of declarations on the non-use of force and IDP returns and the establishment of a framework for direct high-level dialogue between Georgia and the Abkhaz. SRSG Arnault expressed confidence that both parties would see the document as suiting their purposes. The Abkhaz should like it because it deals with security and practical cooperation first, which they favor, while deferring status. The Georgians should like it because it begins with the return of IDPs and slowly, but surely, leads to status. Personal Appeal by FM Steinmeier -------------- ¶5. (C) In an unprecedented demonstration of interest in this process, German Foreign Minister Steinmeier dropped by at the beginning of the meeting to urge the participants to show that the Group of Friends is up to the challenge of helping the Georgians and Abkhaz get out of the "escalation spiral" in which they find themselves. He noted that it had taken joint high-level efforts just a few weeks before to head off a threatened declaration by Georgia to demand the withdrawal of CIS peacekeepers. Stressing that the deadlock between the parties had been allowed to drag on dangerously long, Steinmeier called on the Friends to agree and present their common approach to the Georgians and Abkhaz before the summer break. Steinmeier expressed the German Government's full political support for the UN Friends' effort to launch a new mediation process for the Abkhazian conflict. BERLIN 00000906 002 OF 002 Next Steps -------------- ¶6. (C) At the conclusion of the negotiating session, Lucas encouraged all the Friends to seek concurrence from capitals with the ad ref text as soon as possible. He was prepared to call another Friends meeting at short notice if necessary to finalize the paper, but was hopeful that this could be done by e-mail. He said that once all the Friends were on board, the next step would be for SRSG Arnault and German Ambassador to Georgia Patricia Flor to brief the two parties on the document and secure their agreement. Finally, there would be a Friends meeting with the Georgians and the Abkhaz to formally adopt the approach laid out in the paper, hopefully before the summer break. Fall (UK) stressed that it was important to get agreement of the parties on the document before the final meeting so that the meeting focused on implementation rather than on drafting. SRSG Arnault underscored that in planning next steps, it was important to keep in mind that only President Saakashvili himself could agree to the paper on Georgia's behalf. Germany Pushes Russia for Quick Agreement -------------- ¶7. (C) Kelin (Russia) emphasized that he had instructions only for phase 1 of the document and that he still needed Moscow's views on phases 2 and 3. He thought there was a good chance that there would be no movement on this score from the Kremlin until after a planned meeting between Medvedev and Saakashvili in early September. In reaction to Lucas's entreaties that time was of the essence, Kelin expressed the view that media reports about problems on the ground in Abkhazia were exaggerated and that the situation was not as urgent as commonly believed. Lucas countered that the Group of Friends was "down to its last bullet" and had to show that it was still relevant in helping to resolve the Abkhazia conflict. He said that the Friends had received a "clear signal" from the Abkhaz that they were on board with the proposed approach. Therefore, there was no reason for delay. He noted that if the Friends did not act, "other formats" -- which do not include Russia -- would come to the fore (a clear reference to the ministerial meeting of the "New Friends of Georgia" on June 25 in Warsaw). While SRSG Arnault downplayed this possibility, noting that these other formats would never find favor with the Abkhaz, he agreed that delay threatened to "deepen the crisis." Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Germany is clearly feeling pressure to produce as coordinator for the Group of Friends (especially given the efforts of the "New Friends") and seems prepared to press the Russians at a high level to achieve a quick turnaround on the ad ref text. The active involvement of both Chancellor Merkel and FM Steinmeier is a very positive sign that the Germans are truly committed to achieving a breakthrough after years of deadlock. The Germans also seem to have come around to the U.S. view that the most important thing is to get direct, high-level dialogue between the parties under way as soon as possible and not to be too prescriptive about how this is done or what subjects are discussed. TIMKEN JR

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