C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000811

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MARR EUN RS ZJ GG
SUBJECT: JUNE 12 MEETING IN BERLIN OF THE WESTERN FRIENDS
OF GEORGIA

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JEFFREY RATHKE FOR REASON 1
.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The June 12 meeting of the Western Friends of
Georgia focused mainly on a German-drafted non-paper, which
proposes a three-stage plan for the peaceful settlement of
the conflict in Abkhazia, beginning with security and
confidence building measures (CBMs), including declarations
of non-use of force by both sides. EUR DAS Bryza emphasized
that it would not be helpful to get "bogged down" discussing
CBMs that neither party particularly cared about in the first
phase of the talks. Bryza also suggested making the
non-paper less detailed and less prescriptive, noting that
the Friends should not dictate to the two parties what they
should discuss and in what sequence. German Special Envoy
Lucas admitted that SRSG Arnault had similarly criticized the
non-paper's top-down approach. Lucas' counterpart at the
Chancellery agreed that the non-paper was "a bit heavy" and
rigid, but said the MFA had been very stubborn about changing
it. In the context of avoiding a Georgian demand for the
withdrawal of CIS peacekeepers, Bryza emphasized the
importance of offering the Georgians something concrete to
challenge the current Russian monopoly on security in
Abkhazia, such as an international police presence. However,
no one was optimistic about the EU or any other international
organization taking up the task. The June 12 meeting was
supposed to be followed on June 13 by a full-fledged Friends
of Georgia meeting, but the Russians pulled out at the last
minute, much to the irritation of Chancellor Merkel, who
personally solicited and received a commitment from President
Medvedev during his June 5 visit to Berlin to send Russian
representatives. END SUMMARY.

Only the Western Friends
--------------


2. (C) Germany hosted a Western Friends of Georgia meeting in
Berlin June 12. Plans for a full Friends of Georgia meeting

on June 13 did not come to pass after the Russians decided to
pull out, ostensibly to wait for the results of the June 16
Georgia/Abkhaz meeting in Stockholm. The June 12 Friends of
Georgia meeting was chaired by German Special Envoy for
Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia Hans-Dieter Lucas.
Also attending on the German side were MFA Office Director
for Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus Johannes
Regenbrecht, Deputy Office Director Christoph Reztlaff, and
UN Security Council desk officer Mirko Schilbach. Attending
on behalf of France were Veronique Bujon-Barre and Jay
Dharmadhikari and from the UK, Sir Brian Fall and Louise
Saville. Representing the U.S. were EUR DAS Matt Bryza and
EUR CARC Conflicts Advisor Michael Carpenter.

German Non-Paper
--------------


3. (C) Discussion focused mostly on a German MFA non-paper,
which outlines a three-staged approach for the peaceful
settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia. Hans-Dieter
Lucas reviewed the paper, emphasizing his view that it was
important to put off the status question until the end of the
process (stage three) and to begin instead with security and
confidence building measures, particularly declarations of
non-use of force by both sides. While the German paper
calls for adapting the format of the CIS peacekeeping mission
from "peacekeeping" to "peacemaking," it does not address the
critical Georgian concern of Russia's military posture in the
region.


4. (C) Bryza told Lucas it would not be helpful to get
"bogged down" discussing CBMs that neither side particularly
cared about in the first phase of the talks, since this is
exactly why the UN Friends process had made so little
progress during the last few years. He noted that it would
make the Georgians nervous if the core issues -- i.e., IDP
returns and political settlement -- were put off. Pointing
out that the Georgians and Abkhaz are already talking
directly with each other on the basis of a March 28 Georgian
peace plan (and were concretely discussing a Georgian
non-use-of-force pledge in return for an Abkhaz agreement on
Georgian IDP returns), Bryza said the Friends should not
dictate to the two parties what they should discuss and in
what sequence. Bryza argued that having a firm conception
of a political settlement that elaborates the future status
of Abkhazia and spells out the constitutional guarantees for
military, political, economic, and cultural security for the
Abkhaz is critical to getting the sides to the table in the
first place.


5. (C) Lucas said he had shared the paper with UN Special
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for Abkhazia,
Jean Arnault, who had criticized the paper for its top-down
approach, in which the Friends seemed to be dictating a

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solution to the sides. Lucas in turn criticized Arnault for
being in a "pessimistic mood" and for not fully supporting
the German plan. He said he would discuss it with him in
greater detail during Arnault's trip to Berlin on June 16.

Putting the Permanent Steering Committee on "Steroids"
-------------- --------------


6. (C) The German non-paper calls for the establishment of a
permanent steering committee to "restart and to
institutionalize a framework for direct political dialogue
between the parties." There was agreement that the committee
should be composed of representatives from capitals rather
than local ambassadors to ensure that it had enough influence
to facilitate dialogue. Bryza called for putting the
committee on "steroids," and suggested the creation of
several working groups to focus on different aspects of the
peace settlement: security, political, and economic.

Sharing the Non-Paper
--------------


7. (C) There was some back-and-forth over how the German
non-paper should be shared with the Georgians and Russians.
Bryza pushed for at least orally briefing the Georgians on
the paper before giving it to the Russians, otherwise it
would be "dead on arrival." Lucas countered that if the
Russians thought the paper had been coordinated with the
Georgians before being shared with them, it would also be
DOA. Lucas agreed to have the German Ambassador in Tbilisi,
Patricia Flor, brief the Georgians on the non-paper before
sharing it with the Russians.

Avoiding a Demand for Withdrawal of CIS Peacekeepers
-------------- --------------


8. (C) There was agreement that the main goal at this point
was to avoid a Georgian declaration demanding a withdrawal of
the CIS peacekeepers. There was also agreement that the key
to keeping the Georgians from issuing such a declaration was
to show the Georgians solidarity by protesting the Russian
deployment of additional peacekeeping forces and railway
troops as unacceptable. Bryza pressed further steps on this
issue, saying a Georgian declaration was inevitable unless
the Georgians could be offered something concrete to
challenge the current Russian monopoly on security in
Abkhazia, such as an international police presence from the
UN, EU or some other international organization. The French
rep almost completely ruled out an EU police presence, saying
this should not even be suggested to the Georgians. In a
pre-meeting bilateral, Lucas objected to letting Georgia
"blackmail" the Friends into meeting its demands by holding
the threat of a declaration over their heads. He seemed
more concerned that Russia had not come to the Group of
Friends meeting in Berlin, however, than with Russian combat
troop deployments to Abkhazia.

Chancellery Views on Abkhazia
--------------


9. (C) After the Friends of Georgia meeting, Byrza met with
both Chancellery Director for Eastern Europe, Central Asia
and the Caucasus Norman Walter and Deputy National Security
Advisor Rolf Nikel in succession, emphasizing that President
Bush was personally engaged on the Abkhazia issue and that it
was one of the top priorities in the U.S. bilateral
relationship with Russia. Walter reported that the Georgian
ambassador had just been at the Chancellery to get a read-out
on the Bush-Merkel discussions at Meseberg. The ambassador
had claimed that a Georgian decision on canceling the
peacekeeping agreement in Abkhazia had already been taken --
it was only a matter of when, not if, it would be announced.
Walter said that Heusgen had called the Georgian FM the day
before, pleading that the Georgians not do "anything foolish"
and pointing out that the international community was coming
up with some ideas on how to address Georgian concerns.


10. (C) Bryza emphasized that the Georgians had been very
restrained up to now. Two weeks ago, they had offered to
issue a non-use-of-force declaration if the Russians agreed
to withdraw the paratroopers and to consult with Georgia on
implementation of the April 16 Russian presidential
instructions on relations with Abkhazia. The Russians had
reacted by deploying the railroad troops. Bryza noted that
he himself had just been talking to the Georgian FM before
the meeting. He noted that she had claimed to be under
instructions to make the declaration no later than June 16
and did not leave much hope that this could be delayed. Bryza
stressed, as he had during the Friends of Georgia meeting,
that it was important to offer the Georgians something
concrete to challenge the Russian monopoly on security in
Abkhazia, such as an international police force. Walter

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responded that no one in Europe was on board for an EU
mission. Even if there was the political will to deploy such
a force, it would take six months to implement. Nikel was
equally dismissive of getting any organization to do a police
mission in Abkhazia, arguing that what was needed there were
peacekeeping forces.

Chancellery Distances Itself from German Non-Paper
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Bryza said that without some kind of concrete
gesture, it was unrealistic to expect the Georgians to simply
announce the non-use of force, as proposed in the German MFA
non-paper. Walter agreed that the paper was "a bit heavy"
and that it was perhaps unrealistic to begin with CBMs. Why
not begin with some of the elements in phase two (IDPs,
economic development, etc.)? Walter noted that he had not
seen the German MFA paper himself until two days before and
that the MFA was very "stubborn" about changing it. He said
that Lucas had reported to him that the paper had been
essentially endorsed as is by the Western Friends that
morning. Bryza countered that this was, in fact, not the
case, reiterating his concerns about the paper being too
detailed and not sensitive enough to the fact that this had
to be a Georgia-Abkhaz process and not imposed from the
outside. Both agreed that it would be helpful if Bryza
called Lucas to reinforce the U.S. points on the paper,
without making reference to his conversation with Walter.

Chancellor Unhappy with Russian Absence
--------------


12. (C) Walter recounted how the Chancellor, during
Medvedev's June 5 visit to Berlin, had spent 15 minutes
making the case for Russia to participate in the June 12
Friends of Georgia meeting in Berlin. Medvedev had been
dubious, but in the end, had agreed to send representatives
to a meeting on June 13 "if this is so important to you."
Walter said the fact that the Russians had been no-shows
really grated the Chancellor. In stark contrast to his MFA
counterpart (Lucas), Walter was notably dismissive of the
Russians' excuses for not attending.
TIMKEN JR